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Abstract  
This paper-based thesis consists of five interlinked chapters/articles that explore 
dimensions of both the style of governance and the state-building endeavour in the 
West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, primarily between 2007 and 2013. 
This governance and state-building project came to be known as the Fayyadist 
paradigm, or Fayyadism, in reference to the former Palestinian Prime Minister of the 
Palestinian Authority, Salam Fayyad. The thesis examines the transformations that 
occurred under Fayyadism in the two spheres of security and economy, and 
elucidates their consequences on the people’s security and well-being, as well as the 
broader dynamics of resistance against the Israeli military occupation and settler-
colonialism. Therefore, the primary contribution of this thesis is empirical and 
ethnographic in nature.  
This thesis examines the transformations in the security sphere at three levels. First, 
to historicise Fayyadism, the thesis contextually analyses the evolution of Palestinian 
security forces and reforms over the past two decades. Second, the thesis unpacks 
and critically assesses perceptions about the Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on the 
findings of an ethnographic fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the 
occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the 
associated relevant literatures. Third, this thesis investigates in-depth the security 
campaigns to induce “law and order” as a defining feature of the Fayyadist 
paradigm, and through a bottom-up ethnographic approach, analyses the 
consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on the people’s security in Balata and 
Jenin refugee camps and on the broader dynamics of resistance against Israel. 
This thesis examines and analyses the transformations in the economic sphere at two 
levels. It addresses the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid industry through 
an aid-dependency lens to examine whether the transformations that occurred under 
the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall framework of 
the aid industry. It also utilises theories of contentious politics to analyse the 
implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic model and the 
authoritarian transformations it induced, and also to expand the conceptual 
underpinnings of the contentious politics theories through proposing the notions of 
contentious economics and resistance economy.     
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Introduction 
This paper-based thesis consists of five chapters/articles that address the overarching 
themes of governance and state-building.
1
 It explores dimensions of both the style of 
governance and the state-building endeavour in the West Bank in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (OPT), primarily between 2007 and 2013. This contemporary 
governance and state-building project came to be known as the Fayyadist paradigm, 
or Fayyadism, in reference to the former Palestinian Prime Minister of the 
Palestinian Authority, Salam Fayyad. In particular, this thesis examines the shifts 
and transformations that occurred under Fayyadism in the two spheres of security 
and economy, and elucidates their consequences and implications on the people’s 
security and well-being, as well as the broader dynamics of resistance against the 
Israeli military occupation and settler-colonialism. 
Even though Fayyadism is both externally funded and internationally sponsored, and 
thus deeply influenced by donors’ prescriptions and funds, it is a home-grown state-
building and governance paradigm. The main tenets of Fayyadism aimed at 
establishing a Weberian monopoly of violence in the security sphere and a post-
Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda in the economic sphere, despite the Israeli 
occupation and intra-Palestinian fragmentation. The Palestinian Authority (PA), 
Israel, and the international donors’ community sought state-building and good 
governance through four pillars: reform of the security sector and the enforcement of 
the rule of law; the building of accountable PA institutions; the provision of effective 
public service delivery; and, economic growth led by the private sector in an open 
and free market economy. Through these policies a “new” West Bank reportedly 
emerged; the “Bantustan” was thus transformed, at least in rhetoric, to a functioning 
state. In August 2011, Fayyad announced that the “West Bank is already a state in all 
but name”. In November 2012, Palestine was offered a non-member observer state 
status in the United Nations. Examining the consequences of these transformations is 
the broad objective of this thesis. 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the thesis, I use the term Chapter to refer to the articles/papers to be in conformity with 
the PhD submission regulation at LSE. The articles/chapters of this thesis are interlinked and 
organically connected, but it remains a paper-based PhD thesis.  
Introduction 
Therefore, on one hand, this thesis examines and analyses the transformations in the 
security sphere at three levels. First, and in order to historicise the Fayyadist 
paradigm, it traces and contextually analyses the evolution and reform processes of 
the Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 
1993 until the era of Fayyadism through to 2013. Second, it unpacks and critically 
assesses the Fayyadist paradigm itself by drawing on the findings of an ethnographic 
fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely 
Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the associated relevant literatures. This 
allowed an investigation into whether there is a gap between the rhetoric from the 
top and the reality from below in relation to the Fayyadist paradigm and the 
consequences of its policies. By comparing the different perceptions about the 
Fayyadist paradigm and contrasting them with the voices coming from the 
Palestinian people, the voices below, this thesis examines whether the proclaimed 
institutional successes of Fayyadism were reflected positively in the everyday lives 
of the people, or whether the reform project had detrimental effects on their security, 
well-being, and their ability to resist the occupation -which remains the main source 
of their insecurity. Third, by taking an ethnographic bottom-up methodological 
approach, and looking at Jenin and Balata refugee camps, this thesis further 
examines the security reform pillar of the Fayyadist paradigm. It does so by 
examining and analysing the consequences of the Fayyadist security campaigns, 
designed to induce ‘law and order’, on the security of the Palestinian people, as well 
as the broader dynamics of resistance against Israeli occupation. The authoritarian 
transformations of the Palestinian Authority and the criminalisation of resistance 
against Israeli occupation were the two main themes that emerged from the 
ethnographic data; both illustrate the consequences of the enhanced functionality of 
the Palestinian statutory security forces, and the Fayyadist reforms in general. 
On the other hand, this thesis examines and analyses the political economy 
transformations in the economic sphere at two levels: the international aid industry, 
and the implications of the neoliberal economic model adopted by the Fayyadist 
paradigm. This thesis addresses the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid 
industry through an aid-dependency lens. The dependency of the Fayyadist paradigm 
on donors’ aid and policy prescriptions was manifested by the dominance of the 
donors’ instrumentalist framework on the aid industry, and also by the fact that the 
Introduction 
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Palestinian Authority received more aid money specifically allocated for the 
Fayyadism state-building project (in comparison with the total aid received between 
1993 and 2006). The investment of donors in Fayyadism essentially characterised the 
paradigm and by extension stripped it of its local legitimacy, ownership, and 
accountability. Therefore, this thesis explores the domination of instrumentalists, the 
failing patterns of neoliberal aid, and the preoccupation of donors with an 
‘Investment in Peace’ framework; all of which consequently meant that Fayyadism 
failed to change any of these stated dynamics, and also that it further entrenched 
neoliberal approaches that sustained the status of aid-dependency. The discussion on 
aid is highly relevant not only because of the attached political, security, and 
governance reform conditionalities associated with it, but also because the figures 
are striking; Palestinians have received US$ 24.6 billion of aid over the last two 
decades, which made them one of the highest per capita recipients of non-military 
aid in the world. In the post-Arafat era (2004 onwards), aid represented between 
24% and 42% of the Palestinian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the per capita 
aid averaged around US$530 per year (OECD-DAC 2014). 
Finally, this thesis utilises theories of contentious politics to analyse the implications 
of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic model and the authoritarian 
transformations it induced. These implications are explored by addressing the roots 
and sources of the emerged cycles of contention and contentious collective actions in 
the West Bank during the Fayyadism era, and particularly in the aftermath of the 
post-2011 Arab uprisings. The examination investigates whether the cycles of 
contention transformed into social movements for political and economic rights 
under the Fayyadist paradigm. Additionally, and inspired by the empirical and 
ethnographic evidence of this research, this thesis attempts to expand the conceptual 
framework of the theories of contentious politics by engaging with the notion of 
contentious economics proposed by this research, based on the Palestinian 
indigenous notion of resistance economy.     
In sum, the core unit of analysis is the Fayyadist paradigm, and each chapter is 
devoted to addressing one aspect of it: the first chapter is concerned with 
contextualizing Fayyadism; the second chapter focuses on understanding the 
paradigm itself; the third chapter examines the consequences of Fayyadism on the 
Introduction 
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security of the Palestinian people; the fourth chapter critically examines the role of 
international donors and the aid industry in its policies; and the fifth and final chapter 
analyses the implications of Fayyadism’s neoliberal economic model through the 
application of a contentious politics and economics framework.  
A Brief History of the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in the 1964 Arab 
League Cairo summit and was recognized by the international community, including 
the UN, at the Arab League Rabat summit in 1974, as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people living inside and outside Palestine. It was a 
revolutionary and political-military body that believed in the liberation of the 
historical Palestine. Yasir Arafat, who became the president of the PA, served as the 
chairman of the PLO from 1969 until his death in 2004. Over the years, the PLO’s 
character and tools for struggle (Al-Nidal) witnessed remarkable changes. One major 
change was the move away from the liberation of historical Palestine as an 
overarching goal and military resistance as a tool, towards the acceptance of a future 
Palestinian state on 1967 borders, recognition of the Israeli state, and the acceptance 
of peace negotiations. It led to the signing of Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 which 
resulted in the establishment of an interim self-governing authority, called the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Hence, the PA was an outcome not only of the peace 
accords, but also of the changes in the PLO.
2
   
The PA is an administrative and executive authority created to govern parts of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) (areas A and B
3
); build institutions for the 
promised state in 1999; provide public services; guarantee Israeli security; allocate 
aid to sustain peace, and pursue the final status negotiations (Khan et al.2004). 
However, the PA has limited powers because of the constraints of the Oslo Accords; 
it does not have any sovereignty or control over borders or resources; it can’t design 
                                                          
2
 Figure.14 in the appendix depicts the structures of the PLO and PA as of today (PASSIA 2014). 
3
 According to Oslo Accords, Area A is under the civilian and security control of the PA, while area B 
is under civilian control only. The total governed area by the PA is 29% of the West Bank and 70% of 
Gaza Strip. This classification became less relevant after 2002 when Israel re-occupies the West Bank 
and unilaterally disengages from Gaza Strip in 2005. Today the PA has territorial control over 22% of 
the West Bank, and Hamas has full control inside but not over Gaza, as it persists under a tight Israeli-
Egyptian siege since 2007. 
Introduction 
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its macroeconomic and fiscal policies because it is limited by Paris Economic 
Protocol (PEP); and it is almost fully dependent on the ‘mercy’ of the Israel and 
international community’s aid. It is a body akin to big municipality, although on 
various occasions it is asked to pursue a state’s role. The PA consists of executive, 
legislative, and judiciary branches. The president of the PA (Yasir Arafat until 2004, 
followed by Mahmoud Abbas until today) is the highest political figure, serves as the 
chairman of the PLO, the commander-in-chief, and is elected directly by the 
Palestinian people inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip only, although elections 
occurred only twice in the history of the PA, in 1996 and 2006.  
In 2003, under the reform agenda and pressure on Arafat from the donor’s 
community, the Prime Minister (PM) office was created. The PM is appointed by the 
PA president and the “ruling party” and should be approved by the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC). While the first three PMs were members of Fatah, 
Haniyeh (leader of Hamas) was appointed in 2006 following the elections, and 
between 2007 and 2013, Salam Fayyad (Third Way electoral list) served as the 
Prime Minister. The PLC remains the main check and balances institution, however 
it is a very weak institution; was controlled by Arafat clientlism system until 2004, 
and it became completely dysfunctional after 2006 elections. The judiciary branch 
remains not independent, inefficient and controlled by the executive branch. The 
duties of the PA’s security forces are dictated by the peace accords and include six 
main bodies as national forces and internal security: National Security Forces; 
Presidential Guards; Military Intelligence; General Intelligence Department; 
Preventive Security Apparatus; and Civil Police. The overall economic framework is 
controlled by the PEP which led to a closed, subaltern, weak and dependent 
economy that is ultimately dependent on international aid to operate, and not on local 
production or internal revenues.  
The establishment of the PA changed the Palestinian and regional political –and by 
extension, the international- scene, and its failures in issues related to corruption and 
public provision of services allowed the Islamic resistance movement (Hamas) to 
flourish. Additionally, the establishment of an authority under occupation formed a 
new élite and affected the social structures. The dominant perception about the PA, 
mainly by the international community and the PA leadership, is that the PA is an 
Introduction 
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interim form of authority that will transform itself into a state. However others argue 
that the PA is akin to a big municipality (UNCTAD 2008, Shtayeh 2011), and has 
been transformed from an interim administration into a “de facto international 
(financial) trusteeship” (Khalidi 2005; Brown 2008), and that it represented the 
beginning of the end to the Palestinians’ long struggle for statehood and self-
determination (Turner 2009). Hence, the perceptions range from viewing the PA as 
the occupation subcontractors (Roy 1995, 2011 and Gordon 2008); as a transitional 
client quasi-state (Hilal 2004, 2007; Khan 2004, 2009; Brown 2003, 2010); as elite 
disunity (Jamal 2005 and Shikaki 2002); as a tool for Chequebook diplomacy (Le 
More 2005, 2008 and Brynen 2000, 2005); and finally as phantom and subaltern for 
the western great powers and imperialism (Samara 2005; Nakhleh 2004, 2011; Sbeih 
2011). These “classifications” are vital not only to understand the PA and its role, 
but also to understated the failure of aid, particularly in transforming it from the 
indefinite nascent nature toward a strong independent state.  
Since 1993 the PA had passed through four main phases: 
 PA 1.0 (1993-2000): Oslo Period (Genuine Arafatism) 
In this period the PA approach was an extension of the mentality that governed the 
PLO in exile. It aimed to build the nascent body while protecting Israeli security; and 
to create peace dividends to become more legitimate locally and internationally. 
However, in this period, Arafat was the holder of all possible powers, politically and 
financially, that allowed him to create client-patron and personalised systems, with 
high levels of corruption and badly functioning institutions. While the PA partially 
replaced the occupying power, it suffered from an identity crisis between a 
revolutionary body and a civil administration.  
The overall mantra was to build institutions for peace-building. The PA created 
monopolies and owned significant public assets, while the PLC was almost 
irrelevant. However, a substantial amount of aid money was channelled to officials  
and Arafat’s loyalist and special accounts, all without donors’ accountability, in part 
because they aimed to sustain the peace process. Thus in this period, the type of state 
and economy that emerged in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was “a product of the 
peculiarities of the development context as created by the peace process and Israel’s 
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occupation. But when Arafat was no longer deemed an acceptable ‘partner for peace’ 
by Israel and the US, the PA was forced to submit to a process of reform” (Turner 
2011). 
 PA 2.0 (2000-2004): Roadmap Period (Arafatism Plus) 
The failures to reach sustainable peace during the Oslo period were deepened in this 
period by the failure of the Camp David Summit, the eruption of the Second Intifada, 
and the reoccupation/incursion of the West Bank. The escalation of violence and the 
vanishing of the rationale to support Arafat necessitated the establishment of the 
International Quartet, the aid politburo and the Road Map peace agreement/plan. 
This meant that the PA was required to meet certain conditions to be a credible 
partner for peace. The “peace now, democracy later” paradigm became “democracy 
now, peace later” and a long list of governance reforms were put in place. A single 
central treasury account was created, managed by the finance minister Salam Fayyad 
who was part of the conditionality; a prime minister office was created; donor’s 
money had to be submitted to stricter audit and control; and the PA was asked to 
conduct elections. It was the period of democratic reform for state-building. It ended 
with the death of Arafat after the Israeli siege, leaving a massive infrastructure 
destruction, a bankrupted PA, and a long list of reform agendas ahead. 
 PA 3.0 (2004-2007): Fragmentation Period (Gaza Strip-West Bank 
Divide) 
This period revealed the difficult and painful process of moving away from 
Arafatism. As a result of the donors’ intervention, elections took place and 
Mahmoud Abbas became the new president in 2005. In 2006, Hamas acquired 76 out 
of 132 seats in the PLC and formed the government. It was the first time that the 
Islamic movement lead the Authority. Since the international community considers 
Hamas as a “terrorist group”, aid was poured exclusively through the president office 
and donors’ mechanisms such as TIM and PEGASE. Besides hurting the governance 
reform, donors fuelled the Palestinian fragmentation (Turner 2011; Le More 2008). 
Thus, the PLC was dysfunctional; Hamas government was replaced; emergency 
status was declared; clashes in West Bank and Gaza Strip took place; a caretaker 
government was appointed in the West Bank, and a socio-political and territorial 
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fragmentation characterises this period. The PA became a body with two heads, but 
without legs or teeth. This period can be encapsulated as a period of denying 
Palestinian democracy, resisting democratic change, and building peace through 
exclusion and marginalization of the “wrong” type of leadership. As Turner (2011) 
puts is, “peace-building-via-exclusion thereby promoted the logic of homo sacer, 
where people could be killed without it being considered a crime”. 
 PA 4.0 (2007- 2013): Fayyadism Period 
This period revealed that the PA’s decisions and existence are highly conditional on 
the will of the international community and Israel.
4
 The West Bank PA’s 
government became the exclusive address for donors, while Gaza initiated its own 
isolated governance system under siege. The PA’s financial fragility became 
apparent once again. Fayyad was appointed as Prime Minister for the 12
th
 and 13
th
 
governments and re-initiated a programme of state-building, despite the absence of 
peace negotiations. The PA and donor community prepared various development and 
state-building plans that established for a new planning paradigm based on high 
managerial capacities and measurable milestones. However, this period also 
witnessed forcible and strict reforms of the PA that prioritised the neo-liberal 
agenda, exclusive peaceful resistance, and strict security governance based on 
Webrian prescriptions. The results were mixed, however they lead to the emergence 
of Fayyadism. Thus, it was argued by the Palestinian leadership and major 
international institutions that the PA became a credible “partner for peace”, its 
capacities were enhanced, it started to deliver and raise more internal revenues 
despite continued aid dependency, the security forces became more professional, and 
the levels of corruption declined. The international community testified that the PA 
became ready to govern a state. However, the emergence of this “West Bank First” 
strategy sustained the fragmentation, affected the struggle and resistance dynamics, 
reinforced the “partners for peace” paradigm that is based on exclusion, and covered 
political problems with economic solutions. This created a PA that is more 
accountable to the international community, than to its people. A brief reflection on 
the post-Fayyadism phase is discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. 
                                                          
4
 This research views the external players, particularly donors, as part of the problem and can surely 
be part of the solution (Anderson 1999), and therefore it is crucial to understand the role of aid and 
donors through a political economy and conflict sensitivity analysis lenses. 
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Who is Salam Fayyad? 
Salam Fayyad was the Prime and Finance Minister of the Palestinian Authority 
between 2007 and 2013. He joined the Palestinian polity in 2002 when the PA 
President and Chairman of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, appointed him as the Finance 
Minister, in part due to pressure from the USA and Israel. Fayyad’s role was to 
conduct fiscal reform and tackle corruption. Apart from the period between 
November 2005 and March 2006 (the PLC election, and the formation of the 
exclusive Hamas government), Fayyad did not leave the political leadership scene 
and had been rooting his presence in the Palestinian political system through his 
technocratic card. Fayyad is an economist, a student of William Barnett, who 
received his training at The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).    
Fayyad, married and with three children, was born in 1952 in the small village of 
Dayr al-Ghuṣūn in northern West Bank. He only received his primary education in 
Palestine, and then moved to Jordan with his family, where he obtained his 
secondary school education. Fayyad graduated from the American University of 
Beirut in 1975, and worked in the banking sector in Jordan from 1975 to 1979. He 
moved to St. Edward’s University in the USA and received an MBA degree in 1980, 
and a Ph.D. degree in Economics from the University of Texas in 1986. Fayyad 
served as an academic at the University of Texas and at Yarmouk University in 
Jordan, and was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the 
World Bank in Washington, D.C. He joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
from 1987 to 2001 where his tenure included serving as the IMF Resident 
Representative for the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1996 to 2001. In 2001 he 
briefly became the Regional Manager of the Arab Bank in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip before being appointed as Finance Minister of the PA in 2002.
5
 This brief 
journey into Fayyad’s career indicates that he hardly lived in Palestine and only as a 
professional expert, which is a criticism that that is made until today, affecting his 
public legitimacy. This is why it is common to hear that Fayyad landed in Palestine 
in a parachute. He never pursued a political career and was not associated with any 
Palestinian political party. 
                                                          
5
 Encyclopædia Britannica, Salam Fayyad, [Online], Available: 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Salam-Fayyad 
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Fayyad’s entry into politics occurred in 2002, when a World Bank high ranking 
official who had an excellent relationship with Arafat, and whom I interviewed for 
my research, took Salam Fayyad to Arafat’s compound/headquarter (Mukaata’) in 
Ramallah and made the introduction and gently pressured Arafat by stating that 
“Fayyad is the only person who will rescue you, who can satisfy the US 
administration and fulfil their conditions, who will please the donor community to 
donate more funds, and who Israel can’t veto”.6 Arafat was under the Israeli siege at 
that time in his compound in Ramallah, so he wanted to send clear signals to Israel 
that he is a “partner for peace” through bringing Fayyad on board. This was 
particularly the case because Israel accused Arafat of financing the “Palestinian 
terrorism”, a major task that Fayyad had to tackle. So from the beginning of his entry 
to the Palestinian polity, his duty was to do the “dirty work” that politicians wanted 
to avoid because of the effect this type of work would have on  their popular 
legitimacy. The nature of this “dirty work” that was assigned to Fayyad meant that 
he was in a constant state of “clash and hostility” with armed groups and with the 
very network that Arafat established through his neo-patrimonial style of 
governance. Fayyad spent days and nights with Arafat in his sieged compound 
working under the light of the candles as Israel cut electricity supply. The infamous 
photo of Arafat and Fayyad working together in darkness under siege to bring some 
transparency to the PA’s financial accounts, is a photo that Fayyad keeps on his 
desk, and indeed posts –as necessary- on his Facebook page since 2007 until today 
whenever his legitimacy is under threat.  
Fayyad took the new responsibilities seriously, and he prioritised the technical and 
“apolitical” solutions based on his technocratic expertise. He started a process of 
institutional revolutionary reform at that time, while dealing with the self-enforcing 
corruption dynamics that are inherent in the structure of the PA. His major 
achievement between 2002 and 2005 was the creation of the Single Treasury 
Account, a central and unified account for the PA. However, until today, it is not 
exactly a central and unified account, but it nevertheless represents a major 
development in the realm of the Palestinian governance. 
                                                          
6
 Author’s interview with a former World Bank official in Palestine, London, May, 2014. 
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In late 2005, Fayyad resigned as a minister and founded The Third Way electoral list 
to run for the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC-PA’s parliament in 
the West Bank and Gaza) elections. Fayyad joined forces with the veteran PLO 
leader and educator Hanan Ashrawi who is widely respected and known in the 
Palestinian society, and also with Yaser Abed Rabbo, another member in the PLO’s 
executive committee who does not enjoy a good local reputation but a good 
international one, and is liked by the Israelis. This was a strategic move by Fayyad as 
he built up an electoral list with members from the PLO, the sole legitimate body of 
the Palestinian people. Therefore, Fayyad’s pragmatism and shift to be part of the 
political game became apparent, and his electrical list aimed to appeal to different 
groups and sectors in the Palestinian society and even abroad. The main objective of 
the Third Way bloc was to provide a real alternative to the two-party system of Fatah 
and Hamas. The Third Way promoted good governance, peace-making, and 
democracy as guiding principles for the future vision of a Palestinian state. The list 
received only 2.41% of the popular vote and won two of the Council's 132 seats in 
2006 (Fayyad and Ashrwai). Then, Fayyad served as the Chairman of the Finance 
Committee at the PLC, and in March 2007 he was appointed as Minister of Finance 
in a national unity government. By then, Fayyad had become a corner stone in the 
Palestinian political system as far as the financial management is concerned. He 
became the face that the donor community wanted to see in order to transfer their 
funds to the PA. Indeed, it became a very personalised matter.  
In the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian division between Fatah and Hamas (West 
Bank and Gaza), Fayyad was the first candidate of the PA’s President, Mahmoud 
Abbas, to serve as the prime minister. In June 2007, immediately after Hamas took 
over Gaza, Abbas declared the status of emergency in the West Bank, and appointed 
Fayyad as the Prime and Finance Minister of the PA. He served both positions until 
he stepped down in June 2013. In December 2008, Fayyad announced his plan to 
build the institutions of the future Palestinian state during a donor community 
conference in Paris. He announced a number of plans afterwards that aimed to create 
new realities on the ground as pre-requisites for the state of Palestine, notably the 
plan entitled “Palestine: Ending Occupation, Establishing the State”, which served 
as the backbone of Fayyad’s plan.  
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In his 2010 essay Our Man in Palestine, Nathan Thrall summarised it well by 
arguing that Fayyad’s “reputation as a fiscally responsible and trustworthy manager 
ensures the steady supply of international aid on which the Palestinian economy 
depends. Though he has neither a popular following nor backing from a large 
political party, today he is responsible for nearly every aspect of Palestinian 
governance” (Thrall 2010). Fayyad was criticised locally for many of the same 
reasons for which he is lauded globally. Thrall (2010) argued that Fayyad, “has 
condemned violence against Israel as antithetical to his people’s national aspirations, 
stated that Palestinian refugees could be resettled not in Israel but in a future 
Palestinian state, and suggested that this state would offer citizenship to Jews”. 
In 2010, Fayyad was ranked as number 10 of the top world leaders according to Time 
Magazine, and in 2011 as number 28 top global thinker by Foreign Policy for 
forging a path between violence and surrender. The Hollywood documentary "State 
194" documents part of Fayyad's state-building. Fayyad was praised by the daily 
Israeli newspaper Haaretz as “everyone's favorite Palestinian” (Ravid 2007), and 
“the Palestinian Ben-Gurion who wakes up in the morning to work to build a state 
for his people” (Eldar 2010). In 2013, the University of Texas created the Salam 
Fayyad Excellence Fund for Economics, and currently he serves a Distinguished 
Statesman with the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International 
Security.
7
  
After his resignation as a prime minister in mid-2013, Fayyad never ruled out 
resuming his political career. However, and meanwhile, he was appointed by the 
World Bank as the lead expert on the Yemeni economic reform process through 
serving in Yemen’s Executive Bureau for the Acceleration of Aid Absorption and as 
the Strategic Advisor to the Executive Device of donor pledges and economic 
reform.
8
 This appointment validated to some extent the argument of Fayyad’s critics 
that he is merely an expert of a major international financial institution that can serve 
almost in any context. In addition to this position, Fayyad led a team to write the 
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 Atlantic Council, Salam Fayyad, [Online], Available: 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/salam-fayyad#fullbio 
8
 Al-Hayat Newspaper, Yemen: Salam Fayyad appointed as an executive bureau for the acceleration 
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UNDP’s Human Development report for Palestine which was, in essence, a self-
assessment exercise for his state-building project (UNDP 2015). But more 
importantly, in August 2013, Fayyad established his non-profit development 
company, called Future for Palestine (FFP) to “fill the developmental gap in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory”. Through generous funding from the United Arab 
Emirates, with around $6.2 million expenditures on projects in 2014, FFP’s mission 
is “to strengthen the resilience of Palestinians in their homeland, especially in 
marginalised areas by providing the basic requirements for steadfastness through 
sustainable development, and by improving the availability and quality of services at 
the local level”.9 It is quite astonishing to see how many areas of operation the FFP 
is engaged in: education, Palestinian identity (culture and arts), social sector and civil 
society, agriculture development, marginalised and most affected areas, economic 
empowerment, and renewable energy. Fayyad argues that the different initiatives of 
the FFP do not only cultivate ingenuity, but also “inspire a sense of possibility that 
stands in direct opposition to the sense of hopelessness and despair precipitated by a 
seemingly endless occupation” (FFP 2015:2). 
In sum, the profile of Fayyad is intriguing and raises more questions than answers, 
such as: how could such a technocratic character who lacks constitutional legitimacy 
and more importantly lacks political constituency, and who lacks the “traditional 
trappings” of a national leader, be able to rule and lead a society, decide upon its 
priorities and reshape them, and draw the way forward to liberation and statehood? 
What are the politics of change behind Fayyad’s program? Why have good 
governance and the building of institutions (Dawlat Al-Mo’sasat)  been elevated to 
the status of a national goal in and of itself? Do Palestinians need a “state” or 
“homeland” (Dawlah or Watan)? Why do opinions about Fayyad range between a 
Palestinian Messiah and the new model of the Middle Eastern leaders, to a traitor, 
puppet, fundraiser and an agent for imperialism? What explains this wide gap? How 
was Fayyad able to “sell” technical achievements in an area where politics and its 
dynamics are dominant? How was he able to transform the national goals and 
aspirations to capsulate them in the goal of state-building and thus change the 
historical equation “liberation before state” to become “state before liberation”? 
                                                          
9
 Future for Palestine’s website, Mission and Goals, [Online], Available: 
http://ffp.ps/en/content/mission-and-goals 
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What kind of powers did he use, is it only the power of achievements, or the power 
of money and force? The donor community viewed Fayyad and his plans as credible, 
genuine, and legitimate, while he gained less support from the governed people. A 
crucial question to ask, in order to understand the different dynamics of the crisis of 
legitimacy in the Palestinian political system, is: To whom is Fayyadism more 
accountable, to the people or the donors? This brief introduction of the main actor of 
this thesis does not intend to “personalise” the studied phenomenon; in contrary, a 
major premise of this thesis is that single actors can’t be understood in isolation as 
they are surrounded by a very complex institutional setting. The purpose of this 
introduction of Fayyad is to provide some background that could explain part of the 
complexities analysed throughput the thesis. Understanding the “sociology” of main 
actors is an integral part of understanding complex phenomena, this thesis assumes. 
Research Methodology 
Methodologically, this thesis employs a number of research methods and 
approaches. Due to its empirical and ethnographic design, the research fieldtrips to 
the occupied West Bank between 2010 and 2014 constitute the major source of its 
original contribution.  
The chapters that address the transformations in the security sphere deployed a 
bottom-up ethnographic methodological approach. I conducted fifty in-depth semi-
structured interviews in both Balata and Jenin camps. The sample interviewees 
included representatives from different sectors and categories, including: local and 
national leaders, political faction cadres, armed group members, men and women, 
youth and ex-fighters, as well as people who had been detained by the Palestinian 
Authority. Additionally, I conducted five focused groups in the two camps. My 
fieldwork took place between August and December 2012, and my ethnographic 
investigation, through living in these camps comprised of participant observation and 
engaging in conversation with the people in their stores and workshops, in their 
houses, on streets and in cafes, in local institutions, and at weddings and public 
gatherings.  
The synthesis of a deconstructed state-building project and associated governance 
phenomenon with the narratives of people reflecting on their everyday life 
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conditions characterises the primary scholarly contribution of this thesis and its 
distinctive feature. The ethnographic research and gathered evidence was acquired 
from two locations, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps in Nablus and Jenin 
governorates in the northern part of the occupied West Bank. This research design, 
however, poses a number of methodological challenges concerning the 
representation of the cases, and the justification for selection is explained as follows: 
first, the similarities between both camps in terms of the ethnographic evidence they 
offered were striking, and therefore this thesis does not aim to compare and contrast 
both camps but rather to use them as one unit of analysis; second, two valid 
questions can be raised: to what extent are these camps representative of the whole 
occupied West Bank? And, to what extent are the people interviewed and interacted 
with in these camps over the course of my field research representative of the camps 
themselves? 
Acknowledging these two levels of methodological tensions, this thesis, in its 
chapters on the security dimensions of Fayyadism, follows a case-study ethnographic 
research design (Mahoney 2007; Brady 2008), and the main criteria for sampling 
was based on covering different actors from different categories representing 
multiple segments of the community (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Malki 2011). 
This approach, in combination with intensive observations and participation based 
on living in the camps, was crucial in terms of guaranteeing that the perspectives 
presented here are representative of the camps. Additionally, the cases of Balata and 
Jenin camps, and the ethnographic evidence they offer, are not particularly 
exceptional or outliers when contextualised within the overall perceptions about 
Fayyadism and its performance amongst the residents of the West Bank. Over the 
years, multiple public opinion polls and surveys offered different insights that 
correspond with the original qualitative perspectives gathered from both camps (this 
is discussed further in the second chapter, and the methodological caveats associated 
them are discussed later in this introduction).  
What remains particularly special about these camps is their excessive exposure to 
the security campaigns conducted by the Palestinian Authority and the associated 
repercussions. More broadly speaking, these cases represent the yardstick for the 
Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically this means that their success extends to success 
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in other areas across the occupied West Bank. That said, both camps were 
purposively selected, and this thesis does not claim that the findings can be fully 
generalised, a limitation that exists in any small, case-study based research project 
(George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Yin 2009). However, the 
qualitative dimensions that the case studies illustrate can be tested elsewhere and are 
relevant to the broader empirical and theoretical contexts beyond the case of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
A different methodological approach was used in the chapters that address the 
economic sphere. The fourth chapter is primarily built on thirty original semi-
structured interviews with experts working directly in the aid industry or studying it 
in the Palestinian context; thus all experts work in the OPT. Some were international 
donors or aid experts, while others included Palestinians working for local or 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Respondents represented 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), government aid agencies, International 
Governmental Organisations (IGOs), International Non-governmental Organisations 
(INGOs), as well as researchers associated with policy units that helped design aid 
packages or economic plans like the Paris Protocol, the economic annex of the Oslo 
Peace Accords. Meanwhile, non-donor experts expressed the critical perspectives of 
how aid is disbursed. They include IGOs, Palestinian Non-governmental 
Organisations (PNGOs), the Palestinian private sector, representatives of the 
Palestinian youth movement, and researchers working on international aid associated 
with a university or policy unit.  
Finally, the fifth chapter follows a mixed research approach inherent to its design. It 
looks to the empirical evidence in order to expand the conceptual foundations of 
contentious politics theories. Such empirical evidence, in particular the notion of 
resistance economy, is discussed according to an approach combining action-
research and observation. I observed closely many of the protests, including their 
preparation, and had conversations with many of the different actors involved in 
contentious actions in the occupied West Bank mentioned in the chapter. Last, I have 
been engaged in discussing the concept of resistance economy through my 
institutional capacity via Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network and my 
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affiliation with other research centres, networks, and policy circles in Palestine (I 
elaborate on my positionality later on in this introduction).      
Field Research: Obstacles, Challenges, and Solutions 
I expected and assumed that conducting field research at home, in my country, 
would be fairly straightforward. I am very familiar with the overall context, culture, 
norms and traditions, and language, and after all, I am partially a product of the 
society and culture being studied. However, I can conclude now -with confidence- 
after several research trips between 2010 and 2015, that researching in one’s home 
country is far from being straightforward. The “surprises” that presented themselves 
during the field research required a high level of creativity and adjustment, and 
availability to adapt and re-learn. Above all, conducting research at home requires 
lots of patient, careful and genuine listening, and objective distance. Additionally, 
when other human beings are the key respondents and subjects to the research 
enquires -as opposed to documents or archive- a certain set of ethical considerations 
prevail that need to be addressed thoroughly and persistently. But when the 
researcher and the researched people live in an unstable and very dangerous 
environment under a brutal foreign military occupation and a domination of settler-
colonialism, the peculiarity of the researcher task, I argue, requires additional 
creativity, resilience, patient, trust, and care.  
When I started my major field research in the refugee camps in 2012, I did not 
expect that I would be perceived as a complete stranger and foreigner, as I was just 
coming from another Palestinian locality. People, at the beginning, did not recognise 
that I am also a Palestinian -like them- and they started talking to me in English, 
German, Italian and even Hebrew. I replied to the people in Arabic, but they insisted 
to reply again in other languages and they kept telling me that I went to an excellent 
schooling to study Arabic. There was a consensus at the perception level, that I am 
not a Palestinian. This was due to multiple reasons according to the people including 
my appearance (relatively long hair and semi-light-coloured beard), lighter skin than 
the “typical” Palestinian, the way I carry my bag, the way I walk, and even the brand 
of my jeans, shirt, and shoes. I took immediate measures to change the initial 
perceptions that people built up in their minds about me, at two levels: appearance 
and trust-building. I shortened my hair, carried the bag differently or not at all, 
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bought a new pair of jeans, shirts, shoes and even a pen and notebook from the local 
market. Then I started having deeper conversations with people talking about things 
that a stranger or foreigners will not be aware of, and using certain phrases, words, 
and references that requires local knowledge, to prove that I am a local “indigenous” 
researcher. This initial response helped me to build a high level of trust quickly so as 
to address the initial perception that I am a foreigner (of course I do acknowledge 
that I am a foreigner to the camp in the sense that I am stranger who does not live 
there). 
However, I had to deal with another level of trust-building measure when I started 
discussing the sensitive topics such as security, weapons, resistance, security 
collaboration, political arrests and detention, financial compensations and 
disarmament, and torture and violation of human rights. All of this is in addition to 
dealing with the dire economic conditions of the people. So, I started by taking the 
“blessing” from the local leaders and heads of the Services Committee- al-Lijan al-
Sha’bia’ (the local governing body whom members are appointed, in most cases, by 
Fatah leadership), who helped me in spreading the word that I am a researcher who 
will spend a few months in the camps researching security and economic issues. To 
be perceived as a legitimate researcher is particularly crucial in such settings to be 
protected at the personal level first and foremost. In each interview I had to spend 
some time building trust, and I had to take it slowly and gradually with the aim to 
address the more difficult questions at a later stage in the field research. The key was 
to take things in a gradual manner, and build a solid base of trust and mutual respect. 
Indeed, living with the people in the camps accelerated the process dramatically, and 
people started opening-up voluntarily, which would often “snowball” by them taking 
me to listen to the stories of their relatives or friends. The human connection that was 
built up as a result was crucial for the execution of a successful fieldwork.  
As a researcher who is studying security-related matters, I had to justify my 
objectives to the security personnel in the camps (including militants, or members of 
the PA’s security forces). I also had to explain my research to the UNRWA’s 
director of the camp. Overall, I had to answer a very wide range of questions 
including if the gathered information will go to the Israeli, Palestinian or British 
intelligence. I had to have coffee on a regular basis with key figures in the camp 
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partially to take their “continuous blessing”. Through engagement with all actors 
coming from different backgrounds and representing different political affiliations 
along the political spectrum, my objectivity and neutrality was never questioned, 
which boosted the level of trust between me and the people in the camps. People 
were so eager to share their stories, opinions and thoughts. It was obvious that 
people wanted their voice to be heard and they wanted someone to echo their voices 
and listen to them. This indicated clearly to the legitimacy gap and crisis of 
representation where people, particularly refugees, remain marginalised in the 
political and governance systems and structures in the occupied West Bank.         
I used to start my day early in the morning, sometimes as early as 6 a.m. to have a 
morning conversation with the Palestinian workers who go to Israel for employment 
–mainly in construction-, and finish late, sometimes until midnight. This meant that I 
was able to talk to different categories of the people (for instance housewives, 
unemployed people, or shop owners during the day; and professionals who work 
during the day, students, or workers in Israel or with the PA or in other Palestinian 
cities during the evenings).                   
Building trust and creating a safe space for conversations were not only important  to 
tackle the sensitive topics, but also to overcome the culture of fear that the PA and its 
security forces had created, particularly in the camps and more generally in the 
Palestinian society. Engaging with the people over and over throughout the 
fieldwork was instrumental to access new insights and acquire additional stories and 
reflections over time. I under-estimated the extent and entrenchment of the culture of 
fear due to the PA security forces practices, but being in the camps observing the 
people’s behaviour revealed a reality check that pointed out to the police state in the 
making. Observing respondents and their initial reactions to certain questions 
represented a methodological tool throughout the field research. Careful observation 
was a key pillar to conduct this research, the challenge was how to process and 
digest all the images and input which proved to be a daunting task. But on the other 
hand, it exposed me to the real life in the camps through the lenses of its refugees. 
Similar to the centrality of participants observation method, listening carefully to the 
powerful narrative of the people and engaging with them in a dialogue is another 
methodological choice that this research utilised. This created a huge and 
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overwhelming input which posed a challenge on how best to deal with this issue. I 
used to write a detailed daily diary during the field work phase, in addition to the 
notes I took during the interviews and the audio recording.  
As I was listening to many horrific stories of torturing, political arrest, severe 
violations of human rights, and collective punishment, I also had to shield my 
psychological well-being very well in order not to be severely affected on a personal 
level. This posed another challenge. Therefore, I created some “virtual and artificial” 
distance between me as a Palestinian whose heart aches when hearing these stories, 
and the other me as a researcher who is following his research enquiry and curiosity 
and puts his emotions aside, at least during the time in the field. Striking the right 
balance is challenging indeed, however I made sure that my “investigator hat” led 
me during the time of the fieldwork which encouraged me to look for additional 
complex dynamics, to push the right and sensitive buttons, and to reveal more hidden 
suffering due to the PA’s security campaigns in these refugee camps. This is directly 
linked to my positionality as a researcher. The moving and in many cases heart-
breaking incidents throughout the field research, were main sources of inspiration 
despite the associated pain with it, and therefore the challenges and obstacles 
transformed into opportunities and strength.  
Lastly, with the dire economic conditions, it was important to declare clearly that I 
am not a social worker or financial assistance provider, and that I am not doing any 
research for the UNRWA or the PA. Securing my independence during the field 
research was another challenge and issue that I always wanted to overcome and 
secure. My training as a field researcher for over three years between 2002 and 2005 
when I was an undergraduate student at Birzeit University in Palestine, equipped me 
with a set of skills that was very helpful during my field research. I used to fill 
questionnaires for public polls and surveys, and I was exposed to at least 30 
localities (camps, villages, or cities) in the occupied West Bank. This training, which 
is also linked with my positionality as a researcher, equipped me with some of the 
needed skills to overcome many daily challenges and obstacles.
10
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 For instance, to ensure the participation of women, especially the younger generation (youth), I 
collaborated with women associations in the refugee camps in organising focus groups. In one 
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Researcher Positionality 
As I am combing classical political science approaches with more anthropological 
ones in my research, the issue of “researcher positionality” becomes more crucial 
and central to the analysis. As an engaged Palestinian scholar who is also directing 
Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, and who is an active actor in the 
Palestinian academic and public sphere, I am positioned at a number of intersects 
between academia, public policy arenas, and scholarly activism. This is reflected in 
the nature and design of the chapters, and possibly the roots for that go back to my 
childhood. My childhood was very much influenced by the work of Palestinian 
writer Ghassan Kanafani and Palestinian political cartoonist Naji Al-Ali, which 
considerably affected my current role as a researcher. Both Kanafani and Al-Ali 
were assassinated by Israel due to their political engagement through writings and 
drawings. Both Kanafani and Al-Ali taught me how to express the grand ideas in 
simple and direct ways without harming the deep meaning or the quality of the 
analysis. They also taught me that the voices from below and the power of the people 
should always be in the centre of any analysis. Both Kanafani and Al-Ali taught me 
that novel ideas need to be felt before they are understood, in order to assess their 
purity and value. Additionally, and in more generic terms that goes beyond this 
thesis, I am influenced by the approach of Susan George to understand the role of the 
social scientists. Susan George argues that, "The job of the responsible social 
scientist is first to uncover these forces [of wealth, power and control], to write about 
them clearly, without jargon... and finally…to take an advocacy position in favour of 
the disadvantaged, the underdogs, the victims of injustice". These are leading 
principles for me as a responsible social scientist, and a philosophy that I carried 
with me, as a researcher, during my anthropological fieldwork journey in the refugee 
camps in particular, which affected my positionality as a researcher. Edward Said 
once argued “everything we research, everything we write, the very analysis we are 
able to see or piece together on a particular topic is shaped by where we as 
intellectual and academics choose to place our point of beginning”. Placing the point 
of the beginning inside, around, and about people’s life, is my objective in this 
thesis.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
occasion I was expecting 6 female youth in the focus group, but to my surprise I had 32 women in 
that focus group. Instead of lasting for 1.30 hours, it lasted for 3.30 hours. 
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Being a Palestinian refugee myself who lived his whole life (apart from the last few 
years of studies in the United Kingdom (UK)) in Ramallah in the occupied West 
Bank adds another layer to my positionality as a researcher. I can be seen as an 
indigenous researcher who has a number of built-in values, biases, judgments, and 
political views that directly and indirectly may influence my approach to research, 
and how I look at things. I am a product and output of my own research field, with 
academic training in the UK. But being away from Palestine for a few years has also 
opened my eyes to a number of new things “at home” and allowed me to look at 
things with some distance as a researcher and not only as a Palestinian. For instance, 
I never questioned so many things about the Israeli military occupation when I was 
living under its daily control and oppression. But after a few years of not living 
under its daily control and oppression, I look at this occupation fundamentally 
differently. This reflexivity had its impact on me as a person and also as a researcher. 
This is simply to say that I also grew with the progress of my research, and I 
transformed myself while studying the transformations that my own society went 
through or was going through.  
Additionally and very importantly, during my PhD research years -precisely since 
2012- I am directing and managing the programs of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian 
Policy Network, which indeed affected my positionality as a researcher and as an 
engaged actor in the Palestinian academic and public sphere. It offered me additional 
agency and power, not only through networks and connections, but also through the 
ability to change and impact the narrative and policy in certain realms and through 
the production of knowledge in a number of Palestine-related issues. Directing and 
managing the programs of Al-Shabaka shaped me as a researcher and an engaged 
actor in my own society, and indeed empowered me during my research. Al-Shabaka 
aims to transform the Palestinian weakness of fragmentation into a strength through 
working towards a Palestinian intellectual cohesion and encouragement of a the 
culture of debate, and also aims to strategise for Palestine and put a critical 
Palestinian policy voice on the map globally. Through Al-Shabaka, I was not only 
able to communicate my findings and my research trajectories with a network of 150 
intellectual members spread all over the world, but it also allowed me to engage with 
the wider audience to present my work-in-progress throughout the years. This 
occurred through the avenues of Al-Shabaka itself, and also through other avenues as 
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major media outlets, locally and internationally. Publishing some very preliminary 
findings from the refugee camps, for instance, in the New York Times, Le Monde, or 
Al-Jazeera, and highlighting the issue of resistance criminalisation and authoritarian 
transformation, illustrated to me the level of agency that I do have as a researcher 
and how it affects my positionality, and the level of responsibility that I carry. 
Communicating my ideas in Arabic and English attracted different audiences with 
different and unique input, which was instrumental throughout my research. 
Analysing the operations of the World Bank in Palestine, assessing the overall 
economic framework of Oslo Peace Accords, and spelling out a few pillars of the 
resistance economy model, are a number of ideas that I developed through Al-
Shabaka. The intellectual community and engaged scholarship through Al-Shabaka 
had a positive impact on my legitimacy as a researcher and as a scholar/actor in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
Engaged scholarship comes with its own caveats though, but being aware of these 
caveats and striking the right balance is key for a rigorous engaged scholarship 
(Succarie 2014; Nayel 2013). At times, particularly in parts of the last chapter on 
contentious politics and resistance economy, the advocacy-policy tune might be 
dominant, however, chapter five is characterised by it serious attempt to expand the 
theoretical underpinning of the theories of contentious politics though the utilisation 
of the economic element building-up on the case of Palestine. This partial policy 
domination might be a limitation of the last quarter of the last chapter that I do 
acknowledge, however this was also impacted by my positionality and by the form 
and nature of the voices from below. Being at the intersect between different activist 
groups and grassroots movements who challenged the consequences of the PA’s 
state-building project, the Fayyadist neo-liberal economic agenda, and the legitimacy 
of the political leadership, and being driven by an action-research approach in an 
attempt to operationalise the notion of resistance economy, positioned me in a 
particular way to reflect on the voices from the field that aimed to challenge 
Fayyadism. Those voices, that I witnessed first-hand, were repressed by the very 
authoritarian trends that were built under Fayyadism, which influenced the design of 
the last quarter of the last chapter in the thesis vis-à-vis my positionality as a 
researcher. 
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Lastly, and very importantly, being a researcher from LSE, a hugely respected 
institution, positively impacted my positionality as a researcher. This was 
particularly evident when I conducted interviews with actors in the aid industry 
realm and with the donor community. The legitimacy of the LSE reflected itself on 
me as a researcher.         
This positionality represents an element in the process of reflexivity and illustrates 
the impact of being a Palestinian, an academic researcher at LSE, and an engaged 
scholar through my work at Al-Shabaka. This positionality as argued by England 
(1994) is an “exploration of the investigator’s reflection on one’s own placement 
within the many contexts, layers, power structures, identities, and subjectivities of 
the viewpoint”, and the whole rationale behind positioning is to provide a further 
validation to the conclusions, to the confidence levels in the findings, to the 
transparency of the research inquiry, and to inform the research process, as research 
is a process and not just a product. After all, there is a need for an understanding of 
the nature of and appreciation for the subjectivity of the principal investigator as 
vital and needed processes for self-reflection and a determination of self within 
social constructs under investigation (Behar, 1994; Kirschner, 1987; Rose, 1997). 
Methodologically, as was argued by Hall (1190:18), “there’s no enunciation without 
positionality. You have to position yourself somewhere in order to say anything at 
all”. And therefore, as was argued by Bourke (2014), positionality represents a space 
in which objectivism and subjectivism meet, in a “dialectic relationship” of existence 
(Freire, 2000: 50). Thus, this dialectic relationship between the objectivism and 
subjectivism of positionality is framed within the overall academic scholarly 
understanding of the studied phenomenon in this thesis.   
Triangulation Process 
Due to the research design and the sensitive topics that are discussed with the people 
and different actors through a bottom-up ethnographic approach, the process of 
triangulation is an integral and crucial methodological choice that is used in this 
thesis to ensure accuracy, credibility and rigoursity (Olsen 2004; Hammersley 2008). 
Triangulation is particularly relevant and instrumental when researching contested 
issues and engaging with different actors with conflicting interests and diverse 
expectations (Golafshani 2003). To cross-validate and enhance the rigoursity of the 
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gathered information and data from the field, I utilise various sources of information 
(data triangulation), a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods, top-
down/bottom-up approaches, primary/secondary data for analysis (methodological 
triangulation), and to some extent play the role of an investigator to review the 
gathered data (investigator triangulation). Therefore, in this thesis, I use multiple 
forms of triangulation to generate better confidence in the original results, to allow 
for a larger space for creativity, to enhance the validity, quality and credibility of the 
research findings, and to map out trends of regularity and consistency. The processes 
of triangulation allow this research to dig deeper to reveal some hidden dynamics 
and to have a more confident understanding of the studied phenomenon. These 
processes of triangulation were indeed time and energy consuming, in an already 
highly contested research environment. This thesis distinguishes itself from other 
studies in the field through the utilisation of different tools (profiling of actors, 
following a dialogical participatory approach, conducting in-depth interviews and 
natural and systematic focus groups, and living in the refugee camps for original 
ethnographic research), the quality and originality of the gathered data, and the 
rigoursity of the powerful narrative that is coming directly from the people/refugees.   
Limitations of Surveys    
The use of opinion polls and results from public surveys in the thesis, needs to be 
understood with the usual and traditional methodological caveats associated with 
such methodological choice. The occupied West Bank can be seen as a “republic of 
polling centres”. Over the last twenty years, polling has become an industry in 
Palestine, attracting local, regional and international actors. Some of the results, from 
around ten different polling and public surveys institutions, are used in this thesis to 
illustrate certain indictors or trends. They are used to support the points made in this 
thesis, and not to generate sweeping conclusions. The findings from the opinion 
polls are an additional, supporting tool to reflect the people’s voices at a certain point 
in time regarding a number of inter-linked issues. This thesis does not aim to build a 
matrix of the different surveys, or provide a critical reading to them or their 
methodologies. It is certain that the various surveys referred to in this thesis used a 
number of methodologies, samples and tools for analysis, aimed to serve different 
purposes, are prone to donors conditionality, contain natural biases, and differ in 
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terms of quality and reliability. That said, the survey results used in this thesis were 
selected carefully after considerable assessment, to quantify particular trends or 
provide evidence for certain arguments and claims. These results are particularly 
important in the triangulation process when they reveal similar trends about 
contested issues as popular legitimacy, corruption, human rights violations, and 
security and economic policies. They are also helpful to better contextualise the 
evidence gathered from both refugee camps, and they give a quick glance of some of 
the trends in the occupied West Bank. These are key reasons to utilise them in parts 
of the analysis in the thesis, particularly where the perceptions about Fayyadism are 
discussed, and case studies are contextualised. But in the final analysis, they present 
a unique set of information to deal with, especially if the triangulation process is 
taken into account and the data are utilised from ten different sources. 
Interdisciplinary Contribution 
Methodologically, this interdisciplinary thesis is featured by its contribution to a 
number of fields of knowledge and disciplines. In its core design it reflects the inter- 
and multi-disciplinary nature of the international development studies discipline. In 
the broader theme, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the 
development-security nexuses through using the empirical case study of the occupied 
West Bank in Palestine, via combining classical political science approaches with 
anthropological ones. In more specific terms, and as illustrated throughout the 
different nature and design of each chapter and through the subsequent raised 
research questions, this thesis contributes to the fields of political economy of 
international aid and development, political science approaches, contentious politics 
and social movement theory, security sector reform studies and securitised 
development processes, institutional and human ethnography, anthropology and 
sociology of refugees, state-building and governance in conflict-affected areas, and 
Middle Eastern politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict discipline. This is not merely a 
long list of fields; as the epistemological contribution is also associated with the 
utilisation of different research methods and tools that are borrowed from the above-
mentioned fields of knowledge. The complexity of the studied phenomenon puts this 
thesis at the intersection of these different fields of knowledge to better explain the 
multiple dynamics of the studied phenomenon. Using only one conceptual 
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framework to understand the state-building project and governance reform processes 
in the occupied West Bank in Palestine will not be sufficient to grasp the causes and 
consequences of these processes, and will fall short in explaining the issues. The 
utilisation of different tools and the adoption of conceptual understandings from 
different disciplines, help in ensuring that the chapters of this thesis are inter-linked 
and organically connected through the broader dimensions of the development-
security nexuses.      
Conceptual Reflection 
As an extension to the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis that engages with, 
contributes to, and was inspired by a number of conceptual frameworks and 
theoretical understandings. This includes accounts of the historical-development 
work of Paul Kingston who examined Britain’s aid for development and state-
building in the 1940s and 1950s in the Middle East; the anthropological-
development work of David Mosse; the “governance without government/state” 
theories as was particularly developed in the international relations and political 
science disciplines by Thomas Risse; and the work of Sidney Tarrow on contentious 
politics and social movements theory. 
Paul Kingston (1996) in his Britain and the politics of modernization in the Middle 
East, 1945-1958 analysed the underlying state-building models of the British Middle 
East Office and Point IV (the ancestor of USAID) and the role of aid, which is 
closely related to the  research conducted for this thesis. Notably, the international 
community started to deliver aid to the PA in the context of “emerging optimism” 
(the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords), while for Kingston, the emerging optimism was in 
the aftermath of dismantling the British colonialism in the Middle East. What is 
striking is that the set of assumptions for aid intervention, the set of raised questions, 
and the set of criteria used to evaluate aid in the 1940s and 1950s, are very similar to 
the ones under Fayyadism today. The set of assumptions includes that aid is to be 
used to ensure stability, build regional alliances and support moderate leaders; aid to 
induce a particular style of governance and build institutions with a selective 
governance approach; aid that is based on the assumption of the positive relationship 
between economic development and political modernization and that economic 
Introduction 
38 
 
progress will bring political stability; and finally that the agents for change are the 
external donors themselves. All these assumptions are arguably even more valid in 
the case of the state-building in Palestine because they were framed in a neoliberal 
setting. However, it is not only about the similar assumptions, but also about the 
similar questions that are raised until today, such as “what is the real purpose of 
development, who are the most appropriate agents of development, and what is the 
best kind of development assistance” (Kingston 1996:3). As for evaluating the 
effectiveness of aid, strikingly similar criteria is used in Palestine today compared to 
the criteria used in the Middle East more than half a century ago, namely: “the 
political motivations behind the provision of development assistance, the economic 
model which guides development policy decisions, and the mechanisms used to 
deliver development assistance” (Kingston 1996:3).  
The geostrategic element in the aid industry is alive until today in the era of 
Fayyadism, where political order is perceived as superior to socio-economic 
development, which results in strengthening “inequitable and elite-based structures 
of power”. Having the donors in the front lines of policy arenas, and the adoption of 
a “retail”, as opposed to a “wholesale” development approach, through supporting 
small fragmented projects instead of a big macro package, are elements that shaped 
the overall aid industry in Palestine and in particular during Fayyadism. In the final 
analysis, aid for state-building attempted to replicate the experience of the West in 
the East to impose modernization or Westernization. In this global era that 
Fayyadism interacted with, the aid for state-building was imposed in a standardised 
neoliberal package and the repercussions of that is a key objective of this thesis.  
Furthermore, the politics of aid and the overall framework of the aid industry 
constitute the main driving forces behind the Fayyadist paradigm. In the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, the combination of the role of aid experts, the local 
technocrats, and the liberal peace conditionality on aid, replicate the aid-
development industry trends and crisis. The seminal work of Timothy Mitchell in the 
Rule of Experts, and David Mosse and David Lewis’s Development Brokers and 
Translators, along with the work of Arturo Escobar, Amartya Sen, and James 
Ferguson, amongst others, constituted major inspirational contributions to the thesis 
and to my understanding of the impact of aid on the processes of development or de-
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development. The case of Palestine and the trajectories of the aid industry over the 
last two decades, provide further evidence for the inherent structural limitations of 
aid in inducing structural transformations in the recipient’s economy –especially in 
conflict-affected areas-, or introduce more democratic styles of governance and 
regimes.    
In particular, the work of David Mosse and his theorisation of the two opposing 
views on development policy, namely the instrumentalists and the critics, matches 
perfectly with the situation of the development-aid industry in the OPT. As such, 
Mosse’s categorization and conceptual framing was utilised in this thesis a in the 
fourth and fifth chapters on the failing patterns of aid in the OPT. However, Mosse 
himself acknowledges that neither the instrumentalist view nor the critical view 
“does justice to the complexity of policy making and its relationship to project 
practice, or to the creativity and skill involved in negotiating development” (Mosse 
2005:2). Agreeing with this assertion and conclusion, this thesis aims to tease out 
further elements in the complex structures of aid and introduces two additional views 
on aid to expand the conceptual framing and understanding: “the critical 
instrumentalist and the neo-colonialist”. 
Lastly, in addition to the theories of contentious politics, particularly as developed 
by Sidney Tarrow, the conceptualisation of the initial overarching governance sphere 
in this thesis was influenced by the theories of governance without state/government, 
and mainly through the work of The Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 
(Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood) with the leadership of Thomas Risse. 
The conventional, idealistic and western-centric good governance and state-building 
literature and standardised blueprint frameworks proved to be not sufficient nor 
appropriate to explain the different dynamics in the governance and state-building 
realms in areas that are very far from standardised processes (Fritz and Rocha 
Menocal 2007; Grindle 2004 and 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009). Therefore, in cases of 
quasi states (Jackson 1990), state-like (Khan 2009), limited-self-government (Khan 
et al. 2004) and areas of limited statehood (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006), there is an 
utmost need to explore the proposition that the “good” governance approach11 for 
                                                          
11
 There is no consensus on the definition of the epithet “good”, although some similarities do exist. 
Many scholars explain it as a synonym for the western model of liberal democracy and 
institutionalization. While others argue that “good” simply means the implementation of the 
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state-building
12
 is only relevant if the historical specificity, the contextual 
circumstances and realities, the indigenous mechanisms, and the existing social 
norms are taken into consideration.
13
 The hybrid understanding of governance as a 
concept and practice, as developed by the streams of research by SFB 700 amongst 
others, on the other hand, is more suitable for places like Palestine, especially given 
that governance and state-building are taking place in the absence of state and 
sovereignty. Theories of good governance for/as state-building impacted the overall 
design of this research. Elements of this can be found in the first chapter when the 
notion of hybridity is briefly discussed, but more importantly, Fayyadism as a 
paradigm is understood here as an illustration for the standardised framework of 
“good governance for state-building”, which is deeply influenced by donor’s 
prescriptions and funds 
Fayyadism and the Notion of Resistance        
Conceptually, and before discussing the main elements of each chapter below in this 
introduction, it is crucial to affirm that Fayyadism does not exist in vacuum. It is not 
only about Salam Fayyad, Fayyadism was also impacted by the overall political 
decisions and approaches of Mahmoud Abbas, the PA and PLO president, which are 
considerably different than those of Arafat. This is why Fayyadism is not only an 
externally-sponsored paradigm, but also a home-grown one. Therefore, the 
conceptual basis of the strategy of change underpinning Fayyadism’s pillars can be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
universally accepted core principles of participation, fairness, decency, accountability, transparency 
and efficiency (Hyden et al. 2004; Court 2006; UNCTAD 2009; WB 2003, 2007; DFID 2007; 
Chandler 2009). Additionally, in the realm of “good governance”, there are a number of unsolved 
dilemmas such as which institutions matter more (Rodrik 2004; Khan 2006; Dervis 2006), what are 
the consequences of the governance reform (Fukuyama 2008; Brinkerhoff 2007), how good 
governance is measured (Arndt and Oman 2006; Iqbal and Shah 2008; Kaufman et al. 2009; and 
Hyden et al. 2004), and if good governance for state formation is good option, particularly in the 
Palestinian case (Khan et al. 2004; Khan 2004; Khan 2009). 
12
 Although “state-building” and “state-formation” are mostly used interchangeably in the literature, 
however it can be argued that state-building emphasizes the importance of external forces while state-
formation sees the development of political institutions as an indigenous process (Bates 2001; 
Dorussen 2005). 
13
 In short, “good governance” is understood in this thesis as effective and legitimate. Broadly 
speaking, “legitimate” concerns the popular acceptance, locally and internationally, of the governance 
systems, processes, actors and authorities. While, “effective” is closely correlated with sovereignty 
and self-sufficiency and concerns the ability of the governance mechanisms and processes to ensure 
the provision of public services and goods with the best utilization of the available scare resources. 
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seen as the outcome and result of a set of strategic, institutional, and operational 
transformations, induced by the main governance actors in the West Bank.  
At the strategic level, the PA adopted a strategy that gave the statutory security 
forces the exclusive responsibility for security provision. This aimed to achieve the 
political slogan of the PA under Fayyadism “one gun, one law, one authority”. At the 
institutional level, the PA had changed its policies so to enforce the rule of law, 
achieve monopoly of violence and reform the security sector through the adoption of 
a Weberian principles in distorted environment. Consequently, in order to implement 
these strategic and institutional changes, the PA induced operational transformations 
that shaped the operationalisation of the security sector reform. 
These operationalising factors include: (i) security operations, old-fashioned strong 
arm methods and redeployment of the PA US/EU trained and equipped security 
forces such as the ‘Smile and Hope’ operation conducted in Jenin governorate; (ii) 
cooperation and coordination with the Israeli forces, which is one of the most 
problematic factors not only because it affects the legitimacy of the PA forces, but 
also because it represents a division of labour between the occupying power and the 
occupied; (iii) “weapons cleansing”14 and arms collection targeting armed resistance 
groups that belong to political parties as the PFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah. 
These parties used to provide public services, including security provision. But, the 
favouritism embedded in the process of arms collection made it a debateable and 
non-transparent process; since certain groups were killed or arrested, while others 
were offered financial compensations or amnesties; (iv) finally, practices of 
demobilisation, reintegration, and co-option was coupled with changes in the goals 
and priorities of the international aid community. More than thirty per cent of aid 
was allocated to the security realm and towards creating stability through “filling 
pockets” approaches as reintegration and co-option. Overall, these factors had direct 
impacts on the informal security arrangements, mass assemblies, popular protection 
                                                          
14
 I am using the phrase “weapons cleansing” for a couple of reasons, inspired by the conducted 
fieldworks. Firstly, to indicate the fact that weapons cleansing was a more serious and genuine 
process in comparison with previous attempts, particularly compared to the Arafatsim era. Secondly, 
to reflect the fear expressed by the ordinary citizens that the PA’s security forces, through replicating 
and conducting the “dirty work” on behalf of Israel, such as arresting fighters and confiscating their 
weapons, are acting as sub-contractors to the occupation. Thirdly, to indicate that the disarmament 
process targeted all the military groups including the ones that are affiliated with the Fatah, Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades. 
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and people’s freedom of expression; and therefore it had ultimate consequences on 
the people’s security and economic well-being. 
One particular dimension that acquires major attention in the thesis is the 
relationship between the Fayyadist paradigm and the notion and concept of 
resistance. Resistance in its broad and all-encompassing meaning was a central 
theme that always exposed the fragility of the Fayyadist paradigm in both the 
security and economy spheres, as discussed and revealed by the ethnographic and 
empirical evidence in the following chapters. From a critical perspective, the 
Fayyadist paradigm could be seen as an anti-resistance paradigm, or a paradigm that 
allows for only one form of resistance (as expressed by the people in the camps): 
financially-sponsored peaceful resistance (as opposed to “real voluntary resistance”, 
as one respondent from Jenin camp argued). And therefore, critics argued that the 
Fayyadist paradigm created an industry for peaceful resistance, and by extension 
professionalised it by recruiting people and offering them monthly allowances or 
salaries to engage in such activities. This commodification of resistance interacted 
with a good governance, modernity, and state-building frameworks under 
Fayyadism, as such a transformation was new to the Palestinian national movement. 
Under Arafat, the commodification of resistance was expressed in a neo-patrimonial 
patronage-based politics and a highly personalised style of governance; Arafat was 
not “exclusivist” in the sense that he prioritised armed resistance (as the 
establishment of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades indicates), but he did not seek to 
eliminate other sorts of resistance so long as he could manipulate and exploit them to 
his own end. 
Additionally, as far as resistance is concerned, Arafat was primarily concerned about 
local and regional dynamics, while Fayyad was preoccupied with the way that the 
international community would perceive Palestinians. All this was reflected in the 
dynamics of local legitimacy and popular accountability. These transformations were 
also associated with overall changes in the Palestinian national liberation project, the 
trajectories of the peace process, and the dynamics of the so-called Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising that the notion and practice of resistance 
under the Fayyadist paradigm was a dominant theme expressed by the Palestinian 
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people, and constituted a major source of tension between the people and the 
authorities as illustrated in the discussions presented in the following chapters. 
This is particularly the case when the security campaigns and disarmament processes 
are considered; however, it also extends to the exclusivity of neoliberal economic 
thinking and planning in the economic domain. This thesis reveals through 
ethnography the popularity and legitimacy of both the non-statutory security forces 
and the political factions’ armed groups, as well as the celebration of resistance as a 
way of living under occupation. In this way, the Palestinian people were critical of 
the attempts made under the Fayyadist paradigm to eradicate, tame, and criminalise 
resistance. Moreover, people were highly critical about the tactics and tools that the 
Fayyadist paradigm employed in its efforts to tame and criminalise resistance, such 
as the doctrine of security collaboration with Israel, the use of informal mechanisms 
to induce the formal rule of the PA forces, the (ab)use of the judicial system to 
entrench authoritarian rule instead of ensuing justice, and finally the use of excessive 
violence aimed at perpetuating a culture of fear and ultimately discredit resistance. 
Tension around resistance, this thesis argues, demonstrates the fundamental flaw of 
executing a security reform and pursuing a disarmament strategy in the absence of 
sovereign national authority or a unified leadership, and in the presence of a foreign 
military occupation without fundamentally addressing the imbalances of power. 
After all, Fayyadism aimed and claimed to build a state, reform its security forces 
and security doctrine, and adopt a set of neoliberal economic policies; yet, all of this 
was meant to happen in the absence of sovereignty and state.    
Abbas and Fayyad 
Although the core focus of this thesis is on Salam Fayyad and his philosophy as the 
main protagonist of Fayyadism, this should not be understood as if Fayyad is a “deus 
ex-machina”. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the President of the PA, the Chairman 
of the PLO, the Leader of Fatah, and recently the President of the State of Palestine, 
represents the highest political authority. Indeed, he is the one who nominated, 
appointed, and dismissed Salam Fayyad. He and his team are the ones who negotiate 
“peace” with Israel, not Fayyad. The reason that this thesis does not provide a 
significant analysis and focus on Abbas is because this thesis does not address the 
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very macro political framework of the Palestinian Israeli conflict per se. Instead, this 
thesis addresses the operational dimensions and reform processes in the security and 
development spheres, and assesses the emergence and consequences of these 
processes at the micro level, on peoples’ lives. In other words, this thesis uses 
Fayyadism to understand its implications on the broader picture of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, and does not use the trajectories of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to 
assess Fayyadism. Hence, the analysis moves from a meso to macro level, but not 
necessarily from a macro to meso level. This meso analysis is supported by micro-
level evidence. This distinction might appear arbitrary, artificial or unrealistic as it is 
not possible to completely separate the macro-meso-micro levels from each other. 
However, the research design and the methodological choices and approaches aimed 
to look at the emergence, consequences and repercussions of the security sector 
reform policies and the neo-liberal economic policies as spelled out and 
implemented in and according to the documents and plans prepared by Fayyad’s 
governments. Therefore, the point of reference has Fayyad at its core, not Abbas.  
That said, neither Fayyad nor Fayyadism, exist in vacuum. They are surrounded by 
institutional settings, political system and parties, and complex frameworks. A path-
dependent understanding needs to be used to recognise that Fayyadism is indeed a 
home-grown phenomenon even though it is externally sponsored and financed. 
Abbas and Fatah remain the ones who dominated the Palestinian Authority and its 
politics, and Fayyad was seen as a stranger internally but still attractive to the 
international donor community. Abbas and the internal politics of Fatah, together 
with their undemocratic norms, can be supportive or hugely destructive to the 
Palestinian polity and political system, which depend on factional politics and 
unilateral decisions. The PA or PLO “traditional” Palestinian leadership did not 
perceive Fayyad as an equal partner in the leadership, but more as a service provider 
and as the “man of this phase- Rajol al-Marhala”, as a high ranking official from 
Fatah told me. Fayyad, the technocrat, was engaged to implement a technical, 
procedural, and operational institutional reform as part of a state-building process, 
from the traditional leadership perspective. When Fayyad started dealing with “real 
politics” that impacted the intra-Fatah dynamics and the legitimacy of the traditional 
Palestinian leadership in the international arenas, Fayyad knew he would be counting 
his remaining days as a prime minister of the PA.  
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This illustrates the role of Abbas and the traditional Palestinian leadership vis-à-vis 
Fayyadism as far as this thesis is concerned. The aim is not to marginalise them in 
the analysis, as this is simply not possible and naïve. The institutional complexity 
and the overlap of responsibilities, the domination of the political élite and the 
dynamics of neo-patrimonial structures and client-patron relations, are some of the 
main characteristics of the Palestinian political system within which the Fayyadist 
paradigm needs to be framed and contextualised. However, what is crucial not to be 
dismissed in this overall picture, is that neither Abbas nor Fayyad, nor the traditional 
leadership or even Hamas and other non-PLO political factions or armed groups 
have sovereign authority or even an independent viable state. Everyone lives under 
the control of an Israeli settler colonial regime and military occupation. The self-
ruling of the Palestinians and the adopted style of governance and the state-building 
agenda, has to be understood in an overall colonial context in order to appreciate the 
multiple levels of complexities of building a state, reform its security apparatuses, 
and build its neo-liberal economy, in the absence of the basic pillars of the state. 
Hamasism and Fayyadism 
Fayyadism is a West Bank First strategy, and therefore it can be seen as a model 
opposed to Hamasism, the style of governance of Hamas in Gaza after 2007. Both 
Fayyadism and Hamasism followed different approaches, competing assumptions, 
varying objective and subjective contexts, and aimed to serve different purposes. 
However, both of them emerged in the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian division in 
2007, entrenching the fragmentation of the Palestinians and distorting the Palestinian 
national movement. Both models are dependent on regional, international, and 
external actors for sustainability and financial and political support. Both models 
affected the lives of the Palestinian people negatively, and both models shared the 
transformation towards authoritarianism to sustain their rule, with rising levels of 
human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza. Both Fayyadism and Hamasism 
failed to bring the Palestinian people any closer to realise their self-determination, 
acquire their rights, or fulfil their aspirations. Just the contrary, this thesis argues.       
Although both models function within the overall context of the Israeli settler 
colonialism, they were nevertheless executed in different contextual settings. 
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Fayyadism was supported and facilitated by the colonial power (Israel), as 
Fayyadism did not aim to challenge Israel or address the imbalances of power. 
However, Hamasism was a model developed under an Israeli-Egyptian imposed tight 
siege and under three major wars on the Gaza Strip with devastating levels of 
destruction and human loss (Shaban 2014; Bashir and Rappaport 2014). The set of 
the neo-liberal economic policies in the West Bank was contrasted with a “tunnel 
economy” in Gaza (Pelham 2011). The joint Palestinian-Israeli businesses in the 
West Bank were contrasted with tightening of the siege on Gaza and the movement 
of people and goods. The set of normative liberal values in the occupied West Bank 
were contrasted with a set of Islamic rules and regulations that aimed for the 
“islamisization” of the Palestinian society. While Fayyadism was enjoying the 
generosity of the international donors and their political support, Hamasism was 
suffering from the scarcity of resources and the international boycott even though it 
won the last legislative elections in 2006. While Fayyadism was building showcase 
new cities such as Rawabi near Ramallah, Hamasism and the international 
humanitarian community were negotiating with Israel how many bags of cement 
were allowed to enter Gaza to re-construct the Strip in the aftermath of the three 
wars on Gaza in 2008/9, 2012, and 2014.  
This brief comparison does not aim to judge which style of governance is better or 
worse. Similarly, this thesis does not aim to compare and contrast Fayyadism and 
Hamasism. This is one of the suggested future avenues for research indeed. The 
purpose of this very brief comparison between these two paradigms, however, is to 
illustrate that the West Bank and Gaza Strip initiated two different styles of 
governance that had their impact on the overall Palestinian body politics and the 
ability of the people to resist the colonial rule and military occupation of Israel. The 
authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza cared most about stability and the 
sustainability of their rule, instead of protecting the people, empowering them and 
enhancing their capabilities to engage in a meaningful development process and to 
develop liberation strategies. 
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The Refugees and The UNRWA 
The two main locations of my ethnographic fieldwork are refugee camps in the 
occupied West Bank, Balata and Jenin. Balata is the largest refugee camp in the 
West Bank in terms of population. The selection of the two refugee camps –the 
reasons and justifications are explained later- requires a brief contextualization on 
the Palestinian refugees overall and the particular conditions of these two camps.  
The question of the Palestinian refugees emerged in the aftermath of the Palestinian 
Nakba (Catastrophe) in 1948 and the establishment of the State of Israel. More than 
750,000 Palestinians were expelled, disposed and ethnically cleansed in 1948 and 
were forced by the Zionist terrorist and military groups to leave their original homes 
and lands to become refugees in other parts of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) 
or leave Palestine all together (Pappe 2006; Beinin and Hajjar 2014). In 1967, 
another wave of Palestinian refugees emerged in the aftermath of the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Until today, as was evident by the Israeli 
war on Gaza in the summer of 2014, new waves of refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) continue to emerge. To deal with the issue of the Palestinian 
refugees, the international community created the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) which started its 
operation in May 1950. The UNRWA’s services “encompass education, health care, 
relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and 
emergency assistance”.15 Currently, the UNRWA has around 5 million registered 
Palestinian refugee. Palestinian refugees are defined as “persons whose normal place 
of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who 
lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”.16  
The right of return of the Palestinian refugees was recognised in United Nations 
Resolution 194 which stated in its 11
th
 article that “the refugees wishing to return to 
their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at 
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of 
                                                          
15
 UNRWA’s Website, Who are we, [Online], Available: http://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are 
16
 UNRWA’s Website, Palestine Refugees, [Online], Available: http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-
refugees 
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those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under 
principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible”.17  
The right of return to the Palestinian Refugees remains the core issue in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Al-
Mukayam asl al-hekayah (the camp is the origin of the story) is one of the most 
publically repeated statements to indicate to the significance of the refugee camps in 
the Palestinian-Israeli context. The refugee camps, either in al-watan (homeland) or 
al-manafa (exile), encapsulate the Palestinian story of suffering, but also represent 
its pride through their resilience and resistance. The Palestinian refugees represent 
almost half of the Palestinian people, and they are not merely a minor segment of the 
Palestinian nation. However, the refugees are the ones who paid the heaviest price 
for the Oslo Peace Accords, which side-lined their right of return, and kept the 
Palestinian refugees outside Palestine in a permanent state of crisis as stateless and 
refugees without offering them any positive future horizon. Palestinian refugees 
always suffered from marginalisation despite being the ones who sacrificed most for 
the Palestinian national movement. The socio-economic and security conditions are 
dire both in the camps in or outside Palestine. The camps are heavily populated 
areas, with poor housing, and poor health and education services provided by the 
UNRWA. Despite the symbolic national representation of these camps as castles of 
resistance, the everyday life differs from this symbolism. The everyday life in the 
camps is full of humiliation, repression, and dependency on many levels. This can be 
witnessed on a rainy and cold day when refugees wait for half of the day for food 
assistance provided by the UNRWA. The level of humiliation on such an occasion is 
beyond description in words, and I, as someone who lived it throughout his 
childhood and teenage life, I was able to see the years of suffering in the faces and 
eyes of the people in the camps. With the semi-permanent financial crisis of the 
UNRWA, it provides very basic services to the camps (8 camps in Gaza Strip 
servicing around 1.3 million refugees; 19 camps in the West Bank servicing around 
762,0000 refugee; 9 camps in Syria and 12 camps in Lebanon servicing around half 
a million refugees each; and 10 camps in Jordan servicing around 2 million 
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 UNRWA’s Website, Resolution 194, [Online], Available: http://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-
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refugees).
18
 This thesis does not intent to evaluate the quality or scope of the 
UNRWA’s services and operations.19  
On the eve of the International Day of Refugees in June 2015, the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reported that 41.2% of the total Palestinian population in 
the West Bank and Gaza are refugees (25% of the West Bank’s population; 67% of 
the Gaza Strip’s population). The percentage of persons aged less than 15 years in 
the camps reached 40.9%, and 4.2% for the elderly aged 60 years and over. 
Consumption-based poverty rates among refugees in the West Bank and Gaza 
averaged around 35.4% in comparison with 21.8% for non-refugees. The 
unemployment rate among refugees reached up to 33.7% compared to 22.3% among 
non-refugees, with a 3.3% illiteracy rate for individuals aged 15 years and over 
(PCBS 2015). Despite the horrific nature of these figures and their translation to the 
everyday life of the Palestinian refugees, they fall short in reflecting the real daily 
tragedies, not to mention the methodological limitations of these figures.  
However, this brief socio-demographic profile shows that Palestinian refugees in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip are in a worse condition than their non-refugee peers. 
This should not come as a surprise given the structural disadvantages, neglect, and 
continuous marginalisation to which they are exposed and subjected. 
Methodologically, this thesis does not tackle the reasons behind the marginalisation 
and surrounding structural disadvantages. Also, it does not tackle the operation or 
role of the UNRWA. The UNRWA does not intervene in the provision of the public 
security. For the people in the camps, based on my interviews, the UNRWA is 
merely one of their major symbols of their refuge, and there is a consensus on the 
need to “keep in seeing the blue flag [UNRWA/UN flag] in the camp until we return 
to our original homes”, as an 82 year old woman in Jenin camp and expelled from 
Haifa in 1948, told me. 
In addition to the dire living conditions, these camps were submitted to major raids 
and continuous repression and persecutions by the Israeli army over the years. These 
camps were a “nightmare” to Israel and its security as they are known for their active 
                                                          
18
 UNRWA’s Website, Where we work, [Online], Available: http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work 
19
 For further analysis on the UNRWA and Palestinian refugees, please refer to Farah (2010, 2012). 
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role in armed resistance and in building up and nourishing the emergence of strong 
armed groups. The camps also played a major and pioneering role during the popular 
protests and civil obedience during the first intifada 1987-1993. During the second 
Intifada (2000-2005/6), the infamous Jenin Battle/Massacre took place in April 2002 
during the Israeli incursion of the West Bank. According to Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch the Israeli army committed war crimes during that 
operation. In addition to the human losses, major parts of the camp were completely 
destroyed and it took years before the problematic re-construction process started (a 
number of photos are offered in the Appendix to illustrate Jenin Battle). The 
resistance and steadfastness of the Jenin camp during this battle made it a symbol of 
resistance during the second intifada, and the camp was celebrated by Arafat as 
“Jeningrad”, a model that resembles Leningrad. That battle is a major source of 
pride for its leaders and the refugees overall, and the interviews I conducted with 
both the battle’s leaders and the camp’s refugees highlighted the centrality of that 
battle in shaping the people’s collective identity. Both the Balata and Jenin camps, 
witnessed the birth of Fatah’s armed group, The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, during 
the second intifada. This is why these camps remained a permanent target for Israel, 
and this is also why they were the first and main locations to be targeted by the PA’s 
security campaigns. Both camps as “militarised spaces” with legacies of resistance 
and steadfastness (Moqawama wa Sumud) gave them particular features in the 
Palestinian context that comes with positive and negative implications. The 
elaboration and analysis presented in this thesis illustrates elements in the 
transformation process of these camps due to the Fayyadist state-building project and 
governance paradigm. 
Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises five chapters/articles. The first chapter examines the evolution 
and reform of the Palestinian security forces and groups over the last two decades by 
explicating changes in the relationship and distinction between the statutory and non-
statutory security forces and groups, and also through the notion of hybridity in the 
realm of security provision. This analytical angle provides a fresh critical reading to 
the existing literature, and therefore it builds on and expands the scholarly work of 
Lia (2006, 2007), Agha and Khalidi (2005), Friedrich and Luethold (2007, 2008), 
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Frisch (2008), Leech (2012b, 2014a,b), and Bouris (2014). It also addresses the gap 
in the literature during the era of Fayyadism, contrasts the different security 
paradigms and doctrines throughout the analysis, and categorises reform processes 
into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second Intifada phase; and the 
Fayyadism phase. 
The first phase was characterised by a clash between state-building and national 
liberation projects, and also by a proliferation of security forces under Arafat’s style 
of governance; which permitted the emergence of a hybrid security model. The 
second phase was characterised by the increasing role of non-statutory security 
forces and groups in addressing the security vacuum in the aftermath of the 2002 
Israeli incursion into the West Bank, and also by the emergence of the externally-
imposed security reform agenda as an integral part of the peace process. The third 
phase was characterised by the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of state-
building and security which resulted in a shift from a hybrid security model under 
Arafat to an anti-hybrid security model under Fayyad. 
Conceptually, in an anti-hybridity paradigm, the Palestinian Authority’s statutory 
security forces are the only bodies that have the exclusive right to dominate the 
security realm. Other non-state actors, non-statutory bodies, and armed resistance 
groups have to be marginalised, dismantled, co-opted, integrated, disarmed, or 
punished according to this anti-hybridity model. In a hybrid model, however, 
statutory and non-statutory forces and groups constitute an alternative parallel 
security model whereby these groups can collaborate, clash, or be used or abused by 
the political leadership. The existence of one does not mean the absence of the other. 
Empirically, as discussed in the chapter, Arafat’s security governance model 
represented a hybrid approach, while the Fayyadist approach constitutes an anti-
hybridity approach. The notion of hybridity in this chapter is particularly influenced 
and inspired by the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual accounts of Risse 
(2011), Schneckener (2011), Börzel (2010), Börzel and Risse (2010), Boege et al. 
(2009), Menkhaus (2006/07), IDS (2010), and Luckham et al. (2011).  
This chapter concludes that the proliferation of security forces under Arafat’s rule 
resulted in further insecurities for the Palestinian people. Despite the attempt to 
reverse this condition under Fayyadism through security reform, new tensions 
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between the PA’s security forces, the resistance movements, and non-statutory 
groups emerged. This was manifested in authoritarian transformations and 
constitutes another form of institutionalised insecurities; this time framed in a state-
building and good governance project. Therefore, at best, the security transformation 
and reform under Fayyadism resulted in better stability and more security for Israel 
and its occupation, but did not result in better security conditions for Palestinians. At 
worst, the enhanced functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style 
of governance that was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in 
authoritarian transformations and the criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli 
occupation; in this way, Fayyadism directly and indirectly sustained the occupation.  
The second chapter aims to address one central question: How was the Fayyadist 
paradigm, and the consequences of its policies, perceived by the different actors and 
end-users involved? And, what does a critical unpacking from the people’s 
perspective reveal about Fayyadism? The chapter illustrates the tensions between the 
perspectives coming from the top and those of the people from below regarding the 
comprehension of Fayyadism, its pillars, and the consequences of its policies on the 
people’s security, well-being, and their national struggle for liberation. The voices 
from below challenged the glowing rhetoric of the authorities and their claims to 
institution-building and readiness for statehood, and instead revealed mounting 
anger, frustration, inequality, insecurity, and a widening legitimacy gap.  
The emergence of the Fayyadist paradigm and its successes and failures has 
polarised scholars and practitioners. Some celebrate Fayyad’s reforms and argue that 
the improved performance of the PA has contributed to peace-building and the 
enhancement of Palestinians lives (World Bank 2011a,b; IMF 2011a,b; Freidman 
2009, 2011). Others argue that it has sustained the occupation, re-structured and re-
engineered Palestinian society, created a new élite, and revised the historical national 
goals (Khalidi and Samour 2011; Brown 2010 a,b; Khan 2010; Turner 2011; Bisan 
2011). These perspectives emerged from the literature and were contrasted with the 
voices of the people gathered through ethnographic investigations at Balata and 
Jenin refugee camps. This ethnographic data revealed that despite the institutional 
and technical successes of Fayyadism, these achievements failed to have a 
meaningful impact on the daily lives or basic rights of Palestinians.  
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The voices from below articulated the detrimental effects Fayyadism has on 
resistance against the Israeli military occupation, and by extension on their own 
protection and security. They also exposed the absence of local legitimacy and local 
accountability, and questioned Fayyadism’s agenda, political basis, and trajectory as 
they relate to the Palestinian struggle for freedom. Additionally, the claims made by 
authorities that Fayyadism is the best and only approach for Palestinians to achieve 
their aspirations was challenged by the people; instead they perceived Fayyadism as 
the enforcement of an authoritarian and securitised development policy disguised as 
modernity. In light of Fayyad’s resignation in mid-2013, this chapter concludes that 
the security reform named after him is primarily about the “ism”, and not only about 
“Fayyad”; therefore the approach that Fayyad ushered in became entrenched during 
his six years of rule, and remains the force driving the state-building and governance 
trajectories in Palestine today.   
The third chapter tackles in-depth the security campaigns as a defining feature of the 
Fayyadist paradigm, and this chapter is guided by the central question: From the 
perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps, what are the 
consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on their security and on resistance 
against Israel? Balata and Jenin refugee camps were particularly selected because 
methodologically these cases represent the benchmarks for the Fayyadist paradigm, 
and analytically this means that their success extends to other areas across the 
occupied West Bank. Both camps were regularly celebrated by the Palestinian 
Authority, the international donor community, and proponents of Fayyadism as 
indicators of the success of Fayyadism as an outstanding model for state-building 
and good governance. Balata and Jenin camps were celebrated as camps that 
transformed from places that “export terror” to stable camps operating under the rule 
of law (on account of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces). However, a 
representative voice from below argued that “the security campaigns are like giving 
someone paracetamol to cure cancer”; a statement that summarises the wide gap 
between the claims of authorities and the reality experienced by the people. The 
powerful narrative of the people expresses their ability to unpack and problematise 
the security reform pillar of Fayyadism, and is also discussed in the chapter.  
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Furthermore, the ethnographic evidence from both Balata and Jenin refugee camps 
not only unpacks and deconstructs the implications of the security campaigns on the 
lives of the people, but also expands and challenges the debates in the literature 
(Sayigh 2011; Tabar 2012; Schroeder et al. 2014; Marten 2014; Mustafa 2014). The 
people focused on the notion of resistance as the centre of analysis to explore the 
consequences of the security reform on their lives and their national struggle. This 
meant that they problematised and unpacked the security campaigns through a 
resistance lens, as opposed to the conventional institutional lenses available in the 
literature. These voices from below not only clarified the link between security 
reform and resistance against Israel, but they also illustrated how and why resistance 
against Israel has been criminalised. 
Additionally, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the security reform and 
campaigns resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and 
its security forces operations. This authoritarianism is manifest in the excessive use 
of arbitrary detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space 
for opposition voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. Furthermore, the 
unorganised, incomplete, and therefore ineffective security campaigns employed 
informal tools and mechanisms in an effort to induce formality and exclusivity to the 
PA security forces in governing these camps. The findings also suggest that the 
security reforms were used to address intra-Fatah factional politics. Fundamentally, 
the core objective of the security reform and campaigns was to silence, marginalise, 
and criminalise resistance against the Israeli occupation and its colonial dominance, 
as suggested by the ethnographic evidence. 
This chapter concludes by arguing that conducting security reform to ensure stability 
within a context of colonial occupation and without addressing the imbalances of 
power or revisiting the terms of the peace agreements can only ever have two 
outcomes: “better” collaboration with the colonial occupying power, and a violation 
of the security and (national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own leadership 
and (national) security forces. 
The last two chapters in the thesis examine dimensions in the political economy 
sphere of the Fayyadist paradigm by discussing its interaction with the aid industry, 
and by noting the implications of its neoliberal economic policies on the emerged 
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cycles of contentions, particularly in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. 
The fourth chapter, which is co-authored with Jeremy Wildeman from the 
University of Exeter, deviates from the bottom-up methodological approach and 
instead builds on thirty original semi-structured interviews conducted with Palestine 
aid actors that sought to investigate whether patterns in OPT donor aid have changed 
following the Arab uprisings of 2011. Put differently, have the transformations that 
occurred under the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall 
framework of the aid industry? With the dominance of donors’ prescriptions and the 
dependency on aid money, this chapter argues that the Fayyadist paradigm not only 
failed to trickle down its institutional and technical successes, such that Palestinian 
people’s lives were positively impacted, but it also failed to change the flawed 
patterns of aid, its framework, the priorities of the donors, and thus the whole aid 
industry remains dictated by the instrumental donors from the top. 
In other words, the failure of aid to bring peace and development is well-documented 
in the literature (Khan et al. 2004; Keating et al. 2005; Le More 2008; Taghdisi-Rad 
2011; Nakhleh 2011). However, the implications and consequences of Fayyadism 
and the transformations in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings are still lacking. By 
addressing this gap, this chapter argues that the aid patterns remain unchanged and 
that donors remain transfixed on a long failed “Investment in Peace” framework that 
was designed for economic development by the World Bank back in 1993 (Tartir 
and Wildeman 2012, 2013). By contrasting the findings of this research with the 
existing literature, this chapters argues that donors are not ready to alter a framework 
dominated by policy instrumentalists who emphasise pre-determined normative 
values over actual results, quietly trading financial inducements to Palestinians to 
forego political rights within a “peace dividends” model.  
In addition to the original empirical evidence that this chapter offers, it also provides 
a fresh reading and categorisation of the existing literature based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of Mosse (2005). The distinction between the “instrumentalists” and 
“critics” throughout the chapter constitute a new take on the literature, both 
methodologically and analytically. Another distinctive feature of this chapter is its 
regional settings and its interaction with the consequences of the post-2011 Arab 
uprisings. This chapter argues that it is the very resilience of the Palestinian aid 
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model, and the scale of that intervention, which signifies its importance in the story 
of Middle East regional aid. At the same time, the OPT has acted as a “laboratory” 
where donors have been able to test models that appear not only secure but 
successful enough that the managing directors of major international financial 
institutions in the OPT would consider exporting the post-Oslo Palestinian aid model 
to other Arab states in the wake of the 2011 uprisings. 
Nothing illustrates this better than the appointment of Salam Fayyad as the lead 
economist and advisor to the Yemeni government by the World Bank in 2014 to lead 
the economic reform of Yemen. This shows that the transformation induced by the 
Fayyadist paradigm not only failed to change the dynamics and power imbalances in 
the aid industry in the OPT, but also that the Fayyadist paradigm was used by donors 
to testify the validity of their governance reform policy prescriptions to the whole 
Middle East. In other words, the application of the Fayyadist paradigm in Balata and 
Jenin refugee camps sought to indicate to the world its ability to govern and its 
readiness for statehood, while the donors themselves used the Fayyadist paradigm, 
and Fayyad himself, as evidencing the validity of their policy prescriptions and 
framework for the “new” Middle East.   
Finally, the fifth chapter problematises the neoliberal policies of the Fayyadist 
paradigm and the failing patterns of international aid as root causes for the 
contentions in the era of Fayyadism. Protests against the Fayyadist neoliberal 
economic policies, the international aid industry, and the economic framework of the 
Oslo Peace Accords, albeit fragmented or repressed, constituted forms of contentious 
collective actions where different actors joined forces to confront, challenge, and 
expose repressive authorities and propose alternatives. Inspired by the theoretical 
underpinnings of contentious politics discussed in the chapter, these collective 
actions were triggered by political opportunities, constraints, or threats; however, 
these protests failed to draw on social networks, common purposes, or cultural 
frameworks, and thus failed to build solidarity or collective identities. Therefore, this 
chapter argues that in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings, the political and 
economic protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory constituted cycles of 
contention but failed to transform into a social movement for political and economic 
rights. This is majorly due to the authoritarian transformation of the Palestinian 
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Authority and Israeli settler colonialism, but this is also attributed to intra-Palestinian 
fragmentation, the absence of alternative or unified leadership, the entrenchment of 
the neoliberal economic policies, and the structural changes and social engineering 
processes that the Palestinian society underwent during the era of Fayyadism 
(Khalidi 2012; Hanieh 2013; Hilal 2014; Samour 2014).    
This chapter also engages with contentious politics theories, particularly the 
conceptual underpinnings of Tarrow (2012) and Beinin and Vairel (2013), in order to 
expand them through their application to the case of Palestine during the era of 
Fayyadism. This chapter argues that the concepts, dynamics, processes, and tools of 
contentious politics are also applicable to the economic domain, and therefore 
through the case of Palestine it attempts to operationalises the notion of contentious 
economics as an integral, but also distinctive, feature in the theories of contentious 
politics. This chapter defines the notion of contentious economics through the 
concept of resistance economy, an alternative model that is emerging as an output of 
the cycles of contentions and contentious collective actions. The chapter concludes 
by arguing that in contrast to Fayyadist neoliberalism, the failed patterns of the aid 
industry, and the public and critical intellectual rejection of the economic policies of 
the PA and the overall economic framework of Oslo Accords, the notion of a 
resistance economy could be an ultimate expression of contentious economics. 
Moreover, this chapter uses existing empirical evidence to contribute to the 
expansion of theoretical debates, and as such the interaction between the theories of 
contentious politics, the concept of contentious economics, and the empirical 
dimensions of resistance economy constitute the primary contributions of this 
chapter to the corpus of literature.   
In sum, the predominant contribution of this thesis to scholarly literature on state-
building and governance is empirical and ethnographic in nature. In its overarching 
conclusion, this thesis shows how problematic it is to initiate a state-building 
program without a state, and how an externally-sponsored security and economic 
reform agenda could, if the imbalances of power are not addressed, lead to the 
entrenchment of injustices and thus sustain a foreign military occupation and a settler 
colonial regime. 
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Abstract 
This chapter provides a contextualised analysis of the evolution and 
reform processes of Palestinian security forces since the establishment 
of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 until the era of Fayyadism up 
until 2013. It examines this evolution and the associated reform 
processes by exploring the relationship between the statutory and non-
statutory security forces and groups, and in consideration of the notion 
of hybridity in the realm of security provision. This analytical angle 
provides a fresh critical reading to the existing literature, and provides 
a contextualised setting to historicise Fayyadism.  
 
This chapter categorises the evolution of Palestinian security reform 
processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second 
Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase. The first phase was 
characterised by a clash between state-building and national liberation 
projects, and by a proliferation of security forces under Arafat’s style 
of governance. The second phase was characterised by the increasing 
role of non-statutory security forces to address the security vacuum, 
and also by the emergence of an externally-imposed security reform 
agenda. The third phase was characterised by the adoption of a 
Weberian conceptualisation of state-building and security, which 
resulted in a shift from a hybrid security model under Arafat to an 
anti-hybrid security model under Fayyad. 
 
This chapter concludes that despite the attempt to reverse the 
conditions of insecurity under Fayyadism through security reform, 
new tensions between the PA’s security forces, the resistance 
movements, and non-statutory groups emerged. This was manifested 
in authoritarian transformations; this time framed in a state-building 
and good governance project. Therefore, the enhanced functionality of 
the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that was 
defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in the 
criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation; in this 
way, Fayyadism directly and indirectly sustained the occupation.  
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 Introduction and Background 1.1.
Since the 1993 Oslo Accords through to the present, the trajectories undertaken by 
the Palestinian statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups have been 
fraught with contradictions and dilemmas. The role of statutory forces (in reference 
to the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) security forces) has transformed according to the 
evolution of political developments, conflict dynamics, as well as changes in the 
composition of Palestinian leadership, its strategies, and security doctrines. 
However, such transformations remained within the framework of the Oslo Accords 
and its security arrangements, which intended to fulfil the Oslo Accords’ clauses to 
protect Israeli security through its statutory forces (Khan 2010) and to maintain law, 
order, and stability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).  
In the meantime, the Palestinian non-statutory forces, armed groups and non-state 
actors (in reference to the non-PA’s security forces and groups) continued in their 
role of resisting Israeli military occupation while providing security and protection to 
the Palestinian people. However, this dichotomy between the roles of, and the 
relationship between, the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups is 
not linear or straight forward. This chapter argues that at the conceptual level, 
considering the Palestinian resistance armed groups and non-state actors (for 
example, pre-2006 Hamas) as non-statutory, implies a certain level of illegality and 
unlawfulness. At the contextual level, it is argued here that such conceptualisation 
contradicts with the right of nations to resist foreign occupations and attain their 
right of self-determination by any means at their disposal as affirmed by the UN 
Resolution 2649.  
Given that the majority of the Palestinian non-statutory groups were established 
before the creation of the PA, they are deeply engrained locally and traditionally, 
embedded in the struggle, and viewed by Palestinian people as major actors for 
protection and resistance. As such, they challenge the legitimacy of the PA’s 
statutory security forces. The terms “statutory and non-statutory” has to be 
understood and analysed in this context, this chapter argues. The relationship 
between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups is the lens that 
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this chapter uses to understand and analyse the evolution and reform of Palestinian 
security forces since the Oslo Accords. 
Theoretically, this relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security 
forces and groups is understood and analysed in the chapter through the notion of 
hybridity. This means that an anti-hybridity paradigm implies the adoption of a 
Weberian conceptualisation of the monopoly of violence where the PA’s statutory 
security forces are the only bodies that have the right and exclusivity to dominate the 
security realm. Other non-state actors, non-statutory bodies, and armed resistance 
groups have to be marginalised, dismantled, co-opted, integrated, disarmed or 
punished according to this anti-hybridity model. An anti-hybridity security model 
therefore implies the exclusivity for state-like forces within the overall context of an 
Israeli occupation. In a hybrid model, however, statutory and non-statutory forces 
and groups constitute an alternative parallel security models where they can 
collaborate, clash, and be used or abused by the political leadership. The existence of 
one does not mean the absence of the other.  
Empirically, this chapter argues that the governance and security model adopted by 
Arafat since the establishment of the PA in 1993 until his death in 2004 formed a 
hybrid approach in the realm of security provision. Through Arafat’s model, the 
existence of the PA’s security forces did not fundamentally threaten the existence of 
other non-statutory actors and armed groups. An example is the Fatah’s Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades, which was formed and financed by Arafat himself in 2000. 
However, in the post-Arafat era (the Fayyadism era), the adoption of a Weberian 
conceptualisation of state-building and security meant that this very Fatah non-
statutory body, in addition to the other non-state actors, became targets of the new 
security approach and doctrine under the Fayyadist paradigm.
20
 This resulted in a 
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 Yasir Arafat was the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1969; the 
president of the Palestinian Authority since its establishment 1993; the leader of Fatah since 1959; the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces; and, the head of the PLO’s Political 
Department and Executive Committee until his death in November 2004. Mahmoud Abbas was the 
successor of Arafat in all the above-mentioned positions since 2005 until today. Salam Fayyad was 
the Palestinian Prime and Finance Minister from 2007 until mid-2013. Fayyad joined the Palestinian 
polity in 2002 as Finance Minister after serving for a decade in the IMF and World Bank. Both styles 
of governance, Arafatism and Fayyadism, are explained in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Hamasism refers to the rule and style of governance of Hamas after winning the parliamentary 
elections in 2006.  Following the intra-Palestinian divide in 2007, the dominance of Hamas style is 
exclusive to Gaza (Baconi 2014; Bert 2015; Shobaki 2015). 
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shift from a hybrid security model under Arafat to an anti-hybrid security model 
under Fayyad.
21
 Yet, the continuation and further entrenchment of the Israeli 
occupation, which has ultimate consequences for the security forces and their 
doctrines, remains a constant variable. 
Based on this conceptualisation and framing, this chapter provides a contextualised 
analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces over the 
last two decades. It does so through critical engagement with the literature to provide 
a fresh and original perspective through the hybridity lens. Additionally it addresses 
the periodisation gap during the Fayyadism era in the literature and contrast the 
different security paradigms through analysing the evolution of the security forces 
since the Oslo Accords and through categorising them in three main phases. This 
chapter highlights that the Oslo Accords and Arafatism introduced many security 
forces however their proliferation was associated with higher levels of insecurity and 
coupled with high levels of corruption, patronage-based politics and personalised 
style of governance. Furthermore, this chapter highlights that while Fayyadism 
meant to reverse the negative outcomes of the Oslo Accords and Arafatism, it 
resulted in rising tensions between the PA’s security forces and the resistance 
movements and the non-statutory groups and forces. The contextual setting is 
provided to test the hypothesis that the transformations, reforms, and paradigm shifts 
in the security realm during the Fayyadism era achieved better stability for Israel but 
not better security for the Palestinian people. Despite the security reform processes 
under Fayyadism, the transformations, reforms, and paradigm shifts led to 
authoritarian transformations in the OPT. 
The evolution of the Palestinian security forces underwent three major phases:
22
  
I. The Oslo Accords Phase (1993-1999): Entailed the establishment and 
building-up of the PA’s security forces in the West Bank and Gaza according 
to Oslo Accords. This phase was characterised by a hybrid approach in the 
realm of security provision which was associated with Arafat’s style of 
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 Table.5 and Table.6 in the Appendix contrast the security and economy models of Arafatism and 
Fayyadism and highlight the major transformations and shifts in these spheres.    
22
 A detailed chronology of the evolution of Palestinian security forces over the past two decades, 
prepared by the author, is provided in the appendix (Table.7). It divides the evolution into five 
categories and presents the major characteristics and main events of each phase.    
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governance. An identity crisis featured the PA institutions in the aftermath of 
transforming from a liberation movement to a civil administration. This led to 
the proliferation of the security forces which was associated with a state of 
insecurity to the Palestinian people. This phase is also characterised by the 
lack of civil democratic governing expertise, excessive corruption, and the 
absence of Palestinian sovereignty or real authority;  
II. The Second Intifada Phase (2000-2006): The existing PA security forces 
and infrastructure were destroyed in the aftermath of the second intifada, 
which was brought on by the Israeli incursion of the West Bank as well as the 
continuous attacks on Gaza, particularly between 2000 and 2002. These 
attacks resulted in the emergence of an influential role for non-statutory 
forces/non-state actors to fulfil the security gap and vacuum. However, due to 
the mixed results that emerged from the dominance of the non-statutory 
bodies, as well as the failure of the Camp David Summit, the establishment of 
the Quartet, and finally the death of Arafat, the security sector reform became 
the major priority for the PA, Israel, and international donors. This era 
culminated in the victory of Hamas in the parliamentary elections, a win that 
allowed Hamas to lead the PA’s institutions until mid-2007 when the intra-
Palestinian divide between West Bank and Gaza took place, causing a rupture 
in the security establishment;  
III. The Fayyadism Phase (2007 until Fayyad’s resignation in mid-2013): 
This phase witnessed the reinvention of the Palestinian security forces 
through a major security sector reform initiative. The PA statutory forces 
performed security campaigns and disarmament processes in an effort to 
maintain law and order and to enforce their exclusive legitimate use of force 
through the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of the monopoly of 
violence. The security reform was heavily supported and sponsored by the 
international community and Israel, and its ultimate aim was to eliminate the 
hybridity in the security provision and to criminalise resistance despite the 
absence of a Palestinian sovereignty and the presence of the Israeli military 
occupation.
23
 
A thematic and chronological evolution of Palestinian security forces, and the main 
characteristics of each phase, is illustrated in Figure.1, prepared by the author. 
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 In Gaza Hamas initiated its own self-reliant security governance model while persisting under 
Israeli and Egyptian siege and western official boycott. The results were mixed, particularly when 
examining the human rights violations, but it was argued that Hamas forces owned its security sector, 
had clearer chains of commands, and had developed local professional training and planning 
capacities (Sayigh 2009; Sayigh 2010, 2011a,b; ICG 2008a,b, 2010).   
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Figure 1: Thematic and Chronological Evolution of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 
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Furthermore, Figure.2, prepared by the author, introduces the statutory and non-
statutory security forces. It divides the PA’s statutory security forces into internal 
security forces and national security forces (PA’s “Proto-army”), and combined they 
are comprised of some fifteen active bodies. By contrast, the non-statutory security 
forces and groups are mainly associated with political factions, social movements, 
families and clans, popular protection committees, and other informal bodies that are 
embedded in Palestinian traditions, and combined they are comprised of some 
thirteen active groups. The chart also introduces the major international security 
actors. Further elaboration concerning the statutory and non-statutory security 
forces’ functions, capacities and sources of funding is provided in the appendix 
(Table.9 and Table.10). 
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Figure 2: Mapping the Statutory and Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups 
 
Chapter One: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 
 
66 
 
These security forces, as one component of the Palestinian security sector, performed 
their duties in a highly fragmented space. According to the Oslo Accords, the West 
Bank was divided into three areas: Area (A) under the civilian and security control of 
the PA (17%); area (B) under PA’s civilian control only (24%); and area (C) under 
full Israeli control (59%). Hebron was divided into Areas H1 and H2, and Gaza was 
divided into Yellow and White areas (UNCTAD 2006).
24
 Two decades after the Oslo 
Accords, the level of territorial fragmentation was further exacerbated with the 
construction of an Israeli separation wall, more than half a million Jewish settlers 
living in illegal settlements, five hundred checkpoints and barriers to tighten up the 
matrix of control, and daily lands confiscation and ethnic cleansing (Halper 2010). 
This level of fragmentation (UNDP 2010) carried direct consequences for the 
operations of the security forces and not only affected their efficacy, but constituted 
the major source of insecurity for Palestinians.    
The revolutionary legacy of the Palestinian national movement posed another 
challenge for the security forces created after the Oslo Accords (Agha and Khalidi 
2005; Parsons 2005). The Palestinian security sector was established in exile with 
the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 (Sayigh 1999). 
At that time, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was its core security force, in 
addition to other armed groups; hence, the PLO had a history and culture of informal 
or insurgent policing (Khalidi 2006). These forces were trained and equipped by 
their host countries and other allies, and as such they were affected by different 
styles of governance (Le More 2008). The operations were revolutionary in nature; 
however, four decades before the PA’s establishment they had created a base for 
various levels of contradictions with the civil nature of the PA (Frisch 2008; Sayigh 
2011). This revolutionary legacy has impacted today’s public perceptions of 
Palestinian security forces.  
This chapter is structured in a chronological order. It starts by addressing the 
tensions between state-building and national liberation projects, and their impact on 
the evolution of Palestinian security forces. It focuses on the proliferation of the 
security forces, the complex dynamics of corruption, and Arafat’s personalised style 
of governance, as these are the major features of the Arafatism era. In the second 
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 A map illustrating areas A, B and C in the West Bank appears in the appendix (Figure.13). 
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section, the chapter discusses the road to reform as a consequence of the security 
vacuum that emerged in the aftermath of the second intifada. It also highlights the 
dominance of armed groups and the hybrid model of security provision in the 
security realm; and the clashes between the different security paradigms constitute 
the main focus of the section. Lastly, the third section reflects on the security model 
of Fayyadism, discusses its essence, technical successes, and national failures. The 
appendix offers further elaboration on the Palestinian statutory and non-statutory 
security forces and their functions and capacities (Table.9 and Table.10). 
 Building Security Forces: State-Building vs. National 1.2.
Liberation (1993-1999) 
During this phase, the process of building-up the PA’s security forces was neither 
inclusive nor transparent, was fraught with corruption and nepotism, and was 
exposed to the inside-outside leadership clashes (Lia 2006; Khatib 2010). This 
resulted in the proliferation of security forces, increased internal conflicts and 
competition, the absence of a unified security strategy or chain of command, and a 
failure to protect the Palestinian people. This failure to protect Palestinians was 
partly due to the lack of expertise and professionalism of the security forces, but 
more importantly it was the consequence of the Oslo Accords’ design (Khan 2005) 
and the failure to resolve the dilemma of state-building versus national liberation. 
Meyers (2000:91) argued that, “it is an anomaly in the Palestinian case, created by 
the agreements, that the functions of the Palestinian security forces are very 
specifically limited, but for the interests of an outside state, not to protect Palestinian 
citizens”. Therefore, as was argued by Agha and Khalidi (2005:88), the PA was 
“torn between reining in armed elements and thus providing security to its adversary 
Israel, and indulging those elements and thus participating in the struggle for 
national liberation”. Consequently, the PA has not as yet won sufficient credibility or 
power to be able to assert its primacy over the resistance-oriented factions. At the 
same time, the PA has been totally incapable of defending its people in the sense of 
actively confronting Israeli armed actions or incursions onto Palestinian soil, or 
raising the cost of the occupation (Agha and Khalidi 2005:88). The legacy of 
corruption, absence of professionalism, and Arafat’s personalised style of 
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governance allowed the Palestinian people to perceive the PA’s security forces as 
ineffective and unreliable (Lia 2007).    
1.2.1. The Origins  
The 1994 Cairo Agreement stipulated the establishment of a “strong police force” 
with a maximum of 9,000 recruits (7,000 from abroad and 2,000 from the occupied 
territories) to guarantee “public order and internal security within the jurisdiction of 
the Palestinian Authority” (Lia 2006:96). It set up various Palestinian-Israeli joint 
security bodies, such as the Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee 
for Mutual Security Purposes, the District Coordination Offices, and the Joint Civil 
Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee, as well as Joint Patrols and Joint 
Mobile Units. Ten days after signing the Cairo Agreement, PLA soldiers and the 
returnees (Al-‘aedin) started to return back to Gaza and Jericho to set up the PA’s 
security forces and institutions. The 1995 Oslo II increased the number of policemen 
to 30,000 (12,000 for the West Bank and 18,000 for Gaza); however, by then the 
Palestinian police force had already reached 22,000 in Gaza and Jericho alone. In 
1995, Arafat arrived in the West Bank and Palestinian forces were deployed in Areas 
(A), touring in the Palestinian cities in their PLA military uniform in an act of 
revolutionary victory (Frisch 2008:86-88). 
In 1998 the number of security personnel reached between 30,000 and 40,000, in 
2000 this number had increased to 50,000, and by 2003 there were 53,000 (Le More 
2008). According to Oslo Accords, the police would constitute the “only Palestinian 
security authority”, form “one integral unit under the control” of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, and have six categories: civil, public security, preventive 
security, presidential guard, emergency services and rescue, and intelligence 
(Friedrich and Luethold 2007:19-20).
25
 However, by 2004 there were more than 15 
different security bodies.
26
 This proliferation of security forces urged Ramadan 
Shallah, the leader of Islamic Jihad, to argue in 1996: “Arafat has so many 
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 The different structure of the PA’s security sector between 1995 and 2011 can be found in the 
appendix (Figures 9,10,11 and 12).  
26
 The appendix provides a detailed account –compiled by the author- of the PA’s security forces and 
describes their main functions, their main sources of financing, and their capacities (Tables 9 and 10). 
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intelligence services in the self-rule areas that if you open your window, Preventive 
Security peeps in; if you open your door, the Presidential Security Service comes in; 
if you go out to your garden, you bump into Military Intelligence; and if you go out 
to the street, you come across General Intelligence” (cited in Lia 2006:307). While 
Edward Said (1995:xxxi) stated that “Arafat established several security forces, five 
of them were intelligence services all spying on each other”. 
1.2.2. Proliferation, Patronage and Corruption 
The proliferation of the security forces in this phase did not occur incidentally. It was 
a tool that Arafat used to keep his control over the security establishment and to 
enforce his approach of divide-to-rule. He created a system in which the heads of 
security forces reported to him exclusively. In turn, they themselves were in rivalry 
in their operations, often leading to bloody clashes. This mode of personalised 
governance and patronage led to the establishment of self-interested groups that 
resisted any form of reform. Arafat, up until 2003, refused to use the word “reform” 
preferring, at the best of times, the word “development”. Arafat once stated: “no one 
can intervene between me and my children” in reference to the security forces 
leadership (Al-Shu’aibi 2012:5). This personalised style of governance was 
interrelated with corruption and nepotism, and as such generated negative 
consequences on the security forces’ operations. Not only did it damage the forces 
reputation, but it also impeded the security and safety of the Palestinian people. This 
de-institutionalizing mode of governance was coupled with an intra-Palestinian 
conflict between the inside and outside leaderships. Additionally, there were 
problematic recruitment policies, as well as managerial and administrative 
weaknesses, which were ultimately impeded the effectiveness of these forces and the 
services that they provided. 
During this phase, one of the most striking manifestations of corruption was the 
distribution of cash salaries. The head of the security force (Jihaz) would visit 
Arafat’s office, receive a bag full of cash; soldiers were supposed to queue up to 
receive their cash in hand (Le More 2008). This phase also featured the emergence 
of a “gun culture” in Palestinian society (Lia 2006; Najib and Friedrich 2007), 
whereby it was normal scenery to see men in plain clothes walking in the streets with 
a gun on their side ready to be used for the resolution of any small problem. The 
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matter in which the PA forces dealt with such chaos and violence was also corrupted. 
They managed to control the weak personnel, who did not belong to an influential 
family or to a strong political body; however, the stronger and better-connected 
personnel were merely required to conceal their gun rather than display it. The 
corruption dynamics expanded to reach both procurement and inventory systems, as 
well as the benefits systems with the misuse of resources, powers, and public 
facilities. All of these dynamics were felt and seen by the public, which intensified 
the legitimacy gap between the PA’s forces and people. 
Additionally, there had been an absence of effective mechanisms to ensure inter-
agency cooperation, which resulted in a waste of resources and inefficient 
performance. There was no space for developing effective civil-democratic oversight 
or accountability mechanisms, particularly since the Palestinian Legislative Council 
had been neglected and bypassed due to Arafat’s mode of governance. The executive 
branch of the Authority was dominating the realm in the absence of effective 
judiciary or legislative branches.  
The corruption thread was also reflected at the political level, which witnessed a 
divide between the Palestinian inside and outside leaderships. This divide proved to 
be problematic when the returnees arrived to the West Bank and Gaza and 
established the security forces. These forces and their leadership were returning from 
exile, an imposition that made the local Palestinians uncomfortable. Many felt that 
these security forces were “theirs” not “ours”, and the last thing local Palestinians 
wished for was to replace the foreign occupation with a local one (Lia 2007). 
Palestinians were not expecting practices such as Black Friday in Gaza in November 
1994, when Palestinian police fired live ammunition at civilian demonstrators thus 
killing 13 and wounding another 200, or the arresting and torturing of the opposition 
(Frisch 2008). Hence, there was a problem of inclusiveness from the beginning. 
This inclusiveness problem was reinforced through recruitment policies; since the 
vast majority of the recruited security personnel belonged to one political party, 
Fatah. Such policies served to “de-legitimize the whole institution and was not 
viewed as neutral national institution by the public” (Al-Shu’aibi 2012:2). Moreover, 
the recruitment process lacked transparency and accountability, and was managed 
through political and social bases. This meant that wasta (nepotism) was the marker 
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of merit rather than actual training or skill set. As pointed out in 1997 by 
Mohammed Dahlan, then the PA Preventive Security Chief in Gaza: “We have 
36,000 people of whom we only need 10,000. This huge number is a burden on the 
PA and a burden on the security organ. We view it as a social issue because I cannot 
tell a prisoner who spent 15 years in jail that I have no job for him” (cited in Le 
More 2008:78). Thirteen years later in summer 2010, I asked Dahlan about the 
progress of the PA security forces, he told me: “the major problem for our misery 
now and the defeat in Gaza in 2007 is attributed to prioritizing quantity over 
quality”. 
On the other hand, and in technical terms, the PA’s security forces fulfilled many of 
their obligations dictated by the Oslo Accords, as they engaged in a process of 
dismantling the Palestinian “infrastructure of terror” as well as protecting Israeli 
security. The PA forces, along with their duties to enforce law and order, targeted, 
arrested, and harassed many Palestinian activists and members of the opposition. 
They also conducted a “controlling campaign” to regulate, license, and organise the 
possession of arms. The PA forces managed to “impress” the Israelis, despite their 
lack of expertise (Brown 2003; Friedrich and Luethold 2007). This partially explains 
why Israel and the international community were silent about, and complicit in, 
sustaining the network of corruption and perpetuating the absence of reform in 
Palestinian security institutions. By 1999, a few security forces had developed their 
capacities more than others and acquired a certain stock of expertise. From the 
perspective of the PA’s supporters, the mere existence of the PA’s security forces, 
despite all the challenges, was their biggest success.  
In sum, this phase was characterised by a clash between two parallel projects: state-
building versus national liberation. While the former implied building the 
institutional underpinnings and capacities for the interim authority to transform into 
the statehood phase one the 1967 borders by 1999, the later assumed that that the PA 
security forces will be an extension to the PLO’s PLA and therefore engage in a 
national liberation endeavour of historical Palestine based on 1948 borders. Clearly, 
these are two parallel ventures. One implemented by state-like institutions and the 
other is implemented by a national liberation movement. These two contradictory 
approaches meant that the emerged tensions and clashes between the two approaches 
Chapter One: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 
 
72 
 
were also reflected on the style of governance and the security doctrine of the 
Palestinian leadership. These clashes and tensions, in addition to the deep distortions 
in the processes accompanying the evolution of the PA forces as a result of the 
asymmetry of power relations, resulted in a mixed record concerning the PA’s 
security forces’ effectiveness. 
However after all, Arafat’s personalised style of governance or the complex network 
of corruption were not the only reasons to blame and such explanation will be 
“overtly simplistic, if not disingenuous” as argued by Le More (2008:82). Any 
contextualised analysis should consider the complexity of the internal and external 
dimensions of the growth of authoritarianism and patronage-based system in the 
West Bank and Gaza. For instance, Robinson (1997) has argued that the PA became 
an authoritarian polity because the exiled leadership of the PLO had to recapture and 
centralise power and marginalise the local political leaders. Brynen (1995, 2000) 
argued that the Oslo Accords managed to create new Palestinian elite that sustained 
its operation with a framework of neo-patrimonial style of governance. However, 
Khan et al. (2004) argued that Israel’s intention was to create a “client state” upon 
which it could continue to exert considerable control and leverage through the rents 
it distributed to the PA, which was coupled with territorial fragmentation and a 
strategy of asymmetric containment. Therefore, the tenets of the Oslo Accords and 
Israeli policies were also major reasons to blame as the next section demonstrates. 
 Destroying and Reforming Palestinian Security 1.3.
Infrastructure: Dominance of Non-state Actors (2000-2006) 
A new round of violence began after the failures of Camp David and Taba Peace 
Summits in 2000. This was in addition to the infamous visit of Ariel Sharon, the 
leader of the Israeli Likud political party at the time, to Al-Haram Al-Sharif (Temple 
Mount) in September 2000 accompanied by 1,000 security guards; 47 Palestinians 
were killed, 1,855 were injured, and 5 Israelis were killed in a matter of five days. 
The second intifada erupted, and the PA security forces engaged actively in it. This 
intifada took on a militarised character from the Palestinian side as well, and all 
armed resistance groups intensified their operations. The newly established Fatah’s 
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Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were influential and controversial, having acquired 
substantive resources from Arafat and the PA leadership.
27
  
1.3.1. Security Vacuum  
A major incident that signalled the PA’s security forces engagement in the intifada 
occurred in Ramallah on the 12
th
 of October, 2000. The PA police stopped two 
Israeli soldiers in plain clothes and dragged them to the main police station where 
they were beaten, stabbed, and killed. This incident made the Israeli security 
establishment lose trust in the PA forces, and they reconsidered their relationship. On 
the same day, Israel launched airstrikes against PA security targets, completely 
destroying the security premises. In March 2002 Israel launched Operation 
Defensive Shield, and this military operation caused massive destruction and losses 
in both human and economic measures. Palestinian security personnel were detained 
and disarmed en masse, their facilities destroyed, and PA civil institutions ransacked. 
The destruction of physical infrastructure is estimated to have cost the economy $3.5 
billion, equivalent to 30 per cent of pre-2000 capital stock (UNCTAD 2005). The 
UNCTAD estimated that the cumulative economic opportunity cost in terms of loss 
of potential income over the period 2000–2004 is $6.4 billion, or 140 per cent the 
size of the Palestinian GDP before 2000. The destruction of the PA’s security 
apparatus and facilities exceeded $38.5 million in the West Bank and $34.5 million 
in Gaza Strip up to early 2002 (Dajani 2005; World Bank 2004).   
With their diminished capacity, the activities of the security forces became more 
haphazard. Traffic police with civilian attire, or a city governor detaining thieves in 
his own home due to the absence of prison facilities, became common occurrences 
(Al-Basoos 2005). The destruction of the PA forces’ capabilities, capacities, and 
resources created a gap which was filled by armed groups, military wings, and non-
state security actors, including Hamas (Milton-Edward 2009).  
This security vacuum filled by non-statutory and non-state actors imposed new 
challenges to security provision and governance, as Palestinian people perceived the 
non-state actors as more trustworthy and legitimate than the state-actors (PASSIA 
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 The appendix offers a detailed account –compiled by the author- of the major military groups and 
armed wings and describes their main functions, their main sources of financing, and their capacities.     
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and DCAF 2006). For instance, a national survey conducted in 2005 by DCAF and 
IUED revealed that 34 per cent of the interviewees had great trust in the Al-Qassam 
Brigades (Hamas), and 29 per cent had great trust in the Saraya Al-Quds (Islamic 
Jihad), as opposed to 21 per cent in the Civil Police and 18 per cent in the Preventive 
Security. In another national survey (a sample of 1,800 Palestinians) conducted by 
DCAF in 2006, 74% of the camps respondents and 60% of the outside the camps 
respondents felt insecure. More than 70% of the respondents trusted non-statutory 
forces very much or to some extent, while the trust in the PA security forces remain 
shaky. The most trustworthy groups were the military wings of Hamas (79%) and 
Islamic Jihad (78%). This was confirmed when the people were asked how the PA 
should deal with armed groups. A majority of 86% favoured dialogue and consensus 
over the use of force. 76% of the respondents rejected the use of force against the 
militias (DCAF 2006). The popularity of armed non-statutory groups and non-state 
actors emerged not only because of the destruction of the PA security infrastructure, 
but also because resisting Israeli military occupation is a national popular duty, as 
was expressed by many people. Therefore, a decade after the establishment of the 
PA and despite the billions of aid money, it remained weak and fragile.  
1.3.2. The Road to Reform 
The rising influence of armed groups and non-state actors was a threat to Israeli 
security; therefore, under Israeli and international pressure, the PA was forced to 
start a reform project for its security sector and forces (Sigman et al. 2005). On the 
23
rd
 of June 2002, one day before President Bush delivered a speech on his vision for 
peace in the Middle East, the PA announced its 100-Day Reform Plan.
28
 The 100-
Day Plan called for a “comprehensive reform throughout the government, renewal of 
the legitimacy of elected officials through democratic elections, rearranged 
ministerial structures, and reinforced separation of powers” (UNDP 2003:3). It 
aimed to reduce the power of the President, increase the power of the Parliament, 
institute the rule of law, and increase the scrutiny of Palestinian finances (Turner 
2009) as a prerequisites for peace and state recognition (ICG 2002, 2004). In the 
domain of “public security”, the 100-Day Plan aimed to restructure the Ministry of 
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 Following the 100-Day Plan, the PA worked towards implementing a 60-Day Action Plan in 2003 
and a Six-Month Reform Plan in the first half of 2004, and put forward a One-Year Reform Action 
Plan in September 2004. 
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Interior (MoI) and modernise its apparatus; attach the Preventive Security Services, 
the Police and the Civil Defence to the MoI; and activate the role of the MoI and its 
apparatuses in the enforcement of court rulings. It also aimed to reinforce loyalty to 
the Authority; end the role of the security services in civilian affairs; and give utmost 
attention to the needs of the population, whose support and cooperation would be 
acquired by inducing law and order (PA 2002). 
Meanwhile in 2002, the role of the CIA was expanded, and the Quartet and its 
International Task Force on Palestinian Reform were established as international 
bodies to supervise the Palestinian security sector reform. With the proliferation of 
international controlling bodies, scholars argued that Palestine became under 
(financial) international trusteeship and lost any kind of ownership on the reform 
processes (Khalidi 2005; Brown 2010a). As argued by Turner (2009:568), “the PA, 
still reeling from the ‘shock and awe’ of Operation Defensive Shield and lacking the 
resources to rebuild what had been destroyed, had little choice but to take the shock 
doctors’ medicine”. This was further entrenched by the launch of the Road Map in 
2003 by the Quartet.
29
 Under the heading “Ending terror and violence, normalising 
Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions”, phase I of the Road Map 
demanded the PA to undertake “visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and 
restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis 
anywhere” (Road Map 2003:2). 
The plan demanded that “rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security 
apparatus” had to confront “all those engaged in terror” and dismantle “the terrorist 
capabilities and infrastructure” (Road Map 2003:2). The text stipulated that this 
includes confiscating illegal weapons, and “consolidating security authority, free of 
association with terror and corruption” (Road Map 2003:2). In other words, the PA’s 
security sector was forced to: combat terrorism; apprehend suspects; outlaw 
incitement; collect all illegal weapons; provide Israel with a list of Palestinian police 
recruits; and report progress to the United States (Khalidi and Agha 2005). This 
meant that the Palestinian security reform, 
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 The full title of the roadmap is: A Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. It is a gradualist peace plan consisting of three phases. The Quartet 
is headed by Tony Blair and consists of the United Nations, United States, European Union, and 
Russia. 
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Has remained, in essence, an externally-controlled process, driven 
by the national security interests of Israel and the United States, 
and characterised by very limited ownership on the part of 
Palestinian society. The asymmetric relations of power, inherent in 
the occupation, have enabled Israel and the US to exert control 
over the direction of the reform process, its objectives, 
implementation and evaluation. As the texts of the Wye River 
Agreement, the Tenet Work Plan30 and the Road Map illustrate, the 
primary Israeli and American interest is to transform the 
Palestinian security sector into an instrument in their fight against 
terror…[and] the Palestinian security interests play at best a 
subordinate role in the design and implementation of this 
transformation process (Friedrich and Luethold 2008:192). 
These reform plans forced Arafat to appoint Mahmoud Abbas as the PA’s first Prime 
Minister, and a loyalist as the first Minister of Interior in 2003. Salam Fayyad was 
appointed as finance minister as per the World Bank’s conditionality, and as far as 
security forces are concerned, he created a single treasury account and enhanced 
financial transparency. This meant that after a decade of its establishment, the PA’s 
security personnel were able to receive their salaries through bank transfers; 
however, these reforms were superficial. Abbas remained as Prime Minister for less 
than six months because he was marginalised and kept in clashes with Arafat, and 
within five months, four Ministers of Interiors were appointed. Thus, internal power 
dynamics dominated the reform scene (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). 
1.3.3. Clashing Paradigms  
The clashes between the security reform paradigm and the challenges posed by the 
dominance of non-statutory groups and the hybrid model in the security domain with 
the dominance of the non-state actors, continued to accelerate until the death of 
Arafat in November 2004. With Arafat’s death, a new security doctrine started to 
emerge. Figure.3, prepared by the author, depicts the tensions between the clashing 
paradigms that led to the adoption of a new security doctrine. It illustrates how the 
non-state and non-statutory actors’ dominance, as well as the hybrid security 
provision paradigm, started to weaken after the presidential elections, until it was 
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 Wye River Memorandum was an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority to implement the earlier Interim Agreement of September 28, 1995. It was signed on 
October 23, 1998. However, the agreement's understandings and goals were unimplemented. The 
Tenet work plan was a ceasefire and security plan proposed by CIA director George Tenet in June 
2001 based on the security agreements forged at Sharm el-Sheikh agreement in October 2000, 
embedded in the Mitchell Report of April 2001. 
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temporarily reinvented in the aftermath of Hamas’s parliamentary victory in 2006. In 
2007, it underwent another dramatic reinvention under the Fayyadist paradigm as the 
last section of the chapter discusses.   
Figure 3: Reform vs. Hybridity clash in the Second Intifada Phase 
 
In his presidential victory speech in 2005, Abbas declared his determination to 
establish the PA’s monopoly of violence as the main priority, and to implement the 
electoral slogan “one law, one gun, one authority”. In an immediate reaction to this 
renewal of the security sector reform approach, Abbas forced the Palestinian factions 
including Hamas and Islamic Jihad to agree in Cairo on a period of calm (Tahdi’a). 
This entailed a temporary ceasefire based on reciprocity. The international 
community reacted to this through organizing the London Meeting on Supporting the 
Palestinian Authority. In that international conference, the PA promised to “create 
the conditions conducive to the peace process with the immediate objective of 
restoring internal law and order and preventing violence” (London Meeting 2005:4), 
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while the international community promised to provide advice and assistance on 
legal, structural, and organisational aspects to strengthen the security sector, through 
establishing the EUPOL COPPS and the USSC. 
As a consequence for this speedy entry into security sector reform processes, modest 
progress was made that can be categorised at five levels: (i) structural reorganisation 
through merging numerous security forces, sending long-standing security 
commanders into early retirement, disbanding the Special Forces and the Special 
Security, and reactivating the National Security Council; (ii) commence working on 
a White Paper to establish a normative-legal framework for the security sector; (iii) 
initiation of the Civil Police reform programme with the establishment of the 
EUPOL COPPS to assist the PA in improving its law-enforcement capacity; (iv) the 
PA embarked on tentative Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
processes, such as dismantling Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; and, (v) improving the 
capabilities of the PA security forces through better human resource management, 
increase in salaries and benefits, and local and regional training. Additionally, the 
MoI banned the PA’s security bodies from receiving foreign aid directly, and all aid 
was supposed to be channelled through the Ministry of Finance. The logistical and 
procurements procedures were reviewed, and an inventory check started to develop 
(Friedrich and Luethold 2007; Hussein 2007). 
However, despite these promised transformations, the overall evaluation of the 
security reform process by the end of 2005 was bleak. The DfID (2006:19) 
concluded that:  
The PA security forces lack a monopoly over the means of 
violence. Israel continues to control significant portions of the 
West Bank. Communications between West Bank and Gaza are 
difficult. Command and control of the PASF is factionalised and 
personalised. There are overlapping responsibilities among the 
different services and no unifying doctrine. The security services 
have limited political support, and there is an inadequate legislative 
framework to guide them. The judiciary is weak. Parliamentary 
and other forms of oversight are virtually non-existent. 
The victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections halted this one year of 
reform (Le More 2006). The attempt to impose a new security doctrine led by Abbas 
and donors was put on hold until the new dynamics were figured out. The victory of 
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Hamas rearranged all the cards, confused all the actors, and challenged the PA 
security doctrine. This was mainly due to Hamas’ legacy as a non-state actor that 
provided informal but effective public services, including security, through its 
committees, military groups, charities, and institutions. However, the existing Fatah-
PA’s security forces’ leadership refused to deal with Hamas-government, and 
therefore the chain of commands, responsibilities, interests, ideologies, and 
approaches began to clash. The refusal of Fatah to accept the electoral defeat made 
the year 2006 instable and ambiguous, and thus a new round of archery and 
negligence of citizen’s basic security needs emerged. 
The international community’s boycott of the Hamas-led Palestinian government 
resulted in the inability to pay salaries to 150,000 public employees, including the 
security forces. This led to deteriorating effects that further eroded the legitimacy 
and functionality of the PA institutions. Israel, in turn, withheld the transfer of tax 
revenues that it collects on behalf of the PA (UNCTAD 2006, 2010). The 
international community created parallel routes
31
 to bypass Hamas and continue its 
support for the PA and its security apparatus; a selective process that supported the 
moderate and pragmatic Fatah leadership, and excluded the rest. This represented a 
rejection of Palestinian democracy and an anti-good governance move that fuelled 
the Palestinian divide, and created new elite that were viewed as credible partners for 
peace (Turner 2011). Thus, it reinstituted the old Arafat modes of governance, as 
was argued by Turner (2009:571), 
Funds were channelled directly to the Office of the President, 
payments were made to political allies and opponents were 
excluded, petty corruption flourished as access to scare services 
were exchanged for favours, and suitcases of money were carried 
through the Rafah checkpoint into Gaza. NGOs were brought in to 
fill the gap in providing public services, though with even less 
public accountability than PA ministries.  
As a consequence for this Palestinian schism, the PA’s President initiated measures 
to keep control over security forces. Abbas separated the National Security Forces 
from the MoI; nominated a Chief-of-Staff to report directly to him; appointed a loyal 
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 TIM and PEGASE were the major EU mechanisms used to bypass Hamas. They aimed to channel 
aid directly through the EU to the beneficiaries’ accounts (public servants and security personnel 
salaries) or through the Office of the President. The European countries and union provide 60 per cent 
of aid to Palestinians (Tartir and DeVoir 2009). 
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Fatah leader as the head of three internal security bodies; and, created new bodies 
and expanded others, particularly the Presidential Guard (Friedrich and Luethold 
2007). In June 2006, the PLC was disbanded. Hamas in turn took its measures, first 
by establishing a unity government and subsequently by violently taking over Gaza. 
Meanwhile, Hamas was building-up its back up plans; it built the Back-Up forces in 
Gaza, which later became the Executive Forces. These Forces continue to remain a 
key obstacle for the intra-Palestinian reconciliation, and a challenge for security 
reform. Hamas managed to establish a strong military base in Gaza that combined 
both a state-like security apparatus and an armed resistance wing in an ultimate 
expression of hybridity in this context. However, in July 2007, violent clashes 
between Fatah and Hamas erupted and resulted in 118 casualties and 555 injuries, 
which brought a new phase of fragmentation and instability into the Palestinian 
polity (Brown 2009). This intra-Palestinian divide had multi-level consequences on 
the security sector, its structures, and the further steps for its reform. The Fayyadist 
paradigm, discussed in the following section, emerged as the only way forward to 
reform the security sector and build a Palestinian state.   
 The Fayyadism Phase: Re-Inventing Palestinian Security 1.4.
Forces and Eliminating Hybridity (Beyond 2007) 
In the aftermath of the 2007 intra-Palestinian divide, Hamas controlled Gaza and 
Fatah controlled the West Bank. Both parties took parallel measures to sustain the 
fragmentation (Tartir 2012; Cooley and Pace 2012). The PA President declared a 
state of emergency,
32
 and after dismissing the Hamas-led cabinet, appointed Fayyad 
to head an emergency government. With the appointment of Fayyad, a new era in the 
Palestinian polity and style of governance had emerged. Fayyad, through his West 
Bank First approach,
33
 declared a commitment to both a strict reform agenda based 
on establishing a monopoly of violence by the PA security apparatus and the 
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 A state of emergency can last for up to thirty days. After that, it may be renewed only with the 
consent of two-thirds the PLC. Up to now Palestinians live under a state of emergency, in violation of 
the Palestinian Basic Law (Brown 2007a,b; PCHR 2007). 
33
 West Bank First strategy simply means to focus on the West Bank and leave Gaza behind for now. 
The strategy was largely born out of the American and Israeli desire with the tacit approval of the PA 
to either isolate Hamas, weaken it, force it to moderate, or defeat it altogether. The aim of the strategy 
is to create two drastically different realities in the two Palestinian territories, whereby the West Bank 
prospers and Gaza despairs (Samhouri 2007). 
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adoption of a neoliberal post-Washington economic agenda aimed at creating the 
institutional underpinning for a future Palestinian state (PA 2008, 2010).  
1.4.1. The Essence of Fayyadism  
Fayyad’s major plans (PRDP, 13th Government Plan, and NDP)34 spelled out a 
commitment to modernizing and professionalizing the Palestinian security services 
under the banner of “One Homeland, One Flag and One Law”. It aimed to reinvent 
the security forces through: 
Rebuilding, restructuring and reforming the security services and 
developing democratic oversight mechanisms…creating an 
appropriate legal and institutional framework; enhancing the 
professional and operational effectiveness of security forces; 
ensuring the fiscal sustainability of the security forces; re-inforcing 
democratic governance and accountability; and addressing the 
legacies of conflict (e.g. unlawful ownership and use of weapons) 
(PA 2008:38).  
Fayyad’s plans were premised on the idea that: 
A capable, well-trained and well-equipped security establishment 
that is professional and loyal in its service of the nation is critical 
to creating an enabling environment for social and economic 
development…complementary to this objective are activities to 
address the need to reintegrate certain militia and other surplus 
security related personnel back into general society’ (PA 2008:36). 
Therefore, a major thinking behind the security reform process under Fayyadism to 
eliminate any form of hybridity in the security provision was that: 
Informal “law” enforcement mechanisms have tended to fill the 
vacuum left by incapacitated PA security institutions. Continued 
lack of capacity to deliver security and rule of law is reinforcing 
the reliance on these informal mechanisms. This poses a number of 
problems: “law” enforcement is not always equitable (i.e., based on 
affiliation with and proximity to informal powers); discrimination 
against women and traditionally weak groups has increased; and, 
emergence of informal institutions undermines incentives to 
rehabilitate and develop formal ones. Reversing this legacy will 
require determined and sustained organisational capacity building; 
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 PRDP refers to the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008; the 13
th
 Government Plan 
refers to Ending the Occupation: Establishing the State plan 2009-2010; the NDP refers to the 
National Development Plan 2011-13. 
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it will also require strengthening of democratic oversight 
mechanisms to ensure the  accountability of the security services to 
the people (PA 2008:37). 
This “Security First” approach under Fayyadism posited that security reform will 
prove that Palestinians are credible partners for peace and able to govern themselves 
despite the existence of the occupation.
35
 However, notwithstanding the glowing 
rhetoric, the major problem that remains unsolved is related to the meaning of 
security and political reform in the first place. As argued by Brown (2007:14), 
For Palestinians, political reform was a means of obtaining a more 
functional government and creating a leadership that was both 
more capable and more effective in defending Palestinian interests 
internally and externally. For the international supporters of 
Palestinian reform, the primary (and sometimes only) purpose of 
reforming Palestinian institutions was to support a peace settlement 
with Israel. 
In other words, the various understandings of the security reform under Fayyad 
implied the creation of a monopoly of violence through a “weapons cleansing” 
process which was conducted to disarm or render dysfunctional the military groups 
that are committed to armed resistance of Israeli occupation. Hence, the PA security 
plan under Fayyad has several overlapping elements: 
Checking Hamas and its armed wing, the Qassam Brigades; 
containing Fatah-allied militants through co-optation and amnesty; 
restoring public order by cracking down on criminals; conduct 
security campaign in Nablus and Jenin; and strengthening security 
forces through training, weapons procurement and security reform 
(ICG 2008:4). 
The rationale was to consolidate the PA’s power and provide stability to achieve 
economic progress. As was spelled out by PA officials, this process came out of a 
belief that good governance represents the highest form of resistance; and by 
fulfilling the security commitments, Palestinians are turning the tables and 
strengthening their hand in the negotiations (ICG 2010). 
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 More than 70,000 employees serve in the security sector which acquires 47% of the monthly public 
payroll. However, the public spending on education and health sectors does not exceed 5% of the PA 
budget (Sadeq 2011). 
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1.4.2. Technical Success, National Failures  
Although the Oslo Accords framework had not been altered in this phase, the 
Palestinian security forces became better defined. The international actors were able 
to dominate the reform process with their funds and policy advice, stripping 
Palestinians of any level of ownership. That being said, clear improvement in the 
functionality of the forces can be observed. Disarmament and security campaigns 
were conducted to enforce law and order and collect “illegal” arms, the destroyed 
security sector’s physical infrastructure was rebuilt, strategic plans for the sector 
were drafted, and the USSC and EUPOL COPPS, as well as the Palestinian Security 
Academy, became the major illustration of the new PA security doctrine and 
approach. Furthermore, the security forces were reorganised into six main 
operational branches and two smaller ones, besides auxiliary services, with formal 
control divided between the PA presidency and the MoI (Friedrich and Luethold 
2007). Corruption declined in the security spheres, and the security personnel were 
better equipped, trained, educated, dressed, and compensated. Many of the “old 
security guards” appointed by Arafat were discharged and replaced by a new security 
élite. Finally, this phase witnessed a proliferation in the number of local and foreign 
NGOs working in the security realm (Tartir, 2012b). All these transformations were 
completely dependent upon donors’ funds, with more than thirty percent of total aid 
to Palestinians been devoted to the security sector (Taghdisi-Rad 2010).    
Therefore, in technical terms, the PA’s security forces became professional, well-
trained, and engaged in daily coordination with the Israeli counterpart despite the 
existence of the asymmetry of power. Their technical achievements reached the 
highest levels since the establishment of the PA, and even won international and 
regional Excellency prizes. The DfID (2011:16) highlighted the positive 
developments in the security sector and argued that “the redeployment of the 
Palestinian Security forces in the West Bank from the second half of 2007 was an 
important and successful step which had immediate benefits for people’s sense of 
security and for the economy”. The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 
MAS (2011:14) argued for the readiness of the PA institutional transformation into a 
statehood phase; “since the backbone of this state, the monopoly of violence, does 
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exist”.36 Accordingly, the Palestinian security sector was reinvented under 
Fayyadism and an overhaul to its functionality was conducted, which led many 
scholars to celebrate its success (Sellwood 2009; Bröning 2011; Giambi 2009).  
1.4.3. The Cost of Success 
This reform process was not without costs, and the implications of the enhanced 
functionality of PA security forces on the national struggle and resistance against the 
occupation were detrimental (Khan 2009). The reformed security forces were 
accused of human rights violations, suppression of freedom of speech, and political 
affiliation (Amrov 2013). The PA has twice ranked lower in the Reporters Without 
Borders Press Freedom Index than any Arab government, and Freedom House gives 
it the same rating for political rights and civil liberties, “not free” (Thrall 2010 and 
Danin 2011). They were accused of creating a police state and an authoritarian 
regime (Sayigh 2011). Moreover, they were blamed for adding another layer of 
repression, for failing to protect the foundation of a Palestinian democratic system, 
and for sustaining the occupation through their sub-contractor role that protected 
Israeli security through coordination mechanisms and disarmament process (Leech 
2012a,b). The excessive use of violence, torture, arbitrary detention, and intimidation 
by the PA’s security forces has been documented by numerous local and 
international human rights organisation (Human Rights Watch 2008,2010; ICG 
2008,2010; ICHR 2010; MEM 2010; Al-Haq 2011). Further examples include 
political imprisonment, humiliation, torture, dismissal of public servants due to their 
political affiliation, the closing of Hamas-affiliated NGOs and civil society 
organisations, money laundering regulation (Al-Barghouti and Jadallah 2011). 
The 2010 ICG report warned that Palestinian security forces had violated human 
rights and circumvented the Basic Law through extra-judicial arrest campaigns and 
detention without a court order, as well as through torture and ill-treatment at PA 
detention centres. This warning was repeated over the years; however, the brutality 
of PA forces increased. Following the brutal crackdown on protestors in Ramallah 
between June and July of 2012, an Amnesty International report (2013:1) argued that 
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 For further elaboration on the achieved successes please refer to UN (2011); World Bank (2011a,b); 
PA (2010a, 2011b)  
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“The brutality that followed was shocking even by the standards of the PA security 
forces, whose use of excessive force on previous occasions and abuses against 
detainees had already earned them an unenviable reputation at home and 
internationally”.   
The practices of the security forces were observed by scholars as a reform unfolding 
in an authoritarian context. Brown (2011) argued that Fayyadism had no domestic 
foundation, and that the maintenance of the existing institutions was done “in an 
authoritarian context that robs the results of domestic legitimacy. Hence, the entire 
program is based not simply on de-emphasizing or postponing democracy and 
human rights, but on actively denying them for the present” (Brown 2010a:2). This 
made Palestinian authoritarianism different from the one under Arafat, insofar as it 
was “regularised and softened” and “less venal and probably less capricious. But it is 
also more stultifying” (Brown 2010a:10). Hence, “the main problem with Fayyadism 
is not the way it undermines democracy in the short term but in the way it masks the 
absence of any long-term strategy” (Brown 2009:5).  
Likewise, Sayigh (2011) argued that although the security forces in the West Bank 
received $450 million, their capacities were hindered. This was due to the lack of 
ownership in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, lack of democratic 
governance and constitutional order, and the exclusive focus on technical issues. 
Sayigh (2011) concluded that the authoritarian and securitisation transformation in 
the West Bank will threaten not only long-term security, but also the ability to 
achieve Palestinian statehood. This was reflected in the ICG report (2010:ii), which 
stated that the “undeniable success of the (security) reform agenda has been built in 
part on popular fatigue and despair”. 
Al-Shu’aibi (2012:1) in turn argued that “the security institution is viewed by the 
Palestinian public, civil society organisations including political parties, the private 
sector and the media, not to mention Israel and the international community, as a 
failure in protecting the foundations of a Palestinian democratic system”. 
Meanwhile, Leech (2014a,b) argued that while the process of reforming the security 
sector may manifest a genuine, even existential, improvement in the lives of people, 
the regime treated this as a starting point for increasing authoritarianism not the 
reason for its conclusion.  
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Furthermore, the security doctrine under Fayyadism argued that it can overcome the 
asymmetry of power relations through security coordination with Israel. But this 
security coordination, which is rejected by the vast majority of Palestinian people,
37
 
had a detrimental impact on PA legitimacy; Palestinians perceived the PA as a sub-
contractor to the Israeli occupation. Despite the official claims by the PA that 
Palestinians also benefit from security coordination, the overall security conditions 
of the Palestinian people in the West Bank remain dismal, and basic security needs 
are still lacking.
38
 According to surveys conducted by the UNDP (2010) and DCAF 
(2006, 2009), around 54-60 per cent of Palestinians feel insecure, with the highest 
levels of insecurity found among refugees (reaching 74 per cent).  
Additionally, during the Fayyadism era the most controversial element of its security 
paradigm was “that it assumes the abandonment of all forms of armed struggle as a 
means of pressuring Israel to accept Palestinian rights” (Kanafani 2011:1). The 
pursued disarmament strategy forced the PA forces to clash with their own people, 
increase the number of Palestinian activists in the PA prisons, increase dependency 
on intelligence forces, and induce de-mobilizing measures (such as requiring a 
written permit for any demonstration or public gathering). These disarmament and 
demobilisation processes did not move beyond the limitations of the Oslo Accords 
and aimed to eliminate hybrid mechanisms in security provision developed over the 
years. Additionally, these disarmament processes were perceived as implausible and 
non-viable because the Palestinians and their leadership persist under Israeli military 
occupation, and they have failed to bring economic dividends as promised (Brown 
2011; Sayigh 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Tartir et al.2012). 
Finally, the evolution of security forces during the Fayyadism phase was influenced 
by the contested role of the international community and their security missions, 
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 In 2009, Palestinian and Israeli forces took part in 1,297 coordinated activities (Thrall 2010). 
However, in only one month in the same year (July 2009) the Israeli army carried out 773 military 
raids into Palestinian residential locales, opening fire on 66 occasions and imposing curfews when the 
raids were being carried out (World Bank 2009:21). The year 2011 witnessed a further increase in 
joint security measures, with 5% compared to 2010 (State of Israel 2012). 
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A baseline study prepare by/for the Palestinian Government Media Centre (2011) revealed that two 
in five (44 per cent) are concerned about being mistreated or abused by the Palestinian security 
services; the majority of the public agree with the statement that “the Israeli government has control 
over the Palestinian security services” (61 per cent agree); and while asking exclusively about the PA 
security forces, the services with the highest levels of negative public attitudes are Preventative 
Security Apparatus (25 per cent) and the Intelligence Apparatus (24 per cent). 
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particularly the USSC and the EUPOL COPPS. Supporting the unelected Fatah 
leadership to conduct security campaigns against the elected Hamas representatives 
undermined the donor’s demands for accountability and adherence to the rule of law. 
An aid official commented on this by arguing: 
On one hand, we demand democratic processes, transparency and 
accountability and constantly stress the importance of human 
rights. But on the other hand, we have for the most part been silent 
about the PA’s extra-judicial campaign against Hamas. There is a 
huge contradiction in our message (cited in ICG 2010:33).  
The USSC and the EUPOL COPPS missions were instrumental in shaping the 
relationship between statutory and non-statutory security forces, and were part and 
parcel to the transformations that took place in the security sphere under Fayyadism. 
As such, they bear a share of responsibility in the consequences of these security 
transformations on the lives of Palestinian people in the occupied West Bank. They 
are not only new actors, but also influential ones that shape discourse and strategies, 
and affect the dimensions of the Palestinian struggle. This constituted a major 
transformation in the role of external actors from being sponsors of the reform 
process to become real implementers of it through real presence on the ground. This 
shift from being observers to implementers had its own repercussions on the 
ownership of the security reform processes and opened-up a whole new section in 
the international aid industry as a further amplification of securitisation and the 
securitised development process.
39
    
However, both the USSC and the EUPOL COPPS failed to support democratic 
governance and improve civil oversight and accountability due to the technical 
                                                          
39
 It is also worth highlighting that it was only during the Fayyadism era that the Palestinian private 
sector security companies emerged in the West Bank as PalSafe and Hemaya Security Solutions. Both 
companies employee more than 1200 security personnel, many of them served previously in one of 
the PA security forces and left the public sector mainly because of the higher and more secure salary 
offered by the private sector. This element of privatizing security services constituted a new trajectory 
in the security sphere. A problematic feature that characterizes the operations of these security 
companies in their relationship and cooperation with Israeli security companies. In one of my trips to 
the West Bank in November 2013, I asked a number of security personnel working for PalSafe who 
were servicing in front of a nightclub in Ramallah about the training they have acquired. Proudly, one 
of them said, “I came back from Tel Aviv last night after attending a one week intensive training 
course by the best security company in Israel and possibly in the world. It was great and we do this 
very often and this is why we are well advanced in our techniques and equipment that the PA forces. 
we are modern and they are old fashioned”. These security companies were only established in 2008 
in a further illustration of security amplification under Fayyadism. Other international private security 
companies started their operations in the West Bank mainly as subcontractors to the USSC.  
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nature of their intervention and their lack of local sensitivity. Both bodies focused on 
a conventional train-and-equip approach which created a more skilful security 
forces, but failed to generate a genuine institutional capacity to design, plan, and 
conduct training indigenously. Finally, their support paved the way for moving 
toward authoritarianism and the establishment of a police state (Rose 2008; Sayigh 
2011; Bouris 2012; Bouris and Reigeluth 2012; Kristoff 2012). 
Despite technical successes, such as the training of more than 3,000 Palestinian 
police officers and supporting the justice system, the EUPOL COPPS were criticised 
for their limited and technical scope, for their attempts to promote the rule of law in 
an authoritarian rather than democratic manner, and for their role in sustaining the 
occupation through failing to challenge the Israeli measures (Kerkkänen et al. 2008; 
Bulut 2009; Bouris 2010; Bouris 2014; Persson 2011; Youngs and Michou 2011). 
The USSC was criticised for “brainwashing” the young Palestinians that were 
recruited, entrenching the security collaboration with Israel at the expense of 
Palestinian security, criminalising resistance, and also for protecting Israeli security 
through the creation of “new Palestinian men” (as argued by Keith Dayton who 
headed the mission from 2005 until 2010). The people referred to forces that were 
trained by the USSC as the “Dayton forces”, and not only were they engaged in a 
brutal crackdown on Palestinians, they were accused of an unprecedented level of 
human rights violations (Byrne 2009; Dayton 2009; Zanotti 2009, 2010; Thrall 
2010).
40
 
In sum, the reinvention of Palestinian security forces during the Fayyadism era 
constituted a major pillar that demonstrated the ability of the Palestinian Authority to 
govern the Palestinian people and build public institutions that are able to deliver 
effectively. However, the security reform agenda had detrimental consequences for 
the Palestinian national struggle, the everyday security of the people, the role of 
resistance movements, as well as intra- Palestinian politics.  
                                                          
40
 The Appendix of the thesis offers further information about the EUPOL COOPS, USSC, and al-
Istiqlal University in Jericho. 
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 Conclusion 1.5.
This chapter provided a contextualised analysis of the evolution and reform 
processes of Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority in 1993 until the era of Fayyadism. It examined this evolution through the 
relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups, and 
the notion of hybridity in the realm of security provision. This framing and critical 
analysis and reading of the literature constitute a primary contribution of the this 
chapter to the scholarly knowledge. Through the theoretical and empirical 
implications of this framing on the literature, this chapter analysed and 
chronologically categorised the main phases of the security forces, highlighting their 
main features and characteristics. 
There were three distinct phases: (i) the phase between 1993-1999 saw the 
establishment and building-up of the PA’s security forces in the West Bank and 
Gaza according to Oslo Accords; (ii) between 2000-2006, the existing security forces 
were destroyed in the aftermath of the intifada and when the non-statutory forces 
filled the security gap; (iii) and finally, from 2007 until the departure of Fayyad in 
mid-2013, the phase during which the reinvention of the Palestinian security forces 
took place through a major security reform project, which aimed to eliminate the 
hybridity in the security provision, despite the absence of Palestinian sovereignty 
and the presence of Israeli military occupation. The chapter concludes that the 
proliferation of the security forces under Arafatism resulted in further insecurities for 
the Palestinian people. Despite the attempt to reverse this condition under Fayyadism 
through security reform, however this raises new tensions between the PA’s security 
forces and the resistance movements and the non-statutory forces and groups. This 
was eventually manifested in authoritarian transformations and therefore constitute 
another form of institutionalised insecurities, but farmed in a state-building and good 
governance project.    
The complex relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and 
groups in the Palestinian context posed an additional challenge to the security 
governance reform initiatives. This relationship had transformed with the shift in the 
security doctrine from a pro-hybridity paradigm under Arafatism to an anti-hybridity 
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paradigm under Fayyadism. Despite this shift in the security doctrine, what remained 
constant was the problematic reality and fundamental flaw of conducting a security 
sector reform and pursuing a disarmament strategy in the absence of sovereign 
authority, and while living under a foreign military occupation. 
At best, the security reform under Fayyadism resulted in better stability and more 
security to Israel and its occupation, but it did not result in better security conditions 
for the Palestinian people in the occupied West Bank. At worst, the enhanced 
functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that 
was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in creating 
authoritarian transformations and criminalising resistance against the Israeli 
occupation, and as such directly and indirectly sustained it. 
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Chapter Two 
2. Securitised Development and Palestinian 
Authoritarianism under Fayyadism 
 
Abstract 
This chapter unpacks and critically assesses perceptions about the 
Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on the findings of an ethnographic 
fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West 
Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the 
associated relevant literatures. This chapter aims to address one 
central question: How was the Fayyadist paradigm, and the 
consequences of its policies, perceived by the different actors and end-
users involved? And, what does a critical unpacking from the people’s 
perspective reveal about Fayyadism? 
 
The application of a bottom-up ethnographic methodological approach 
reveals that the voices from below challenge the rhetoric of the 
authorities and their claims to institution-building and readiness for 
statehood. The ethnographic data revealed that despite the proclaimed 
institutional successes of Fayyadism, these achievements failed to 
have a meaningful impact on the basic rights of Palestinians. Instead, 
the voices from below highlights mounting anger, frustration, 
inequality, insecurity, and a widening legitimacy gap.  
 
In particular, the voices from below articulated the detrimental effects 
Fayyadism has on resistance against the Israeli military occupation, 
and by extension on their own protection and security. They also 
exposed the absence of local legitimacy and local accountability, and 
questioned Fayyadism’s agenda, political basis, and trajectory as they 
relate to the Palestinian struggle for freedom. Additionally, the claims 
made by authorities that Fayyadism is the best and only approach for 
Palestinians to achieve their aspirations was challenged by the people; 
instead they perceived Fayyadism as the enforcement of an 
authoritarian and securitised development policy disguised as 
modernity. In light of Fayyad’s resignation in mid-2013, this chapter 
concludes that the security reform named after him is primarily about 
the “ism”, and not only about “Fayyad”; therefore the approach that 
Fayyad ushered in became entrenched during his six years of rule, and 
remains the force driving the state-building and governance 
trajectories in Palestine today.  
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 “The Palestinians want an independent and sovereign state, and they are not looking for a 
state of leftovers”. 
“We have crossed the threshold of readiness for statehood…we are ready for statehood”.  
“We get closer to the Rendezvous with freedom…West Bank is already a state in all but 
name”. 
Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, April 2010, April 2011, and  August 2011 respectively  
 Introduction  2.1.
Since taking office in 2007, Palestinian Prime Minister of the West Bank Salam 
Fayyad, along with Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership, argued that they have 
created in effect a functioning state under Israeli military occupation, as the above-
mentioned quotations and the official documents of the PA affirm (PA 2011a,b; PA 
2013a,b). Hoping to convince the international community to testify to its ability to 
govern the Palestinian people, the PA approached the United Nations (UN) in 2011 
and 2012 demanding the recognition of Palestine as an independent state (Quigley 
2013; Azarov 2014). In 2012, Palestine was offered a non-member observer state 
status in the UN (UN 2012). 
This new status of Palestine in the international arenas meant very little to the 
Palestinian people and their everyday lives. Despite the UN recognition and the 
claimed institutional building successes under Fayyad, Palestinians continue to live 
under an Israeli settler-colonial rule and military occupation (Roy 2012; Salamanca 
et al. 2012). Moreover, ruled by two Palestinian governments (Fatah in the West 
Bank and Hamas in the Gaza), Palestinians exist within an unprecedented level of 
territorial and political fragmentation. More disturbingly, under Fayyad both the PA 
and the Palestinian people became more dependent on international aid and as such 
they increasingly lost confidence in the peace process. During this time Palestinian 
democracy and its political institutions tasked with checks and balances, such as the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), became dysfunctional. Furthermore, under 
the leadership of Fayyad the PA conformed to a strict governance reform agenda 
drawn up by the international donors’ community and Israel. 
These reform agendas are not new in the Palestinian context; ironically, the PA was 
asked by the international community to reform its institutions before they were 
built. Furthermore, when contrasted with the Arafat era, the PA lost its small margin 
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to manoeuvre, dismiss, control, and negotiate within the state-building context under 
Fayyadism. Notably, the PA’s shrinking level of manoeuvring is mainly attributed to 
the political trajectories that unfolded over the last two decades. The accumulation of 
the above mentioned conditions, particularly aid dependency, triggered the 
emergence of a new discourse and practice: Fayyadism. 
In the words of Fayyad himself, Fayyadism is a “strategy of self-reliance and self-
empowerment, focused on providing good government, economic opportunity and 
the rule of law, to build strong state institutions capable of providing for the needs of 
our citizens under occupation, and despite the occupation” (PA 2011:7). The PA, 
Israel and the international community sought state-building through four pillars: 
reform of the security sector and the enforcement of the rule of law; the building of 
accountable PA institutions; the provision of effective public service delivery; and, 
economic growth led by the private sector in an open and free market economy (PA 
2008, 2009, 2011a,b, 2012a,b). Through these policies a “new” West Bank 
reportedly emerged; the “Bantustan”41 was thus transformed, at least in rhetoric, to a 
functioning state.
42
 
This chapter unpacks and critically assesses perceptions about the Fayyadist 
paradigm by drawing on relevant literatures and fieldwork at two sites in the 
occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps. Echoing the voices of 
the people in both camps, this chapter examines whether there is any gap between 
the rhetoric at the top and the reality from below in relation to the Fayyadist 
paradigm and the consequences of its policies. This exploration and critical analysis 
is guided by the following research questions: How were the Fayyadist paradigm and 
                                                          
41
 The term “Bantustanization” was originally used in the South African apartheid literature to refer to 
the development of the reserves set aside for African occupation into self-governing states, 
colloquially known as “Bantustans”. In this system, the whites retained exclusive rights in their own 
part of the country, where any native African (officially known as ‘Bantu’) was regarded only as a 
visitor and could only enter the white areas with a permit (Alissa 2007:141 in Hilal 2007). The term is 
used to refer to the territorial, political and economic fragmentation model that the Israeli government 
has created in the West Bank and Gaza. Azmi Bishara (1995) defines the Palestinian Bantustan as “a 
place that lacks sovereignty and at the same time is not part of Israel. It’s neither one thing nor the 
other” (Cited in Alissa 2007:128). 
42
 The notion of a “miraculous” or “new” West Bank was highlighted in the literature as an evidence 
for the success of Fayyadism: “The West Bank has been transformed from a besieged and 
impoverished bantustan into a rough sketch of what a functioning Palestinian state might look like” 
(Weiss 2009); and “Fayyad has completely transformed the West Bank from an immiserated 
backwater into a thriving, integrated society” (Weiss 2010).  
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the consequences of its policies perceived by the different actors and end-users 
involved? And, what does a critical unpacking from the people’s perspective reveal 
about Fayyadism? 
This chapter is structured into the following sub-sections: a discussion of the 
perceptions about Fayyadism as found in the scholarly and practitioner literature; an 
analysis of the major successes and failures of Fayyadism spelled out by its 
proponents and critics, followed by a critical reflection on these perceptions; and a 
discussion of the perspectives about Fayyadism amongst those living in Balata and 
Jenin refugee camps in the occupied West Bank, gathered by the author in 2012. 
This chapter opted to utilise a bottom-up methodology to gather the original 
empirical evidence from both camps. Finally, the last section is a brief epilogue in 
the aftermath of Fayyad’s resignation in June 2013, and presents different views that 
aimed to re-define Fayyadism after six years of coining it.   
 Understanding Fayyadism 2.2.
The emergence of the Fayyadist paradigm and its successes and failures has 
polarised scholars. Some celebrate Fayyad’s reforms and argue that the improved 
performance of the PA has contributed to peace-building and the enhancement of 
Palestinians lives; others argue that it has sustained the occupation, re-structured and 
re-engineered Palestinian society, created a new élite, and revised the historical 
national goals. Fayyad’s critics questioned his legitimacy and political agenda, while 
Fayyad’s competency and transparency were the focus of his proponents.43 
Therefore, Fayyad was viewed as a Palestinian Messiah and as a traitor to the 
Palestinian cause, and everything in between (Bröning 2011). 
Proponents argue that Fayyadism has: led to better functioning institutions and 
public service delivery; built the PA local legitimacy through its achievements; 
created better security conditions, and achieved constant economic growth since 
2007 (World Bank 2011a,b; IMF 2011a,b; Freidman 2009, 2011). Additionally, they 
argue that Fayyadism followed new public management approaches; increased 
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 In 2010 Fayyad was ranked as number 10 top world leaders according to the Time magazine, and 
number 28 in 2011 as top global thinking by Foreign Policy for forging a path between violence and 
surrender.  
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transparency while decreasing corruption; created a leadership that is viewed as a 
credible partner for peace; built public institutions ready for statehood; minimised 
the levels of aid dependency; and empowered the Palestinian people. 
Critics argue that Fayyadism: has not built new institutions; has achieved only 
fragmented successes; has created an economic bubble; has achieved economic 
growth without creating employment; and, that it is non-sustainable, inequitable, aid-
driven, and anti-poor (Stop the Wall 2008; Turner 2009, 2011; Khalidi and Samour 
2011; Khan 2010; Brown 2010a,b; Smith 2011; Khalidi 2011; Bisan 2011; Dana 
2013, 2014; Knutter 2013; Shikaki and Springer 2015). These scholars argue that in 
contrast to policies under Arafat, Fayyadism: functions with improved financial 
management, albeit with corruption; achieved monopoly of violence through 
suppressing activism and creating a police state; remained heavily dependent on 
funds from the international donor community; altered the goals of the national 
struggle; functioned as sub-contractor to the Israelis military occupation; pursued 
non-plausible policies; de-politicised the Palestinian cause and provided economic 
solutions for political problems; and finally, aimed to acquire international 
recognition and statehood on only twenty two per cent of the historical Palestine. 
These polarised assessments can be explained by examining the different 
understandings of and about Fayyadism between the proponents who celebrated its 
success and the critics who exposed its negative repercussions and failures. Both 
strands in the literature, however, either focus on Fayyad himself or analyse the 
transformations at the institutional ethnographic level; but none so far have focused 
on the voices of the people in their assessment of the impact of Fayyadist policies. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to address this gap in the literature through a critical 
reflection on the existing literature and through the presentation of original 
ethnographic evidence from the West Bank.      
2.2.1. The Successes of Fayyadism 
From the perspective of its proponents, Fayyadism was understood as a process of 
state-building focused on improved public administration that was marked by a 
fundamental attitudinal shift. Western media and many international journalists, such 
as the New York Time’s Thomas Freidman, perceived Fayyadism as “the most 
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exciting new idea in Arab governance ever” and “as a new approach to Palestinian 
governance: basing legitimacy on transparent and efficient administration, rather 
than the rejectionism, personality cults, and security services that marked Yasser 
Arafat's regime” (Freidman 2009:A21). Freidman considered Fayyadism to be one of 
the main reasons for the emergence of the Arab Spring (Freidman 2011). Echoing 
Freidman’s celebration of Fayyadism, Robert Danin argued that Fayyadism 
“represents, above all, a fundamental attitudinal shift. Its emphasis on self-reliance is 
a conscious effort to change the role of the Palestinians in their narrative from that of 
victims to that of agents of their own fate…It strives to replace cynicism and 
hopelessness, rampant among Palestinians, who have repeatedly seen their dreams 
squelched, with reasons for hope. The process itself is transformational and 
repudiates the use of violence” (Danin 2011:4). In this sense, Fayyadism “replaced 
reform and minor technocratic goals with bold, revolutionary aspirations… provided 
an important safety net for the Palestinians and the Israelis…and thus empowers 
Palestinian leaders to convince their constituents that it is worthwhile to make the 
painful compromises that will be necessary for a genuine settlement to be reached” 
(Danin 2011:1).  
Quoting Dan Bern’s statement that “true revolutionaries never bomb buildings”, 
Michael Bröning argued that the PA under Fayyad has undergone an untold 
technocratic revolution by moving away from the dogma of “liberation before state”. 
This technocratic revolution was based on “factual attainment of the basic 
requirements associated with a sovereign state rather than on the abstract rights 
legacy” (Bröning 2011:64). Furthermore, Fayyad was celebrated as a responsible 
statesman, who embodies the “best hope for Palestine” and the “most important 
phenomenon in the Middle East” (Cohen 2010a,b), and “probably the best partner 
for peace that Israel has ever had” (Horovitz 2010) and a “real revolutionary” (Danin 
2011). Noam Chomsky described Fayyad’s policies as sensible and developing 
concrete achievements of the ground, as the Zionist movement did previously, and 
these policies could turn into a viable Palestinian state (Chomsky 2010). The Israeli 
president Peres described Fayyad as the Palestinian Ben-Gurion. Fayyad is still seen 
by many on the outside as the embodiment of a kind of “Palestinianness” that is both 
reasonable and moderate. The sentiment expressed by these observers was similar to 
the opinion held by Thatcher about the Soviet Union, when Thatcher famously 
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claimed that Gorbachev was someone “we can do business with” and “found easy to 
deal with” (Leech 2012:2). 
Consequently, the perceived institutional and governance successes attributed to 
Fayyadism led to the publication of numerous reports by various international 
community organisations, particularly the ones submitted to the Ad Hoc Liaison 
Committee in 2010 and 2011 (World Bank 2009, 2011a,b, 2012; IMF 2011a,b;UN 
2011; QQR 2011), testifying to the readiness of the PA for statehood.
44
 The World 
Bank, while assuming that strong institutions and sustainable economic growth 
remain the foundations of Palestine’s state, wrote in 2010 that “if the PA maintains 
its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services; it is well-
positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future” (World 
Bank 2011a:5). The World Bank summarised the success of Fayyadism by stating 
that “the PA has continued to strengthen its institutions, delivering public services 
and promoting reforms that many existing states struggle with. The quality of its 
public financial management has further improved. Education and health in the West 
Bank and Gaza are highly developed, comparing favourably to the performance of 
countries in the region as well as globally. Significant reforms still lie ahead for the 
PA – but no more than those facing other middle income countries” (World Bank 
2011a:5). 
 The IMF stated that “the PA is now able to conduct the sound economic policies 
expected of a future well-functioning Palestinian state, given its solid track record in 
reforms and institution-building in the public finance and financial areas” (IMF 
2011a:5). While MAS concluded its evaluation of Palestine’s readiness for statehood 
by stating that “Our analysis showed that the PA is ready for the transformation into 
statehood phase as the backbone of this state is there: the monopoly over violence, 
the power to represent and enter into agreement, the capacity to deliver public 
services, and with (apart from the oppressive and blackmailing behaviour of the 
Government of Israel) a financial system that can be contained to achieve stability in 
the long term. The PA institutions have the physical infrastructure, the legal 
environment, the technology, the institutional culture, the required human resources, 
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Mainly attributed to political reason, the very same institutions issued less enthusiastic reports in 
2012 and 2013 (World Bank 2012, 2013a,b; IMF 2013a,b). 
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and the financial resources” (MAS 2011:14). A number of other United Nation 
bodies, the European Union and a number of its institutions, the Quartet, and many 
DC-based think tanks published similar evaluations.    
The PA, in turn, produced a number of documents focusing exclusively on its own 
achievements (PA 2010a,b,c,d,e; 2011a,b). For instance, a 2011 report celebrated an 
endless list of achievements including: the consolidation of the rule of law 
throughout the criminal justice chain; the setting of new standards for the security 
and justice systems, the expansion of the justice system, and the formation of a 
specialised courts; the rehabilitation of the security sector infrastructure; economic 
growth of 9%; increased internal government revenues to exceed 2 billion US 
dollars, and the resulting reduction in dependency on aid funds; a reduction in 
unemployment and an improvement of social services; the adoption of a more 
holistic approach to health management; and, the implementation of a social safety 
net reform and the enhancement of associated infrastructure (PA 2011, 2012c).  
From an international institutions indicator-based perspective, Figure.4 depicts a 
quantitative evaluation of Fayyadism based on the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. It highlights the substantial improvement of the measured 
indicators mainly between 2008-2010, particularly the ones related to government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, and regulatory quality.
45
 However, 
the decline in all indictors in years 2011 and 2012 speaks to the unsustainability and 
fragility of Fayyadism. Therefore, it is important to remain critical of the conclusions 
drawn from these indicators, and to consider the impact that the perceived progress 
in governance terms has had on the population. In other words, these indictors need 
to be understood in a context where the number of families receiving financial 
assistance increased from 30,000 to 100,000 between 2007 and 2010.  
                                                          
45
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are widely debated in the scholarly community (Hyden et. 
al 2004) and in the context of Palestine. However, given the vital role of the World Bank in Palestine, 
the indicators play an important role in the aid industry with its political ramifications on the peace 
process. 
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Figure 4: Palestine’s Percentile Rank- Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2012 
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2.2.2. The Failures of Fayyadism 
From the perspective of its critics, as was argued by Nathan Brown, Fayyadism at 
best was understood as “a program of improved public administration rather than a 
state-building effort”. However, even with this understanding, Fayyadism was 
perceived as a dangerous endeavour because “Fayyad's soft talk and cheery 
dedication enabled policymakers throughout the world to ignore the brewing crisis. 
And this may be where Fayyad, despite his impressive management skills, did 
Palestinians a disservice” (Brown 2011:5). Importantly, Philip Leech understood 
Fayyadism to be a program that “does little to challenge the basic structures of 
Israel’s rule”, and he noted that it elevated the PA to be “the primary agent extending 
neoliberal hegemony in the West Bank” (Leech 2012:1). 
Others describe Fayyadism as the program of “a bunch of traitors to their own cause” 
(Black 2012), and accused Fayyad of being “a collaborator with the Israeli 
occupation and a pioneer in normalisation” (Massad 2010). Azmi Bishara labelled 
Fayyad as “the man who abandoned the national discourse, forswore national rights 
and came from outside the national movements to present a Palestinian state as a 
solution for the Israeli demographic problem” (Bishara 2010:2). Bishara has accused 
Fayyad of organising state-building as a “contrived fold festival which prioritise the 
protection of Israel’s security over fundamental Palestinian interests” (Bishara 
2010:3). In my interviews with them, Hamas leaders describe Fayyad as being part 
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of the Zionist project and considered his policies to be a “major national crime”. The 
Islamic Jihad leaders described him as “politically mutinous”. Few in Fatah’s 
leadership described Fayyad as the “policeman of the occupation, the good employee 
and fundraiser, and the puppet”.46  
Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour criticised the notion “neoliberalism as liberation”, as 
pursued by Fayyadism, and argued that it “redefines and diverts the Palestinian 
liberation struggle”. They concluded that with the utilisation of a neoliberal agenda 
for state-building, the program “cannot succeed either as the midwife of 
independence or as a strategy for Palestinian economic development...neoliberal 
‘governance’ under occupation, however ‘good’, cannot substitute for the broader 
struggle for national rights nor ensure the Palestinian right to development” (Khalidi 
and Samour 2011:6). These neoliberal governance reforms under occupation were 
also criticised for being unrealistic and “surrealistic demands” (Hilal and Khan 
2004), simply because basic pillars, as sovereignty and rights, are not attainable to 
guarantee their materiality (Khan 2010). Bröning argued that “the work of Fayyad 
government must be viewed as highly personalised and as of yet, precarious”. Thus 
the ambiguity of Fayyadism is compared to “turning wine into water”. Moreover, 
Bröning argues that due to Palestinian internal politics, Fayyadism “shifted from a 
program of statehood to a program to preparing for negotiations for statehood” 
(Bröning 2011:64).   
Nathan Brown acknowledged that Fayyad was successful on a number of fronts, but 
he argued that “Fayyad is not the problem, but Fayyadism is not the solution to 
Palestine’s political crisis”. Fayyad’s successes included winning the trust of western 
governments, gaining the respect of the international political arena, and achieving 
modest victories in Palestinian governance: “the security services became less 
partisan, public finances became more transparent (even without any domestic 
oversight), corruption likely decreased, pockets of the civil service were rebuilt on a 
more professional basis, and basic order in Palestinian cities was improved” (Brown 
2011:4). Despite these successes, however, the overall failure of Fayyad to create 
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 Nathan Brown argued that Fayyad could proudly claim to be Palestine's most accomplished prime 
minister ever because all of his predecessors “were impotent, transitory, or frustrated occupants of the 
post, and  collectively set a very low bar”. Hence, he described Fayyad as someone who could not 
walk on the water, “but did an almost miraculous job of not drowning” (Brown 2011:3). 
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both a short and long-term strategy is apparent: Fayyad failed to establish any new 
institutions during his time in office. All institutions in place during his time in 
power pre-existed and were built either in the early 1990s, during the Jordanian rule, 
or during the previous British rule. In this way, Fayyad merely protected these 
institutions from a failure to continue to provide public services. Evidence exists to 
support the fact that Palestinians were as close, or perhaps even closer, to achieving 
statehood in 1999 compared to today, thus Fayyad did not bring Palestinians closer 
to statehood. Furthermore, the Palestinian parliament has not met since Fayyad came 
to power in 2007, thus he did not prove to Palestinians that they should or could be 
self-reliant. In fact, he actually achieved the opposite through full dependence on 
international aid and donors’ policy prescriptions; as such, Fayyad did not achieve 
sustainable economic development and instead entrenched dependency on the Israeli 
economy and international aid (Brown 2010a,b,c). In conclusion, Brown argued that 
“the main problem with Fayyadism is not the way it undermines democracy in the 
short term but in the way it masks the absence of any long-term strategy” (Brown 
2009:5).  
Alarmingly, the security sector reform and disarmament processes that took place 
under Fayyadism had detrimental consequences on the dynamics of the Palestinian 
national struggle and resistance against Israeli occupation (Khan 2009). As the 
previous and the following chapters show, reinvention of the Palestinian security 
sector under Fayyadism was associated with an increasing level of Palestinian 
authoritarianism. Critics accused the reformed PA’s security bodies of human rights 
violations, the practice of arbitrary detention, and excessive torturing (HRW 2008, 
2010; ICHR 2010; ICG 2008a,b; ICG 2010; Al-Haq 2011; MEM 2010). The PA 
security forces were accused by critics of creating a police state and an authoritarian 
regime (Sayigh 2011), and they were blamed for adding another level of repression 
by sustaining the Israeli military occupation through its enhanced functionality and 
security collaboration (Leech 2012a,b; 2014a,b). 
My fieldwork in Balata and Jenin refugee camps indicated that the attempts made by 
the Fayyadist paradigm to induce law and order were successful to some extent; 
however, the consequences on peoples’ lives were severe. Due to the incomplete and 
ineffective nature of the security campaigns, people argued that the concept and 
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practice of resistance was targeted; first to tame it, and then to criminalise it. 
Members of armed groups committed to resisting the Israeli occupation and to 
protecting the Palestinian people were arrested and tortured in the PA’s jails. The 
security campaigns not only meant arbitrary detention and excessive torturing for 
local leaders from the camps, but it also meant that the security collaboration with 
Israel became the panacea to induce stability and security for Israel and the Israeli 
people and settlers.
47
 Consequently, the basic needs of the Palestinian people were 
denied, and any opposing voices (even from the elected opposition) were suppressed; 
illustrating the authoritarian transformations of the PA under Fayyadism. The next 
chapter will expand on this authoritarian dimension and provides ethnographic 
evidence on the impact of Fayyadism on both resistance and the basic security needs 
of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The idea and notion of resistance, 
in its broad meaning, is prominent both analytically and empirically because it 
constitutes a major characteristic of Palestinian society and its struggle, and also 
because it was a major target for eradication under the Fayyadist paradigm and state-
building agenda. From the people’s perspective, the occupation had to be resisted by 
all possible means; however, the agreements and security arrangements that the PA 
signed over the years since the Oslo Accords regarded any form of resistance as 
“terror that had to be criminalised”. This tension justifies the focus on resistance at 
the analytical and empirical levels, and hence it was a major component in the 
gathered ethnographic evidence for this research. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned PA documents and plans, as well as the 
international community reports and evaluations, were fundamentally questioned by 
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 Security collaboration/coordination/cooperation between the PA forces and the Israeli 
establishment is manifested in different ways. Security coordination most often implies Israeli forces 
ordering the arrest of suspect Palestinians and having the PA forces hand them over. A high official 
from the Preventive Security told me: “We get lists with names, they need someone, and we are 
tasked to get that person for them.” The suppression of any Palestinian protests that aim to confront 
with the Israeli soldiers or settlers is another example. The facilitation of arrests to Israel, the 
withdrawal from the streets if Israeli forces would like to invade an area under the PA control, the 
exchange of intelligence information, the “revolving door” phenomenon where Palestinian activists 
are imprisoned in both the Israeli and the PA jails for the same reasons, the regular joint Israeli-
Palestinian meetings, workshops and trainings between security leaders, are just few additional 
examples. Over the years, security coordination had detrimental impacts on the legitimacy of the PA 
and was perceived by any people as national betrayal. The complicity of the PA in 2008/9 war or 
Gaza and the revealed information about the shocking extent of security coordination by the leaked 
Palestine Papers showed the centrality of the security collaboration as a defining feature of the PA 
security doctrine under Fayyadism. The impact of security collaboration will be further explained in 
empirical terms in the next chapter. 
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critics. These critics perceived the reports that celebrated Fayyadism as attempts to 
mask reality and hide behind narrow, static, numeric, and technical measurements of 
success. Additionally, they critiqued the guiding neoliberal norms which failed to 
account for the trajectories of the de-development processes and the political 
construct of poverty, unemployment, and other developmental challenges. These 
critics viewed the PA plans under Fayyadism as fundraising proposals to the donors, 
and therefore they neither perceive them as liberation strategies nor a bottom-up 
participatory approach as claimed by the proponents of Fayyadism.
48
 The UNCTAD 
revealed that the celebrated economic growth of 7.1% in 2008, 7.4% in 2009 and 
9.3% in 2010, was a jobless growth, aid driven, based on an eroded productive base, 
anti-poor, and reflects an economy recovering from a low base (UNCTAD 2011). 
Evidence suggested that this growth was associated with high unemployment levels 
(30%), poverty reaching 26% (18% in WB, and 38% in Gaza), public debt increased 
by 100%, and the fact that 50% of Palestinian households were impacted by food 
insecurity (Bisan 2011). 
This chapter argues that the different understandings of what Fayyadism is and what 
constitutes its pillars led to conflicting conclusions. While Fayyadism in its rhetoric 
was built on four main pillars (reforming the security sector and enforcing the rule of 
law; building accountable PA institutions; providing effective public service 
delivery; and achieving market-oriented economic growth), this chapter argues that 
the emphasis on these four rhetorical pillars marginalised another four 
practiced/implemented pillars that actually constitute the core thrust of Fayyadism. 
An exploration of these four practiced and implemented pillars was informed by the 
voices coming from below regarding the implementation of Fayyadist policies, and 
as such they are highlighted to challenge the existing literature and address its gaps.  
First, essentially Fayyadism is a paradigm that prioritises security matters and 
considers the security collaboration with Israel as its major defining feature in its 
                                                          
48
 The titles of the plans can be telling. The plan in 2008 was called the Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan. In 2009 the plan was called Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State. In 
2010, the plan was called Homestretch to Freedom, and in 2011 the plan was called National 
Development Plan: Establishing the State, Building our Future. What is noticeable here is the 
dropped words. It starts by dropping ‘Reform’, followed by ‘Occupation’ and then ‘Freedom’; as if 
these tasks were achieved and what is remaining is how Palestinians will build their future. As stated 
by Fayyad in September 2011: ‘our effort has been to make statehood inevitable…we are now ready’. 
This reflects part of the “war of discourses and narratives” between the various actors. 
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security sector reform project. Therefore, the development process was a securitised 
one par excellence, and the Fayyadist paradigm only accepts one way of resistance 
against the Israeli military occupation; peaceful popular resistance (Ghandour-
Demiri 2014). Any other form of political resistance must be repressed and 
eliminated at all costs, even if it meant an authoritarian transformation in the PA’s 
practices. Popular peaceful resistance is not new to the Palestinian struggle, however 
its forced exclusivity is new. It was adopted as a window-dressing to cover up the 
authoritarian transformations of the PA and to keep all its opponents under control. 
Second, in its core Fayyadism was not concerned with building checks and balances 
institutions that are accountable to the Palestinian people, instead the Fayyadist 
paradigm enjoyed the absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council and followed a 
mantra that achievements will build local legitimacy regardless of the de jure 
legitimacy. Therefore it was a paradigm that actively denied Palestinian democratic 
traditions and institutions. 
Third, by aiming to effectively deliver public services under occupation, as opposed 
to under a full sovereign context, implied that the Fayyadist paradigm aimed to de-
politicise Palestinian life and favoured normalcy under military occupation; in this 
way the Fayyadist paradigm both directly and indirectly sustained Israeli occupation. 
Fourth and finally, the leading role of the private sector in the Palestinian economy 
did not directly translate to the adoption of a market-oriented economic growth 
approach, but rather the entrenchment of a neoliberal economic agenda that proposed 
economic solutions to political challenges. This economic dimension corresponded 
with the Israeli notion of economic peace, rather than political peace. 
Table 1: Fayyadism’s Rhetorical versus Practiced Pillars 
Fayyadism’s Rhetorical Pillars Fayyadism’s Practiced/Implemented Pillars 
Monopoly of Violence and Rule of 
Law 
Exclusive Peaceful Popular Resistance, Security 
Collaboration with Israel, and armed resistance 
criminalisation as a major bulk of the SSR 
Accountable PA Institutions 
Building Local Legitimacy via ‘Achievements’ but 
Lacks Checks and Balances Institutions or local 
accountability  
Effective Public Service Delivery 
Adapt with the existence of occupation, de-
politicisation of the Palestinian cause and enhanced 
functionality to sustain the status quo 
Market-oriented Economic Growth 
Neoliberal Economic Agenda and the practice of 
‘Economic Peace’ 
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 Voices from Below: Perspectives from Balata and Jenin 2.3.
Refugee Camps  
The case studies of Balata and Jenin refugee camps have been selected to facilitate 
the unpacking of Fayyadism, identify its pillars, and explicate their consequences on 
the lives of people in the West Bank. Methodologically, these cases represent the 
benchmarks for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically this means that their 
success extends to other areas across the occupied West Bank. Both camps were 
regularly celebrated by the PA, the international donor community, and proponents 
of Fayyadism as indicators of the success of Fayyadism as an outstanding model for 
state-building and good governance. Balata and Jenin camps were celebrated as 
camps that transformed from places that “export terror” to stable camps operating 
under the rule of law on account of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. They 
were used as showcases to testify the ability of the PA to govern its people and 
provide security to Israel, and as signs of its readiness for statehood. This celebration 
was mainly attributed to the security and disarmament campaigns that began in 2007 
and continue today. The PA conducted these campaigns in coordination with Israel, 
and they were made possible by the financial support of the international donor 
community. 
However, my extensive ethnographic fieldwork in these two camps between August 
and December 2012 revealed a wide gap between the perceptions of the people and 
those of the authorities. The voices from below challenged the proclaimed successes 
and the glowing discourse of Fayyadism; alternatively they drew a picture that 
depicted the ultimate failure of Fayyadism to both protect them and fulfil their basic 
needs. The dominant narrative of the people questioned the building blocks of 
Fayyadism, and as such revealed a different version of reality. This new reality was 
characterised by anger against the PA, its security forces and security doctrine, as 
well as its economic policies that were recognised to result in a high level of 
inequality, injustice, and frustration.  
The cases of Balata and Jenin camps, and the ethnographic evidence they offer, are 
not particularly exceptional or outliers when contextualised within the overall 
perceptions about Fayyadism and its performance amongst the residents of the West 
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Bank. Over the years, multiple public opinion polls and surveys offered different 
insights that correspond with the original qualitative perspectives gathered from both 
camps. What remains particularly special about these camps, however, is their 
excessive exposure to the security campaigns conducted by the PA and the 
associated repercussions. Examining a sample of those public opinion polls and 
surveys, with all the associated methodological caveats, also indicate a gap between 
the rhetoric from the top and the views on reality from the bottom.  
For instance, contrary to the Fayyadism’s claim of bridging the tryst and legitimacy 
gap, in February 2010 MaanNews Agency, through its online polling of 23,480 
participants, revealed that 95.5% believe that politicians lie (MaanNews Agency 
2010a). Later in the same month, this time with 28,673 participants, 78% believed 
that the PA security forces were engaged in surveillance, monitoring activities, and 
intervening in people’s privacy (MaanNews Agency 2010b). Such figures clearly 
contradict with the claimed professionalism of the PA security forces. While 
Fayyadism claimed that it uprooted the phenomenon of nepotism in March 2010, the 
statistics of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) revealed that 76% of 
respondents believed there to be widespread bribery in the public sector, and 92% 
believed there to be widespread nepotism and favouritism in the public sector (PCBS 
2010). A public opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and 
Communications Centre (JMCC) in October 2010, with a sample of 1,200 
respondents, revealed that 73% argued that under Fayyad’s government they 
perceived the presence of nepotism in providing public services (JMCC 2010). 
Similar results were reported in May 2012 (JMCC 2012a). 
Additionally, despite the fact that Fayyadism professed to eradicate corruption, in 
November 2012 a public opinion poll conducted by the JMCC, with a sample of 750 
respondents from the West Bank, revealed that 82% think that there is corruption in 
the PA. Moreover, Fayyadism claims to protect civil rights; yet around 40% of 
respondents stated that freedom of expression is permissible to a low or very low 
extent, 18% stated that it is not permissible at all, and 56% declared that the PA does 
not respect civil right and political freedom (JMCC 2012b). In March 2013 another 
survey by the JMCC revealed that 60% of participants did not think that security 
cooperation with Israel benefit the Palestinians and should be stopped (JMCC 2013), 
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reflecting the public rejection of a major pillar of Fayyadism. In an ultimate 
illustration of the ongoing crisis of legitimacy, more than 30% of respondents 
expressed that they do not trust any political figure or political faction.  
In contradiction to the claim that the success of Fayyadism is due to local 
accountability, the Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) revealed 
in a May 2012 survey that 50 percent of West Bank respondents believed that 
Fayyad’s government is not accountable to the people (AWRAD 2012). In February 
2013 another AWRAD public poll, with a 1,200 respondents sample, indicated that 
46 percent of West Bank respondents evaluate the performance of the government 
led by Salam Fayyad negatively, while only 18 per cent of West Bank respondents 
view Fayyad’s government positively. Notably, 56% of West Bank respondents 
disapproved of the overall performance of Fayyad (AWRAD 2013a). In April 2013, 
West Bank respondents with a positive evaluation of the Fayyad government 
declined to 13 percent, while 63% of West Bank respondents disapproved the overall 
performance of Fayyad (AWRAD 2013b). Furthermore, according to a public poll 
conducted by The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in 
September 2012, only 2% and 17% evaluate the performance of the government 
headed by Fayyad as very good and good respectively, 35% evaluated its 
performance as bad, and 18% as very bad (PCPSR 2012). After six years of Fayyad 
rule, another survey by PSR in June 2013 showed that 70% of the West Bank 
respondents supported the resignation of Fayyad (PCPSR 2013). This raises many 
questions regarding the claimed popularity of Fayyad and the policies Fayyadism.   
The bottom-up methodological approach I have taken in this research highlights and 
prioritises the voices and perspectives of the people, and as such illustrates the 
complexity of and contradictions in attempting to conduct security campaigns aimed 
at inducing law and order from within a persistent foreign military occupation. This 
research also reveals the fragility of the PA’s legitimacy, even within the political 
constituency of the PA-supporters at Jenin and Balata camps. In other words, the 
voices of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps do not support the claims of 
the authorities. One respondent from Balata camp told me in a tone full of anger: 
Fayyad sits in his air-conditioned and elegant office in Ramallah, 
and then go in his fancy black armed Audi to his house in 
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Jerusalem that is guarded by a British security company. Abbas is 
surrounded by thousands of US-trained guards (Dayton forces) in 
his compound in Ramallah. They live in their castles and we are 
30,000 people living in one square kilometre. I am sure that they 
told you about all their successes and how much the people are 
happy with their achievements. But I want to assure you and say it 
very loud [he literally screamed] that I wish to go back and live 
under direct Israeli occupation instead of having an authority that 
subcontracts this occupation and claims it represents me and 
receives billions of dollars on my behalf. All what I see from this 
authority is humiliation, national deterioration, repression, 
corruption and injustices. I keep hearing in the news about their 
successes; but whenever I hear that I ask myself who is living on 
Mars, me or them? The situation on the ground is just miserable. 
They lie and then they believe their lie and act accordingly. This is 
just a farce.              
Methodologically, I have conducted fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews in both 
camps. The sample interviewees included representatives from different sectors and 
categories, including local and national leaders, political faction cadres, armed 
groups members, and men and women, youth, ex-fighters, and those previously 
detained by the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, I have conducted five focused 
groups in the two camps (A list of interviews is provided in the appendix). Through 
observing participants between August and December 2012, I adopted an 
ethnographic approach and therefore I had conversations with the people in their 
stores and workshops, in their houses, in streets and cafes, in local institutions, and at 
weddings and public gatherings. I witnessed first-hand clashes with the PA forces 
over the course of my fieldwork, including examples of infighting and chaos, as well 
as the tendency to escalate violence, and some of these observations are embedded in 
the details in the following chapter. 
2.3.1. Anger, Legitimacy Gap and Insecurity  
I entered the camps with the hypothesis that the institutional successes of Fayyadism 
trickled down and affected the people positively. However, I was confronted with the 
opposite. With very few exceptions, the vast majority pointed out to the high levels 
of insecurity, unemployment, poverty, frustration, and anger. The youth in particular, 
who suffer forty per cent unemployment amongst them, argued that despite the 
claims and international reports, nepotism, corruption, and wasta were never 
addressed by Fayyad. One youth argued, “I truly wish to see this authority clean 
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without corruption, but this will never happen even if Prophet Muhammad replaces 
Salam Fayyad”.  
This lack of trust was accompanied by feelings of anger against the PA and Fayyad’s 
policies. The anger amongst the ex-fighters and members of armed groups, who were 
previously arrested by the PA and tortured in their jails, as well as their families, 
pointed out vividly that the PA’s security campaigns occurred with a high cost. “I 
want to revenge from the PA. Firstly through election and then I will use my weapon 
to take revenge from those who interrogated me in the PA’s jails in Jericho”, a 
former member of the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Group from Balata camp 
who was arrested in the PA jails for 83 days told me. Another respondent from 
Balata camp who is affiliated with Hamas argued, “I feel that I live in a police state 
full of informants. If I just think of opposing the PA and Fayyad policies, I feel that 
the PA security forces will be on the door of the house”. Calls for revenge and anger 
at the PA security forces and Fayyad security doctrine overshadowed the partial 
successes that the security campaigns achieved over the years. The PA’s legitimacy 
under Fayyad was particularly questioned by respondents. A local leader affiliated 
with the Palestinian Left from Jenin camp argued: 
There is no parliament, no election, and no democracy. I don’t know 
who represents me. I did not elect Fayyad, well no one elected him. 
He reached us with a parachute. No one can talk on my behalf. 
Fayyad claims he is accountable to us; however we see him only in 
the news. He is accountable to the donors because he is the finance 
minister of the donors money, not the Palestinian people money. We 
only trust God.                   
The crisis of legitimacy was further exemplified when the security collaboration with 
Israel was discussed. “Do you want me to tell you how many people and freedom 
fighters were killed because of Fayyad’s security collaboration doctrine?”, a female 
activist from Jenin camp asked me. This practice of security collaboration was a 
defining feature of the Fayyadist paradigm, and it was focused on quelling 
resistance. The perception that Fayyadism aimed in the first place to tame resistance 
against the Israeli occupation was a dominate view amongst the camps’ population. 
“All what have happened over the last five years served one objective: use us to 
show others that resistance is a crime”, a Fatah cadre from Jenin camp told me. 
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Another Fatah local leader from Balata looked at the other side of the resistance 
equation and argued: 
Fayyad wanted to be the Palestinian Ghandi and wanted to win the 
Nobel Prize after all our sacrifices. I tell you what: we don’t 
believe in peaceful resistance. Do you want to convince me that 
playing a violin will urge a settler to leave his settlement, or hitting 
on a bowl will dismantle the wall, or holding a carton with a slogan 
on it will reclaim Jerusalem. This peaceful resistance is not for us, 
it is for tourists and foreigners and for the international community 
consumption. 
While these camps can be perceived as “securitised spaces”, they should be located 
in the overall context of Israeli aggression and Palestinian authoritarianism. The 
legacy of armed resistance and use of weapons are dominant in the popular narrative 
and vivid in the collective consciousness, and there seemed to be different sorts of 
classification for weapons. One person could have at least four different types of 
weapons: one for his personal security; one for resistance; one for “problems-
solving” in the local community, and one that belongs to the security force he is co-
opted by/work for. In one incident, a respondent illustrated this to me and showed 
me which weapons belong to which category. 
“Taming resistance was not conducted in an arbitrary way”, one respondent argued. 
A representative of the youth told me: 
Fayyad is not stupid. Probably he is the smartest in the so-called 
Palestinian leadership. He knows what he is doing and I can claim 
that he is the only one who has a plan and an agenda. It is another 
question though if this plan is for or against the Palestinians. 
Fayyad was smart because he offered us, through the banks, loans 
and easy credit so we get busy with repaying them instead of 
resisting the occupation. He simply promised money to give up 
resistance. This is exactly what Israel and the donors also wanted 
since Oslo Accords two decades ago. It is all to achieve economic 
peace instead of real peace and benefit the elite in the top. Fayyad 
is their master.  
2.3.2. “Fayyad is Not Hasan Nasrallah” 
Illustrating the lack of local accountability and absence of any form of local 
ownership in the Fayyadist paradigm, respondents pointed out that at best Fayyadism 
serves the interest of the PA’s élite, and at worst it serves an external, and even an 
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Israeli, agenda. While this may appear to be an extreme judgment, people questioned 
the local roots of Fayyadism and pointed out that he joined the Palestinian polity as 
part of the donors’ conditionalities. “What is the national history of Fayyad? He was 
never arrested in the Israeli jails, and he never belonged to any political factions. He 
spent his life in Washington and now he is our prime minister falling on our head 
with a parachute”, one respondent commented. The claim that Fayyadism is a 
bottom-up approach did not resonate for the people in the slightest. A respondent 
argued: 
They [Fayyad’s governments] claim that the plan echo our needs, 
however no one visited the camp to ask us about our needs. I don’t 
care if the PA rented a building for $100,000 per year in Ramallah 
and moved the offices of the Ministry of Interior to it. I care about 
why I am not feeling secured, why I am not employed or way my 
income has declined. I also care about our national struggle and 
goals. If the security forces are there to supress but not to protect 
us, why I should care or be happy if their ministry has a new 
building? If the so-called Fayyadism was a national and local plan 
it will care about the human beings not about the stones for the 
buildings. 
The majority of respondents raised questions about the local legitimacy of 
Fayyadism and how it is perceived it public consciousness. A respondent from Jenin 
camp took this theme further and argued, “it is straight forward and not a rocket 
science. Why do you see and hear the Israelis praising Fayyad all the time. You must 
raise a question mark. He can’t be loyal to Palestine while being celebrated by the 
enemies”. A youth activist from Balat camp claimed that Fayyad is “an infiltrator 
who was successful in replacing the Palestinian factions with the PA’s security 
forces, and now forcing us to live in his ideology of economic realism as prescribed 
by the US. This will be the real disaster”. A mother of a martyr and a prisoner in the 
PA jails argued that “Fayyad is implementing a Zionist-American plan, and I will 
never elect Fatah or Fayyad”. In turn, a leftist local leader in Balata camp concluded 
our two hours conversation by stating: 
Let us make it simple. Under Fayyad’s rule the only thing that 
happened in the security sphere is that the PA forces are helping 
the Israeli occupying forces in their tasks; they are subsiding the 
occupation. Therefore, Fayyad is implementing an American-
European policies imposed on the PA, and since the PA officials 
are bunch of corrupted people, then the American- European 
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coalition brought someone to clean up that mess. However Fayyad 
remains the finance minister of the donor’s money. Fayyad is not 
Hasan Nasrallah. 
2.3.3. “Miracle of Ramallah” 
Highlighting case study examples of their own successes was an integral part of 
Fayyadism, and it also illustrates the tension between the perspectives from below 
and the ones from above. While the liberal model of modern Ramallah was held up 
by Fayyadist enterprise proponents to be replicated elsewhere, the voices coming 
from the camp argued that the Ramallah model is an “imposed and strange model, 
even though its appears as a miracle”. The “miracle of Ramallah” was perceived in 
the camps as “fake” and a case for living under a “five-stars occupation”. A 
respondent from Balata camp argued, “Ramallah represents what is Fayyadism: It is 
inequality with the exclusive focus on the core while marginalizing the periphery. 
Ramallah was transformed into a model city, I call it the postcard and billboards city. 
It is fake and dangerous”. The focus on Ramallah, the de facto capital of the PA, 
marginalised other cities and locations and was echoed by many respondents. A local 
leader form Balata argued: 
Over the years Fayyad governments ignored and marginalised 
Nablus as a city since it was causing them troubles in terms of 
security and therefore decided to punish it. The result was the 
transformation of Nablus from the economic capital of the West 
Bank, into a capital of misery, unemployment and poverty. 
A female activist and a member in the Balata camp committee argued that “what 
Fayyad has created is a resort to relax from occupation in Ramallah. When I want to 
take a break from the occupation I take my kids and go to Ramallah”. Another 
respondent from Jenin camp argued that “Ramallah is not under occupation. It is in 
the heart of Switzerland”.49 The idea here is not about Ramallah per se, but rather 
about its symbolic meaning and about the aim of Fayyadism to depoliticise the 
Palestinian struggle for rights and assume normalcy under occupation. “Ramallah is 
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 For further elaboration on the transformations occurred in Ramallah please refer to Taraki 
(2008a,b); Barthe (2011); Yahya (2012); Khalidi (2012); and Rabie (2013). A major feature of 
Fayyadism is the real estate sector showcase as Rawabi, a new city not far from Ramallah. For 
Grandinetti (2015:2) while the middle-class ethos being cultivated by Rawabi “views neoliberal 
capitalism and consumerism as a sign of modernity and a new form of resistance, it rather, operates to 
depoliticize economic development under occupation, preclude alternative models for ‘‘resistance’’ 
economies, and make the occupation less costly, or even profitable, to Israeli and Palestinian elite”. 
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a city of consumerism, nightclubs, and elitism”, a respondent from Balata argued 
before elaborating further and stating: 
Fayyad wanted us to believe that we can have a normal life under 
occupation. Of course we are a resilient nation, however that does 
not mean that we can forget about the occupation and our political 
demands. Yes maybe it is important to have growing businesses, 
fancy cafes and cars, build new cities, have five stars hotel, 
organise investment conferences and international festivals, and 
open up new KFC restaurants. However, all of these can’t mask the 
picture of reality. Depoliticising our struggle can only help Israel 
and sustains its occupation and accept its mere existence. Fayyad 
believed that building a modern and peaceful city like Ramallah is 
a form of peaceful and civilized resistance.          
In Ramallah, it was common to refer to the people from the northern part of the West 
Bank, such as Jenin and Balata refugee camps, as “Thai people” because they are 
used as cheap labour in Ramallah. Under the Fayyadist paradigm, the “blonde 
Ramallah” and the de facto political capital of the PA acquired the benefits of the 
core, as opposed to the periphery. The benefits were mainly reflected in the 
economic and business spheres, and were evident in the associated culture of 
consumerism. By extension, this created the impression that Ramallah is a city 
superior to the others, and this meant that other areas, such as the camps, were 
viewed as “inferior and residual areas”, as “spaces for chaos”, and as “a bunch of 
trouble makers who are threatening our profits and businesses”. The ‘modernity’ 
package that covered Ramallah induced multiple behavioural transformations that 
affected the unity and cohesion of the Palestinian people and society, yet another 
example of the detrimental consequences of Fayyadism.
50
       
2.3.4. “Fayyad’s Dangerous Policies”  
Unsurprisingly, Fayyad’s call to adopt an exclusively peaceful resistance strategy 
was not taken seriously in the camps. Almost none of the interviewees thought that a 
peaceful resistance strategy would be effective, instead preferring a strategy that 
aimed to clash with and confront the occupying power. A local Islamic leader in 
Jenin camps argued “I am telling Fayyad that the armed resistance is about 
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preserving dignity despite that it could result in speedy death. Negotiation is a 
humiliation for dignity and it is a slow death”. Another respondent stated, “the PA 
adopted a weekly super peaceful protest aiming for appearances in the media, but not 
resisting the occupation. Maybe these peaceful protests are important; however they 
will never fulfil our rights”. Fayyad’s polices were perceived by many to be not only 
dangerous, but apathetic. A respondent from Jenin camp stated “Fayyad wanted us to 
face a whale with peaceful resistance. It is a joke, apathetic, fake, betrayal, and 
catastrophe”. While others argued that the concept of resistance does not exist in the 
Fayyadist dictionary. “Fayyadism is an approach based on begging the occupier to 
give us some leftovers, but never to clash with or confront the occupying power to 
acquire our full rights”, a youth activist argued in Balata camp. An active member in 
Fatah and a former fighters in its armed wing, told me: 
I am not saying that the exclusivity of armed resistance is the 
solution. Actually it is not especially if we think about the 
international community. And also any exclusivity implies a 
certain level of dictatorship that may go against the public will. 
However, I do not see why we do not adopt different methods of 
resisting the occupation. We are under occupation and even the 
international law allowed us to resist in any possible way to 
achieve our self-determination. Under Fayyad, the word resistance 
became even a dirty word and in many occasions it is not allowed. 
It is only allowed if we go with the foreigners and the activists 
from the Israeli left and start singing together in front of the 7 
meters wall. This is not resistance Mr. Fayyad, it is a celebration of 
the military occupation and the colonial subjugation. 
The notion of resistance was not the only disputable pillar of Fayyadism, and many 
described Fayyad’s other policies as very dangerous. A local political leader in 
Balata camp contented that: 
Fayyad policies are very, very dangerous. They are not based on a 
clear political basis, his existence reinforces the Palestinian divide 
and his economic policies only bring disasters unto the Palestinian 
people. Fayyad tried to co-opt the freedom fighter and transform 
the army of fighters to an army of public sector employees, who 
are waiting for their monthly salary. 
Another grassroots activist argued that “Fayyad followed policies to mainly ensure 
the domestication of people: an economic one through offering easy credit and a 
security one through empowering the security forces. All of these shackled the trust 
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in Fayyad and his government”.51 The shaky base of Fayyadism urged a local leader 
from Jenin camp, and a member of the PLC, to tell me: 
The security operations, whether justified or unjustified, resulted in 
distrust between the PA force and the people, and created a hostile 
atmosphere in the camp against the PA and its security forces. 
What Fayyad was not aware of is that I, as a citizen, need to be 
convinced that this police officer or solider is there to protect me 
and that therefore I will respect him and not to be afraid of him. If 
today I am afraid of him, tomorrow I will threaten him.  
Other voices from below argued that “Fayyad only helped the people around him 
and just entrenched the inequality in our society. He took the lead in the security 
coordination with the Israelis, which is a national betrayal and a catastrophe for the 
Palestinian people”. A local female activist in Balata camp declared to me that 
“things at the surface look better in terms of personal security; however 30% of 
women in camp suffer from internal violence and 70% are harassed in one way or 
another including sexual ones in the alley of the camp but they can’t go and 
complain anywhere”. Speaking to the ultimate consequences of Fayyadism, a local 
cadre of Hamas in Balata camp told me: 
Fayyad and his governments are making us busy with the glowing talk 
about economic growth and security; however what they are 
missing is that they make the Palestinians chase jobs but never 
attain them. This is like the tires of the car; the front tires are the 
jobs and growth the PA and Fayyad are talking about, and the back 
tires are the Palestinian people. They run and run but they will 
never meet. 
Finally, the fragility of the Fayyadist paradigm was highlighted by the local leader in 
Jenin camp, a legendary figure of the 2002 Jenin battle and member of the PLC, 
when he argued: 
With my due respect to Fayyad, but in a matter of two days Israel 
can destroy everything he has built. With Fayyad’s rule, 67% or 
more of the public servants are in long term debts with the banks, 
no factories were built, unemployment levels are the same as 
before, the cost of living has increased, one million Palestinians 
have become dependent on the PA’s monthly salary and the 
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uncertainty associated with it, and corruption remains, albeit 
packaged differently. To me, Fayyad is a World Bank employee. 
The most wanted fighter by Israel in the second intifada concluded by saying: 
Fayyad did his best, he is surrounded by agreements and existing 
frameworks, he does not have a magical tool but he has a vision to 
build the institutions for the future state. However, no one is ready 
to give him a state and therefore all of what he built is for nothing. 
So I argue that Abbas and Fayyad should dismantle the PA and 
hand in the keys to the Europeans. 
The voices from below presented above clearly told a different story than the official 
one of Fayyadism. It is not only a rhetorical difference, but it is also an illustration of 
what the practice of Fayyadist policies meant on the ground and how they have 
affected people’s lives. The following section addresses the different views on 
Fayyadism after six years of initiating it and after the departure of Fayyad from the 
Palestinian polity. The brief elaboration below reveals the existing gap in the 
literature as well as the tensions between the proponents and critics of Fayyadism.     
 Post-Fayyad? 2.4.
Principally as a consequence of intra-Fatah politics and infighting, Fayyad was 
forced to leave the Palestinian polity in June 2013. Fayyad’s resignation raised the 
questions: Is this the end of Fayyadism? Is it about Fayyad or the “ism”? This 
chapter argues that is about both, “Fayyad” and the “ism”. Although the defining 
features of the “ism”, the security and economic collaboration with Israel, were 
established with the Oslo Accords in 1993, Fayyad was the right fit at the right 
moment with the right tools who gained the support of the donor community to 
implement the set of policies they had prescribed. This made Fayyad a unique prime 
minister. However, Fayyad’s resignation was an opportunity for his critics and 
proponents to re-define Fayyadism after six years of its inception. Strikingly, the 
views about Fayyadism remained sharply polarised.   
Proponents of Fayyadism considered his resignation to be a “pivotal moment in the 
history of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians” (Tobin 2013). Roger 
Cohen, NYT’s columnist, redefined Fayyadism as a “revolution of acts over 
narrative, of state-building over slogans, of pragmatism over posturing” (Cohen 
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2013). Khaled Elgindy argued that “for many in the U.S. and Israel, Fayyadism is 
seen not just as a pathway to Palestinian statehood but as a means of “reinventing” 
Palestinian politics along the way” (Elgindy 2013). Isabel Kershner argued that 
Fayyadism was “a byword for the new norms of a well-run Palestinian government” 
(Kershner 2013). Christa Case Bryant argued that Fayyadism was “a paradigm about 
self-empowerment instead of victimhood”, and quoted Robert Danin stating that 
Fayyadism was “a can-do paradigm to pursue a peaceful, cooperative path with 
Israel and is also about self-empowerment” (Bryant 2013). Thomas Friedman, who 
is normally cited for coining the term Fayyadism, argued in his article “Goodbye to 
All That” that Fayyad was the ‘Arab Spring’ before there was an Arab Spring since 
Fayyadism is “the all-too-rare notion that an Arab leader’s legitimacy should be 
based not on slogans or resistance to Israel and the West or on personality cults or 
security services, but on delivering decent, transparent, accountable governance” 
(Friedman 2013).  
Dov Weisglass, the Bureau Chief to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, argued that 
Fayyadism had “created a revolution in the Palestinian lifestyle and in Israel-PA 
relations. The security forces were reorganised: The "Intifada generation" was 
replaced with worthy people, who were trained to do their jobs; the armed gangs 
dominating the streets were driven away and crime was terminated; the terrorism 
against Israelis from Judea and Samaria came to an almost complete halt; the 
government and public fund management underwent a fundamental reform; the 
"family" monopolies controlling imports and trade were dissolved” (Weisglass  
2013). Defence analyst for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Amos Harel, argued that 
Fayyadism had created a significant contribution to the security of the State of Israel, 
and in particular to the public's sense of personal security for Israelis (Harel 2013). 
Congressman Elliot Abrams argued that Fayyadism was “western, dedicated to 
efficiency, productivity, and clean government…It was a bottom-up and entirely 
non-violent approach to state-building” (Abrams 2013). Daoud Kuttab, summarised 
the view of Fayyad’s proponents and argued that “If anyone could have imagined 
what the perfect prime minister should be, Salam Fayyad would have fit that 
description” (Kuttab 2013). 
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However, Fayyad’s accomplishments were not without serious dispute. Nathan 
Brown argued that “Fayyadism was supposed to constitute Palestinian self-reliance, 
but it was sustained only because foreign countries bankrolled it. Unsurprisingly, 
then, it decayed as international attention began to wander. Fayyadism was said to 
promise political reform, but it was based on the denial of democracy and the 
continuation of authoritarian rule…Fayyadism was supposed to be based on building 
institutions, but it was completely dependent on a single, indispensable individual” 
(Brown 2013). In May 2013, the Arab World for Research and Development 
(AWRAD) conducted a poll of opinion leaders (238 interviewees) to evaluate the 
performance of the Fayyadist enterprise. The poll found that 58% of respondents 
believed that Fayyad failed to root out corruption (3% believed that Fayyad was able 
to root out corruption); 32% believed that Fayyad’s government did not improve 
transparency and accountability in the PA (31% believed that he achieved an 
improvement); 32% believed that the provision of social services did not improve 
(30% believed in the opposite) (AWRAD 2013). 
In summary, Fayyad, who was seen as the “Palestinian Karazi” (Dana 2014), failed 
to find the right formula and balance to meet the demands of the West Bankers or to 
wage a more effective resistance to Israeli occupation that did not reduce living 
standards or suffer the effects of another intifada, as was argued by Nathan Thrall 
(Thrall 2013). Fayyad paid the price for lacking the political constituency and was a 
scapegoat for Palestinian internal politics. However, despite his departure from the 
Palestinian polity, the “ism” that he built is still driving the state-building path. 
 Conclusion  2.5.
This chapter aimed to unpack and critically assess the perceptions about the style of 
governance and state-building paradigm known as Fayyadism by drawing on 
relevant literatures in combination with the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork 
investigation at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin 
refugee camps. The chapter illustrates the tensions between the perspectives coming 
from the top and those of the people regarding the comprehension of Fayyadism, its 
pillars, and the consequences of its policies on the people’s security, well-being, and 
their national struggle for liberation. The voices from below challenged the glowing 
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rhetoric of the authorities and their claims to institution building and readiness for 
statehood, and instead revealed mounting anger, frustration, inequality, insecurity, 
and a widening legitimacy gap.   
Fayyadism was perceived by the various actors and end-users as both a strategy for 
state-building through the rhetoric of good governance as well as a predicted 
outcome for the status of aid dependency status and weak Palestinian Authority. 
Despite external funding and sponsorship, Fayyadism is a home-grown phenomenon 
and achieved a number of successes for the PA at the level of institutions and 
induced transformations in its functionality. However, these successes failed to have 
a meaningful impact on the daily lives or basic rights of Palestinians, as was revealed 
by the ethnographic evidence gathered from Balata and Jenin refugee camps 
particularly, and the occupied West Bank generally.  
The ethnographic findings revealed the consequences of Fayyadism and its policies 
on the resistance against Israeli military occupation, as well as the implications of the 
enhanced functionality of the PA’s institutions, particularly the security forces, on 
the sustainability of the status quo. The voices from below exposed the absence of 
local legitimacy and local accountability for the Fayyadist paradigm. They also 
questioned the agenda and political basis of Fayyadism, as well as the trajectory it 
aimed to direct the Palestinian struggle for freedom. In brief, the voices from below 
rejected the claimed successes of the Palestinian Authority made by the PA itself, 
Israel, and the donor community. Clearly what mattered to the people was different 
than what mattered to the authorities. 
Therefore, contrary to official claims and narratives, Fayyadism failed in a number 
of ways: it did not create a sustainable socioeconomic development or even a 
national security paradigm; by eliminating the hybridity in the security provision, the 
Fayyadist paradigm altered Palestinian national liberation goals; the Fayyadist 
paradigm suppressed informal mechanisms for resistance and protection as tools for 
struggle against the occupation; Fayyadism did not necessarily result in protecting 
the basic security rights of Palestinians; and finally, Fayyadism was presented as the 
only, exclusive, and best approach for Palestinians to achieve their aspirations, which 
in turn enforced an authoritarian and securitised development policy disguised as 
modernity. Did Fayyad’s resignation from the Palestinian polity in mid-2013 equate 
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to the automatic end of Fayyadism? This chapter argues that it is mainly about the 
“ism” and not only about “Fayyad”, and therefore the approach that Fayyad ushered 
in became entrenched during his six years of rule, and remains the force driving the 
state-building and governance trajectories in Palestine today.  
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Chapter Three 
3. Criminalising Resistance: The Cases of Balata and Jenin 
Refugee Camps 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter tackles in-depth the security campaigns to induce “law and 
order” as a defining feature of the Fayyadist paradigm. It is guided by the 
central question: From the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin 
refugee camps, what are the consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns 
on their security and on resistance against Israel? Balata and Jenin refugee 
camps were selected because methodologically they represent the 
benchmarks for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically their success 
extends to other areas across the occupied West Bank. 
 
The ethnographic evidence from both camps discussed not only unpacks and 
deconstructs the implications of the security campaigns, but also expands and 
challenges the debates in the literature. As opposed to the conventional 
institutional explanation to the security reform processes in the literature, the 
voices from below problematise and unpack the security campaigns through a 
resistance lens. This means that these voices not only clarified the link 
between security reform and resistance against Israel, but they also illustrate 
how and why resistance against Israel has been criminalised. 
 
Additionally, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the security campaigns 
resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its 
security forces operations. This is manifest in the excessive use of arbitrary 
detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for 
opposition voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. Furthermore, the 
unorganised, incomplete, and therefore ineffective security campaigns 
employed informal mechanisms to induce formality and exclusivity to the PA 
security forces in governing these camps. The findings also suggest that the 
security reforms were used to address intra-Fatah factional politics. This 
chapter concludes by arguing that conducting security reform within a 
context of colonial occupation and without addressing the imbalances of 
power can only ever have two outcomes: “better” collaboration with the 
occupying power, and a violation of the security and (national) rights of the 
Palestinian people by their own government and (national) security forces. 
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“We are clear. The only legitimate and legal weapon is the PA’s security forces one. We will 
not allow anyone to claim that they represent the resistance front”.  
Adnan Al-Damiri, Spokesman of the PA’s security forces, July 2009 
“I am a freedom fighter. I am not a thief or a member of a criminal gang. Criminalising my 
operations and illegalizing my weapon are acts of national betrayal”. 
Former member of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Jenin camp, September 2012 
 “I am against the security campaigns. I support regular and permanent security activities 
and routine operations”. 
The PA’s Prime Minister, Rami Al-Hamdallah, December 2013 
“Security coordination [with Israel] is sacred, is sacred. And we’ll continue it whether we 
disagree or agree over policy”. 
Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, May 2014  
 Introduction and Contextual Background 3.1.
Security sector reform (SSR) has become a crucial element of any state-building or 
peace-building endeavour (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Chandler and Sisk 2013). It 
aims not only to enhance the capabilities of the security forces through equipment 
and training, but also to: foster norms and standards; reorganise structures, 
hierarchies, and chains of command; enhance democratic governance and control; 
and, advance oversight, accountability, and transparency mechanisms (Schroeder et 
al. 2014). These were integral elements of the Palestinian SSR doctrine, particularly 
during the era of Fayyadism between 2007 and 2013 (Thrall 2010; Sayigh 2011; 
Bouris 2014). During this epoch, however, the domination of technical, neutral, and 
apolitical understandings of the externally-sponsored, and aid-dependent, security 
reform processes led the Palestinian people to question the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of these reforms. To this end, Palestinians look to the consequences these 
security reforms have had on their highly politicised lives, as the case studies of this 
chapter testify. While “depoliticizing the political” is particularly relevant in the case 
of Palestine, it also characterises the agenda of international aid regimes in the 
developing world, as was discussed in James Ferguson’s The Anti-politics Machines. 
Aid regimes suspend “politics from even the most sensitive political operations” and 
insist on understanding these issues as “technical problems” (Ferguson 1994). The 
case of Palestine, particularly under Fayyadism, is no exception (Rand 2007a,b,c; 
Sayigh 2007; Sellwood 2009, 2011; Zomlot 2010; Menocal 2011). 
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The central tenet of the Fayyadist paradigm is the dominance of security reform as a 
major pre-requisite for state-building, thus under Fayyadism the West Bank became 
a space for security amplification. Today, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) security 
sector employs around 44 per cent of the total 150,000 civil servants in the public 
sector, and received nearly $1 billion in the PA’s 2013 budget (UNSCO 2013a,b). 
The PA witnessed an eight per cent growth in job creation in the security sector from 
2011 to 2012 alone, which translates to one security personnel for every fifty-two 
Palestinian residents; as compared to one educator for every seventy-five resident 
(Shtayyeh 2012). Around thirty per cent of international aid is spent on the security 
sector, mainly from the United States, European Union, and Canada (Human Rights 
Watch 2014).
52
 This aid was not only spent on equipment and training activities, but 
it also supported the development of the PA’s security infrastructure, including the 
security academy in Jericho, fifty-two new prisons, and the construction of eight new 
security compounds throughout the West Bank (Byrne 2011). 
Reform of the PA’s security sector and enhancement of the effectiveness of its 
security forces was conducted under Israeli military occupation and colonial 
domination. Therefore, and as obvious manifestation of the asymmetric relations of 
power, the prerequisites and conditionalities of the colonial occupying power, as 
well as the international sponsors, dictated the reform of the Palestinian security 
doctrine. Specifically, the major pillar of Fayyadism was the further entrenchment of 
the security collaboration/coordination
53
 between the PA and Israel, which 
proponents of Fayyadism argued would guarantee Israeli security, eradicate 
Palestinian resistance, and ensure conformity to the peace agreements and security 
arrangements. This security collaboration was criticised by the Palestinian people 
precisely because it aimed to “tame the struggle and resistance against the Israeli 
occupation”. On one hand, security collaboration as a defining feature of the security 
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 There is a semantic debate over coordination and collaboration as terms to describe the relationship 
between the Israeli forces and Palestinian security forces. The distinction between these two terms is 
crucial in Arabic. The different authorities use the term “coordination”, Tansiq in Arabic. The 
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reform had contributed significantly to the erosion of the PA’s local legitimacy 
(Amrov and Tartir 2014a,b). On the other hand, the PA’s leadership argued that the 
security coordination with Israel protected the Palestinian people (Al-Damiri 2013). 
The rationale of the latter was not convincing to the Palestinian people, whom are 
facing daily violations and insecurities. The PA, Israel, and the donors’ community 
attempted to complement their rationale with aid money in the form of “security-
economic dividends”. But, the persistent failure of this “peace-dividends model” 
since the establishment of the PA in 1993 (Tartir and Wildeman 2013) continued 
with no exceptions. Therefore, security collaboration with Israel as the defining 
feature of the PA’s security reform; remained a highly contested issue, particularly 
when it is contrasted with its consequences on the resistance and political opposition 
realms.  
To implement its security policies and its security reform efforts, the PA and its US-
trained security forces conducted a number of security campaigns in the occupied 
West Bank in the aftermath of the 2007 intra-Palestinian divide. These security 
campaigns aimed to: check both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and their armed wings 
(The Qassam Brigades and Sarya Al-Quds); contain Fatah-affiliated militants 
through co-optation, integration, and amnesty arrangements; restore public order by 
cracking down on criminals; conduct security campaigns in Nablus and Jenin in 
particular; and, strengthen security forces through training programs and weapons 
procurement (ICG 2008a). Former Prime Minister of the PA in the West Bank 
(2007-2013), Salam Fayyad, argued that: 
A capable, well-trained and well-equipped security establishment 
that is professional and loyal in its service of the nation is critical 
to creating an enabling environment for social and economic 
development…complementary to this objective are activities to 
address the need to reintegrate certain militia and other surplus 
security related personnel back into general society (PA 2008:36). 
In this context, the governorates of Nablus and Jenin, and their camps (Balata and 
Jenin) in the northern part of the West Bank, were the “pilot projects” (RRT 2008; 
Giambi 2009) of these security campaigns due to their reputations as “castles of 
resistance” and/or “spaces of chaos and anarchy”. This chapter examines the 
consequences of these security campaigns on the people’s security, as well as the 
broader dynamics of resistance against the occupation from the perspectives of the 
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people living in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The contestation surrounding the 
security campaigns, as also illustrated by the four quotations at the beginning of this 
chapter, was summarised by a respondent from Balata refugee camp in one sentence: 
“the security campaigns are like giving someone paracetamol to cure cancer”. 
Thus, the apparent gap between the Palestinian leadership and the people, including 
those militants who were one of the major targets of the security campaigns, 
highlight the tensions surrounding attempts to criminalise resistance vis-à-vis the 
induction of law and order. While Palestinians in Balata and Jenin claimed that the 
PA, through its security campaigns, aimed to tame resistance and create a police 
state; the Palestinian leadership argued that the miraculous success of the security 
campaigns was a building bloc in the state-building project, a victory for the rule of 
law, and marked the establishment of public order.  Acknowledging the voices from 
below and unpacking the security campaigns from the refugees’ and end-users’ 
perspectives elucidates the consequences of the security campaigns on resistance and 
everyday (in)security, and is the primary contribution of this chapter. Through the 
application of a bottom-up research design, the original ethnographic findings and 
evidence presented and analysed in this chapter challenges and expands  the existing 
literature, and more importantly reveals further insights into the lived experiences of 
Palestinians in the Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The chapter is guided by the 
central question: From the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee 
camps, what are the consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on their security 
and on resistance against Israel?   
Methodologically, I conducted fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews in both 
Balata and Jenin camps. The sample interviewees included representatives from 
different sectors and categories, including: local and national leaders, political 
faction cadres, armed group members, men and women, youth and ex-fighters, as 
well as people who had been detained by the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, I 
conducted five focused groups in the two camps (A list of interviews is included in 
the appendix). My fieldwork took place between August and December 2012, and 
my ethnographic investigation comprised of participant observation and engaging in 
conversation with the people in their stores and workshops, in their houses, on streets 
and in cafes, in local institutions, and at weddings and public gatherings.  
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The similarities between both camps in terms of the ethnographic evidence they 
offered were striking, and therefore this chapter does not aim to compare and 
contrast both camps but rather to use them as one unit of analysis. From this 
approach, two challenging questions emerge: to what extent are these camps 
representative of the whole West Bank? And, to what extent are the people 
interviewed and interacted with in these camps over the course of my field research 
representative of the camps themselves? Acknowledging these two levels of 
methodological tensions, this chapter follows a case-study ethnographic research 
design, and the main criteria for sampling was based on covering different actors 
from different categories representing multiple segments of the community. This 
approach, in combination with intensive observations and participation, was crucial 
in terms of guaranteeing that the perspectives presented here are representative of the 
camps. More broadly speaking, these cases represent the yardstick for the Fayyadist 
paradigm, and analytically this means that their success extends to success in other 
areas across the occupied West Bank. Indeed both camps were purposively selected, 
and this chapter does not claim that the findings can be fully generalised, a limitation 
that exists in any small, case-study based research project; however, the qualitative 
dimensions that the case studies illustrate can be tested elsewhere and are relevant to 
the broader empirical and theoretical contexts beyond the Palestinian case. 
The major argument advanced in this chapter is that despite the better everyday 
security conditions of Palestinians under Fayyadism, particularly if contrasted with 
the security conditions during the second intifada era 2000-06, the people feel that 
these improvements are fragile because the major source of insecurity, the Israeli 
occupation, was not addressed or targeted. Beyond this argument, the ethnographic 
evidence presented below suggests that the security reform campaigns resulted in an 
authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its security forces 
operations. This authoritarianism is manifest in the excessive use of arbitrary 
detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for opposition 
voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. Additionally, the ethnographic evidence 
suggests that the unorganised, incomplete, and therefore ineffective security 
campaigns had used informal tools and mechanisms in an effort to induce formality 
and exclusivity to the PA security forces in governing these camps. The findings also 
suggest that the security reforms were used to address an intra-Fatah factional 
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politics. Fundamentally, the core objective of the security reform and campaigns was 
to silence and criminalise resistance against the Israeli occupation and its colonial 
dominance, as the ethnographic evidence presented in this chapter suggests.  
This chapter is structured to first discuss perspectives found in the literature, and 
proceeds to contrast these perspectives with the original insights and perspectives 
that emerged from the ethnographic data. The discussion drawn from the literature is 
focused on the effectiveness of security reform under Fayyadism, and is critically 
presented through three lenses: impact of international aid and donors; corruption 
dynamics; and, the creation of a police state. The second part of the chapter, which 
constitutes the major original contribution, engages with the ethnographic data I 
gathered at Balata and Jenin refugee camps, and proceeds to analyse the 
consequences of the security reforms on the lives of people from all sectors within 
the camps. Lastly, the chapter concludes by addressing the gap between the 
perspectives found in the literature and those of Palestinians living in the camps, and 
suggests that despite the establishment of professional security forces under 
Fayyadism the people most wanted protection from the major source of their 
insecurity, the Israeli occupation.  
 Effectiveness of Security Reform under Occupation: 3.2.
Perspectives from the Literature  
The viability, effectiveness, and consequences of conducting security reform within 
a context of foreign occupation and colonial dominance are questionable at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. Such reforms could, directly or indirectly, further 
entrench the occupation and reinforce colonial dominance through local agents and 
institutions that are backed by the international donor community and their funds.
54
 
On the other hand, however, better trained, equipped, and governed security forces 
are able to protect the people and deliver security provision more efficiently, at least 
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 Mustafa (2014:21) argued that “SSR has served to reinforce the paradigm of occupation at the same 
time as linking the PA and its population into the macro-structure of bio-political imperialism and its 
program of global pacification.” Mustafa’s argument continues that in the case of Palestine, SSR is 
intended not to secure Palestine’s security but Israel’s, but this is not particularly surprising not only 
because of the bases of Oslo Accords but also because “in the context of a neo-colonial state-building 
project, [SSR] will be primarily intended to serve the interests of the (hegemonic) international 
community”. 
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theoretically. Recognizing the tension between these two understandings is crucial to 
understanding the polarisation that exists in the literature. Furthermore, from this 
tension emerges the argument that despite the aim of the security forces to induce 
law and order and enhance the effectiveness of the security forces, the Fayyadist 
paradigm lead to authoritarian transformations; this hypothesis is validated by the 
ethnographic data, as the second part of this chapter illustrates.  
Accordingly, the literature and scholarly work is divided. One strand argues that the 
security reform under Fayyadism resulted in greater protection of the people and 
better security and economic conditions. The DfID (2011:16) argued, and it was also 
testified by the PA (2011b), that “the redeployment of the Palestinian security forces 
in the West Bank from the second half of 2007 was an important and successful step 
which had immediate benefits for people’s sense of security and for the economy.” 
The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute-MAS (2011:14) has argued for the 
institutional readiness of the PA into a statehood phase; “since the backbone of this 
state, the monopoly of violence, does exist.” To affirm the positive impact of the 
security reforms and the disarmament process, usually the peaceful status of Jenin 
and Nablus were highlighted; “…Jenin and Nablus were once no-go areas are now 
safe and bustling at all hours” (Danin 2011). The impact on the peace process was 
also tackled by the literature, not only because the disarmament process “created the 
best ever Palestinian partner for peace” (Thrall 2010), but also because the 
“Fayyadist enterprise provided a safety net for Palestinians and Israelis and it can 
keep hope, people and peace process alive” (Weiss 2009, 2010). Finally, proponents 
argued the security reform under Fayyadism represented a pre-requisite for 
sustainable neoliberal socio-economic development (QQR2011; PA 2011). 
On the other hand, some argue that the security reform under Fayyadism created a 
police state designed to guarantee Israeli security and to perform as a sub-contractor 
to the occupation. Brown (2011) argued that the maintenance of existing institutions 
was done “in an authoritarian context that robs the results of domestic legitimacy. 
Hence, the entire program [of Fayyadism] is based not simply on de-emphasizing or 
postponing democracy and human rights but on actively denying them for the 
present.” This made Fayyadist authoritarianism different from the one of Arafat, by 
being “regularised and softened” and “less venal and probably less capricious. But it 
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is also more stultifying”, according to Brown (2010a:10). Additionally, Sayigh 
(2011) concluded that reform in the security sector resulted in an authoritarian 
transformation that threatens not only long-term security, but also the ability to 
achieve Palestinian statehood. Security reform was also perceived as problematic 
since it forbade Palestinians and their leadership to resist the Israeli occupation 
(Leech 2012a,b); and it also failed to bring economic benefits and dividends (DCAF 
2009; Al-Barghouti and Jadallah 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011). In other words, 
as was argued by Friedrich and Luethold (2008:208), “the intended overall strategy 
of the dominant, externally-driven security sector reform process currently unfolding 
in Palestine, both in vision and in practice, appears to be the transformation of the 
Palestinian security apparatus into a reliable instrument for Israeli security policy 
and the US-led war on terror.”  
The effectiveness of security reform under Fayyad, as expressed by the perspectives 
of its proponents and critics, can be understood only in consideration of its three 
dominant characteristics and themes, namely: the impact of international aid and 
donors on the reform process; the dynamics of corruption; and the authoritarian 
transformations under Fayyad’s rule. 
3.2.1. Impact of International Aid and Donors’ Intervention 
In addition to enhancing the functionality and capacity of the PA’s security forces, 
the intervention of international aid and donors resulted in: the exacerbation of 
Palestinian fragmentation; the depoliticisation of the security sphere, with focus on 
technical matters that lead to symbolic changes; and, the criminalisation of resistance 
against Israeli occupation. Cambrezy (2014:2) argued that “SSR programs not only 
failed to lead to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Palestine but 
they also contributed to the upsurge of violence in Palestine”. Further, Cambrezy 
argued that with the focus on Israeli security, the international actors neglected to 
look at the impacts of their SSR programs in Palestine. In other words, “SSR has 
contributed to the fragmentation of the political scene, to the upsurge of violence 
between the main political factions and to an erosion of the credibility of the 
Palestinian Authority's institutions…this is not only a problem of unintended 
consequences; it is due to the normative framing and the core objective of 
international assistance” (Cambrezy 2014:2). This adopted normative framing had 
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negative implications not only because it was a top-down imposed approach, but also 
because it actively denied the local context.   
Because of its focus on technical matters, Schroeder et al. (2014) argued that 
between 2006 and 2012 (Fayyadism era) there was nearly a complete absence of 
formal democratic control and governance in the PA security service. First, they 
argued that the evidence suggests that international sponsorship of the security 
reform resulted in the further weakening of civilian, democratic political control over 
the PA security forces. Second, they asserted that with the shift towards governance-
oriented reform programs, the adoption of good governance and accountability 
standards by the PA security forces remained “mostly symbolic” (Schroeder et al. 
2014:219). As a result, the donors approach to security reform strengthened the 
“already powerful security commanders and further weakened the institutionalisation 
of civilian political control over the security forces in the West Bank” (Schroeder et 
al. 2014: 220). Undoubtedly, this particular dimension helped usher in the rise of the 
Palestinian authoritarianism. The establishment of a number of units in the 
Palestinian Ministry of Interior, such as the Inspector General’s Office and The 
Strategic Planning Department, tasked with conforming to democratic governance 
reform prerequisites and donors’ conditionality remained “isolated bubbles” with no 
influence on the security operations. In an effort to address the rising number of 
citizens’ complaints about human rights infringement and ill-treatment by West 
Bank security forces, the EU sponsored and created the Police Security and 
Discipline Department as well as the Bureau for Grievances and Human Rights, both 
of which remained “ineffective and little was known about their actual tasks and 
work” (Schroeder et al. 2014: 221). Bouris (2014:95) argued that “in reality, the EU 
has supported a technical and training approach rather than a genuine security sector 
reform process promoting democratic civilian oversight and accountability”. Bouris 
(2014:95) also argued that “the main obstacle to the EU’s efficiency in the domain of 
SSR is the EU itself and this has significant reverberations not only for the security 
sector, but for the whole state-building project carried out in the OPTs”. This 
technically-oriented and politically-constrained EU approach can be understood as 
the EU “trying to promote the rule of law dimension in the OPTs in an authoritarian 
rather than democratic manner” (Bouris 2014:162). 
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Beyond these technical dimensions, the external intervention, particularly from the 
US, aimed to criminalise resistance and to “depoliticise the political”. As cited in 
Cambrezy (2014:29), in November 2013, a former high-level American agent who 
served at the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) mission expressed this in 
his statement that “Condoleezza Rice [former US Secretary of State] asked us to 
build a Palestinian security sector that would convince Israelis that Palestinians 
could be a partner”.55 This meant that the overall aim of the ‘Train, Build and Equip’ 
program was "to build organised units, with a national identity, that would reinforce 
the civil police in appropriate situation, and fight against criminals and terrorists” 
(Cambrezy 2014:31).
56
 This dimension of criminalising resistance served to 
depoliticise the most pressing issue in the conflict, the politics of security, and thus 
reduced it to the level of a technicality. As Le More (2008) argued, the agenda of the 
security reform was and remains in the service of Americans and Israelis, with other 
donors merely footing the bill. In sum, donors’ intervention meant that the security 
sector was handled in technical terms without any consideration for the political 
implications or the wider consequences these had on the Palestinian national 
struggle. As discussed below, this de-contextualised understanding is problematic in 
the security sphere, particularly when it is associated with corruption; as evidenced 
by the findings from Balata and Jenin refugee camps. 
3.2.2. Corruption but with Better Bookkeeping 
Despite the rhetoric of institutional building and good governance, the complex 
dynamics of corruption and patronage politics remained constant elements in the 
reform projects of the PA. Consequently, inspired by the voices from below, it is 
argued here that under Fayyadism the dynamics of corruption were manifest 
differently. One commentator told me that under Fayyadism, and particularly in the 
security domain, corruption still existed but with better bookkeeping. Mustafa 
(2014:26) argued that “the rampant corruption, as well as nepotistic, unaccountable 
and repressive personalised style of politics favoured by the leadership has no doubt 
significantly hindered the development of SSR”. In turn, Weinberger (2013:23) 
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 For further analysis on the “partners for peace” paradigm and on peace-building as 
counterinsurgency, please refer to Turner (2009, 2011, 2014).  
56
 According to the US state department, by 2012, US security mission had trained and equipped nine 
NSF Special Battalions and two Presidential Guard battalions, totalling over 5,500 personnel. 
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argued that “security sector reform cannot succeed unless Palestinian leaders, 
accountable to their public, assume local ownership”. Weinberger concluded by 
stating that “despite improvements in the personal security of West Bank 
Palestinians, corruption and human rights abuses continued” (Weinberger 2013:8).   
While security reform under Fayyadism aimed to professionalise the security forces, 
Marten (2013:1) argues that “old patronage networks ultimately proved stronger than 
the technocrats. Fayyad never managed to control the rat’s nest of overlapping 
Palestinian security agencies, whose constant infighting was encouraged by struggles 
within President Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah party”. Security forces, therefore, “despite 
generous international assistance and markedly improved technical capabilities, 
remained beset by violent, personality-based patronage politics”, Marten (2014:181) 
concluded. Such conclusions not only challenge the claims of transparency and 
accountability under Fayyadism, but also elucidate that executing security reform 
from within a vacuum and without reforming the overall political domain actually 
fostered patronage politics and enabled it to continue; an assertion supported by the 
perspectives of people in the camps. Moreover, Schroeder et al. (2014:215) argued 
that “in states where political authority is weak or contested, democratic control over 
the security forces is often completely lacking. Instead, governance of the security 
sector can be characterised by alternative mechanisms of control based on patronage 
politics or rooted in informal power structures. In some cases, state leaders exert 
direct, centralised control over the security sector, while in others, individual security 
agencies serve specific clientelistic factions in the domestic political spectrum”. The 
Palestinian security sector is characterised by presidential control over operations, 
budgets, and personnel, as well as the dominance of personal patronage in the 
security service; this led Marten (2013:2) to conclude that “despite massive 
international assistance, including over $500 million from the U.S. State Department 
in recent years, reform of the West Bank security forces has frayed”. 
Additionally, Marten (2013:2) argued that in the case of Jenin, “when the dust 
settled, it became clear that factions inside the supposedly reformed security forces 
had been fighting one another for control over territory and patronage in Jenin. At 
least two of the senior officers who were arrested had recently undergone U.S.-
funded training in Jordan”. The people I spoke to from Jenin camp went further and 
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argued that it is not only the factional infighting that is to blame, but also the intra-
families infighting and infighting between different geographical localities. Many 
respondents pointed out how one particular US-trained security official from a 
neighbouring village wanted revenge against the camp and its resident (for no 
specific reason), and that such personal considerations, far from being factional, 
created huge insecurities. When this US-trained security official was dismissed due 
to intra-Fatah factional politics, and hence “transformed from an official who 
commanded six hundred soldiers trained by the US general Keith Dayton to not even 
command six goats” as one respondent put it, he was accused of murdering the 
governor of Jenin city, an act that led to another full-fledged security campaign in 
early 2012. A similar incident happened later in the year and led to yet another 
security campaign that saw hundreds of newly-donated American anti-riot vehicles 
touring the governorate and camp in an act that was described by the head of Jenin 
camp as “totally exaggerated and un-needed, and only to show off”. Such incidents 
are related to corruption and patronage politics, and reveal two main considerations. 
First, security personnel are perceived by the camp’s residents as having been 
“brainwashed” and as being criminals, despite the years of training towards 
professionalism. Second, security conditions must be fragile if the behaviour of one 
person can cause a security campaign that justifies the arrest and detention of seven 
hundred residents of Jenin camp just because the PA forces “thought they may be 
responsible about the murdering of the governor”, as one respondent put it.                 
3.2.3. Creating a Police State 
Beyond the above-mentioned observations, Fayyadist security reforms were also 
characterised by an acceleration of authoritarian practices by the PA and its security 
forces. In the era of Fayyadism, Palestinian security forces were mandated to quell 
demonstrations and repress protestors, and to this end they engaged in arresting 
activists, the violent disarmament of political military wings, the routine torture of 
fighters and militants, as well as the torture of political activists, to the point that 
they killed a few of them. Furthermore, security forces have accelerated security 
coordination and cooperation with the Israeli security establishment to an 
unprecedented level under the supervision of the USSC. There are daily 
announcements for bids to construct more prisons, as well as bidding for anti-
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demonstrations weapons. There are regular meetings between PA President 
Mahmoud Abbas and the security forces leadership, where it has been repeatedly 
reported that he has ordered them to “rule with an iron fist”. The dominance of the 
security narrative and security sector in the PA is indicated by the recent upgrading 
of security personnel to PA leadership positions. These are just a few examples of 
the authoritarian consequences of the security reform.  
To illustrate this quantitatively, the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK 
(2012:11) reported that “the data collected from June 2007 to the end of 2011 
indicates that PA security forces detained 13,271 Palestinian citizens, 96 per cent of 
whom were subjected to various methods of torture resulting in the killing of six 
detainees and causing chronic illness in others. Ninety-nine per cent of the detainees 
had experienced detention by the Israelis after which they were also detained by the 
PA on the same charges”. The Euro-Med Observer for Human Rights (2013) 
reported recently that in 2013 the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank 
arbitrarily arrested 723 persons and interrogated 1,137 without any clear charge or a 
court decision or memo of arrestment. Additionally, the PA security forces arrested 
56 persons because of critical Facebook status updates, as well as arresting 19 
journalists and a number of cartoonists and writers. Furthermore, 117 cases of 
extreme torturing were documented. Similar numbers were reported by the 
Independent Commission on Human Rights (ICHR), which further evidence an 
increase in violations committed by the security agencies/and or civil institutions. In 
2012, the ICHR received 3,185 complaints, compared to 2,876 complaints in 2011, 
and 3,828 complaints in 2010 (ICHR 2012). Moreover, in 2013 the ICHR received 
123 complaints on the disrespect of court rulings by civil and security authorities, 
compared with 102 complaints of disrespect and non-implementation of court 
rulings in 2012 (ICHR 2013).  
In other words, the judicial system, which is required to abide by the security reform 
mandate, is not providing the opportunity for civilians to demand accountability with 
regards to mistreatments by their own government officials. Human Rights Watch 
(2014) pointed to this serious lacuna in the judicial system in a report published on 
19 May 2014 wherein it criticised the courts for prosecuting activists assaulted by 
the police during a protest on 12 April 2014. The police officers who exercised force 
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were discharged by the courts while protesters who were victims of police assault 
were charged. Because of the lack of democratic oversight, the security forces have 
the leverage to utilise the judicial system to their advantage, and in turn, the judicial 
system fails to protect civilians from security force brutality. In the above-mentioned 
HRW report, the organisation’s deputy MENA director puts it like this: “It’s absurd 
that the Palestinian justice system is prosecuting the victims of police brutality rather 
than their attackers. Palestine should start living up to its human rights obligations by 
exonerating the victims and holding the police to account” (HRW 2014:1). 
The spread of excessive forms of authoritarianism and human rights violations in the 
West Bank led Sayigh (2011:21) to argue that “human rights are bestowed or 
withheld as a matter of discretion rather than obligation”. Leech (2012:13) argued 
that the “reform of the security services has tightened the PA’s grip on the social 
freedoms that were previously considered standard, for instance, free expression, 
political affiliation and public assembly”. Furthermore, Leech (2014b:2) argued that 
“the PA’s authoritarian nature had effectively entered a new, more directly coercive, 
phase” between 2007 and 2013. This authoritarian nature is exemplified in three 
particular characteristics, according to Leech (2014b:3): first, “the PA maintains a 
robust security apparatus in order to ensure control over its own civilian population; 
second, it [the PA] has undermined mechanisms of accountability including elections 
and freedom of the press; and third, it [the PA] engages in large scale clientalism or 
‘crony capitalism’”. Throughout 2011-12, Leech (2014b) estimated that there were a 
total of 59 incidents of protests across the West Bank (those against Israel and its 
occupation are not included). Out of these incidents, 42 were against the PA and 
involved clashes with or suppression by the PA security forces. One of the most 
brutal crackdown of protestors occurred in June-July 2012 in Ramallah, and 
Amnesty International’s account of this incident reveals: “The brutality that followed 
was shocking even by the standards of the PA security forces, whose use of 
excessive force on previous occasions and abuses against detainees had already 
earned them an unenviable reputation at home and internationally” (Amnesty 
International 2013:1). 
Consequently, Leech (2012) and Mustafa (2014), based on Henry and Springborg 
(2001), characterised the PA as “a bully praetorian republic”, wherein power rests 
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almost exclusively on the operations of the “military/security/party apparatus”. 
Hence, those elites leading the apparatus who are heavily reliant on coercion, co-
optation, and rent-seeking measures are not drawn from a clearly identifiable social 
subset and are therefore “at least not unrepresentative of their relatively 
homogeneous political communities”. This scholarly illustration of the PA’s 
authoritarian transformation echoes the perspectives of the camps’ residents in the 
following sections. These voices from below not only illustrate the practices of a 
police-state and an authoritarian regime, but also explain why and how this 
transformation happened and how it is linked to  multiple resistance dimensions.   
3.2.4. Addressing Imbalances of Power 
The ethnographic data from both Balata and Jenin camps expands and challenges the 
debate in the literature. Indeed, the people in the camps reveal that security reform 
under Fayyadism was characterised by three words: momawillen, fasad, and dawlat 
police (donors, corruption, and police state). These key words correspond with the 
sub-themes in the literature discussed above. However, in a challenge to this 
literature, the people focused on the notion of resistance as the centre of analysis to 
explore the consequences of the security reform on their lives and their national 
struggle. This meant that they problematised and unpacked the security campaigns 
from a resistance lenses, instead of the conventional institutional lenses available in 
the literature. Accordingly, the mere technical successes of the security forces were 
seen as fragile, temporary, and conditional to the will of Israel and generosity of the 
donors. Fundamentally, the collective consensus from people is that “after all, it is a 
game of power dynamics. This is what security all about”, as one respondent from 
Jenin camp told me. This power play is expressed in the tools used to tame resistance 
and criminalise it, such as the doctrine of security collaboration, the use of informal 
mechanisms to induce the formal rule of the PA forces, the (ab)use of the judicial 
system to entrench authoritarian rule instead of ensuing justice, and finally the use of 
excessive violence aimed at perpetuating a culture of fear and to discredit resistance.  
The effectiveness of Palestinian security forces operating under Israeli military 
occupation needs to be contextualised within a framework that acknowledges the 
power dynamics and imbalances, the realities on the ground, and the terms and 
clauses of the peace agreements and interim arrangements. According to agreements, 
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the role of the PA security forces is primarily to protect Israeli security (both the 
security of the Israeli state and people), prevent any clashes with Israeli soldiers or 
settlers, and fight against “Palestinian terrorism”. People in both camps affirmed that 
these are the fundamental pillars; however, the people argue that these mandates 
always get denied by the PA. In other words, conducting security reform to ensure 
stability within a context of colonial occupation and without addressing the 
imbalances of power and revisiting the terms of the peace agreements, can only ever 
have two outcomes: “better” collaboration with the occupying power, and a violation 
of the security and (national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own 
government/authority and (national) security forces.
57
  
As international law expert Charles Shamas (2012) explains, “There is nothing 
wrong with wanting a good law enforcement system, a good justice system or a 
responsible police, what is wrong is when you don’t consider the environmental 
parameters, if you are willing to accept to go about it as such, then what SSR does is 
simply ensure a permanent state of crisis management for a permanent occupation”. 
The ultimate result of SSR in this case will be the creation of “an authoritarian 
regime” (Byrne 2011) and/or a future “police state” (Schanzer 2012). After all, 
security forces’ effectiveness means the ability of well-equipped and well-trained 
soldiers to follow orders and commands and to induce the political vision of the 
ruling authorities. In the West Bank, these authorities are the PA, Israel, and the 
donors. Effectiveness, then, is an outcome shaped by the dominance of powers and 
authorities. A look at the security coordination system between Israel and the PA, 
reveals that Palestinians must confront two levels of oppression (Israel and PA) from 
the same centrifuge of power, and therefore public anger at the PA and a crisis of 
legitimacy are the consequences of Fayyadism, as the following section will discuss. 
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 In his 2002 speech before the Herzliya Conference, the former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon asserted that 
the Palestinian security reform “must accompany a sincere and real effort to stop terrorism, while 
applying the "chain of preventive measures" outlined by the Americans: intelligence gathering, arrest, 
interrogation, prosecution and punishment” (Sharon 2002). 
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 Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps: Echoing the Voices from 3.3.
Below 
3.3.1. Brief Background 
Jenin refugee camp is located in Jenin governorate in the north of the occupied West 
Bank. It was established by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in 1953 to host Palestinians from the Carmel region 
of Haifa (from 54 villages and cities) after Al-Nakba in 1948. It sits on 0.42 square 
kilometres and its population is around 16,260 inhabitants comprised of 3,645 
families (with 5.2 as an average household size). Sixty percent of the population is 
younger than 24 years old, with poverty and unemployment rates of thirty-five and 
forty percent respectively. The camp has two schools, one running double shifts, and 
one health centre. High unemployment, overcrowded schools, and extensive damage 
from the second intifada are the camp’s major problems according to the UNRWA 
(OCHA 2008a; UNRWA 2014).  
Balata refugee camp is located in Nablus governorate in the north of the occupied 
West Bank. It was established by the UNRWA in 1950 to host Palestinians from 60 
villages and the cities of Lydd, Jaffa, and Ramleh after Al-Nakba in 1948. It is the 
largest camp in the West Bank in terms of population. It sits on 0.25 square 
kilometres, and its population is around 23,600 inhabitants comprised of 5,100 
families (with 5.9 as an average household size). Sixty-two percent of the population 
is younger than 24 years old, with poverty and unemployment rates of thirty-five and 
forty-six percent respectively (64% among youth between 18-30 years old). The 
camp has four schools and one UNRWA health centre. High unemployment, high 
population density, bad water and sewage network, and overcrowded schools are the 
camp’s major problems according to the UNRWA (OCHA 2008b; UNRWA 2014). 
The centrality and legacy of both Balata and Jenin refugee camps to the resistance 
movement during the second Palestinian intifada made them the candidates for the 
security campaigns of the PA under Fayyadism. The debate about these security 
campaigns revolved around the meaning, and consequently the implications, of 
inducing law and order vis-à-vis armed resistance movements as well as the voices 
of the political opposition. Nablus’s security campaign began in November 2007, 
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followed in May 2008 by Jenin’s security campaign, which was named “Smile and 
Hope”. From the PA’s perspective the idea was simple, as a high-ranking PA official 
told me: “we want to demonstrate to the donors and Israel that the PA can govern the 
Palestinian society even in the impossible areas as Balata and Jenin camps. We want 
to show them that nothing is impossible and if we are successful in these difficult 
spaces, then we can do it anywhere else”.  
This idea of establishing a showpiece of security reform was shared by the top 
political level in the international community arena. At a dinner in Israel with former 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair and top U.S. diplomats from the region, US Gen. 
Jones “proposed a new approach: instead of going for a grand deal, they would pick 
one place under Israeli occupation and make it a model” (Calabresi 2009). This 
“Pilot Project” was also supported by Israel, and according to the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF), the “Pilot Jenin and Nablus” program “is an Israeli initiative 
implemented through direct coordination between the Palestinians and Israel, with 
limited American involvement, and “attempt to strengthen the moderate Palestinian 
camp, led by Abu-Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], implementing results from the 
Annapolis Conference” (IDF 2008). Moreover, Marten (2013) noted that “U.S.-
funded and Jordanian-trained PA forces swept through in 2008, arresting militias 
which had long spread terror and extortion among residents…It was Fayyadism at its 
best.” This led the former Mayor of Jenin to name the years 2008-2009 as the 
“Golden Age” (Giambi 2009:33). This “quiet revolution” (Bronner 2008) let Giambi 
(2009:33) to argue that Jenin “has gained a reputation as a model security area where 
armed gangs and warlords have been replaced by organised security forces that 
respect one chain of command”.  
However, this idea of making Jenin and Nablus as models for others in the West 
Bank (Zanotti 2010) came under severe dispute. Tabar (2012:48) argued that 
“resistance in Jenin over time was subdued by separately intervening technologies of 
power, including most notably a long colonial counterinsurgency campaign that was 
followed by donor-driven projects to revamp the camp and re-establish security 
collaboration with Israel”. While in the case of Balata, Leech (2014a:1) argued that 
despite the perceived success of the PA in imposing law and order in Balata and 
Nablus after 2007, and the popular consent of the PA’s security agenda initially, this 
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“does not demonstrate public endorsement of the PA’s legitimacy. Rather it is more 
likely that such consent was a product of a recent experience [2001-2007] of extreme 
violence followed by the restoration of some basic services”. In other words, a closer 
examination to the general consensus about the popular consent to the PA security 
campaigns in Nablus reveals that “this consensus was superficial and did not last. 
Indeed by 2012 the popularity of the regime had waned” (Leech 2014a:11). 
Such critical observations were shared and further expanded by the perspectives of 
the people in these camps. As cited in Giambi (2009:25), a civil society activist 
explained, “The security situation seems very stable but actually it is not. It is like a 
crystal ball that can break into a thousand pieces at any time with a minimum 
movement. Israel in one day can destroy everything Palestinians have built in a long 
time and with many efforts”. During our interview a local leader, and the head of 
Jenin camp, put it to me as follows: “there was no phenomenon of security chaos. 
The PA just exaggerated it which reflects their inability to lead. They used the media 
machine to portray us as a threat to the national and community security”. A theatre 
trainer in Balata camp with leftist political views told me: 
In these security campaigns there are three key words: lies, media, 
and money. The PA forces used these three pillars to ensure the 
implementation of the campaigns. A media machine was behind 
and in front of them covering their lies, and there was no scarcity 
in resources when it comes to security issues. 
When asked about the security conditions and campaigns, other respondents from the 
camps pointed to what they claim to be the accurate picture of reality based on hard-
core facts. A 25 year old youth from Balata asked in frustration: “what does security 
mean if you are unemployed and struggle to survive? We want jobs we don’t want 
anything else. Those security forces can’t protect themselves, so how do you expect 
them to protect me?” A local woman, and leader in Balata, asked “why don’t we 
have a police station inside the camp? This will change the behaviours”. On the other 
hand, a psychologist and counsellor suggested: “I feel secure because of my 
community’s values and behaviour, not because of the PA security forces or its 
campaigns”. A mechanic from Jenin camp echoed this by stating “There is no sense 
of security at all. It is so fragile and Israel can invade any time. Now we are also 
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afraid of the PA invasions. We are protected by our culture and values only; and of 
course by God”. 
3.3.2. Unorganised, Incomplete, and Ineffective Security Campaigns   
People from both camps criticised the security campaigns for being unorganised and 
lacking a singular source of command and authority. They attributed this to internal 
fighting and clashes among the forces and the different interests pursued by their 
leadership. “I was arrested by the Preventative Security Force, and then the Military 
Intelligence Force came to my house to arrest me”, one respondent told me. Another 
stated, “It was rather ironic that the Preventative Security Force and the Civil Police 
had a major argument and fired shots in the air in front of my house over who will 
arrest me”. A third respondent argued, “security forces follow the political decisions. 
If you have fights at the political front, you will have them exemplified on the 
ground and in the operations of the security forces. At the end, we the people pay the 
costs of their infighting. They almost shot each other at the entrance of the camp the 
other day”. A fourth respondent stated: “when you see the PA security forces 
themselves fighting against each other, how do you expect them to protect us?”. 
Despite coming from different categories and segments of the population, people in 
both camps share similar perspectives regarding the efficacy of PA security forces, 
and this perspective contradicts the official rhetoric and is therefore challenged and 
denied by the authorities.      
The incomplete, unorganised, and unplanned nature of these security campaigns, in 
addition to the absence of any level of local consultation, meant these campaigns 
were publically perceived as both ineffective and illegitimate. One respondent told 
me: 
When they began in 2007 we felt some hope and optimism, and it 
felt that all of us wanted to end the chaos and instability. We 
helped them to protect us. But then things started to deteriorate 
because we never understood what they were doing, which kind of 
weapons they are targeting, why they are arresting great people and 
local leaders who lead the intifada, or why they killed others. Then 
we started seeing the corruption very vividly. After a promising 
start, they became just a mess and unbelievably aggressive, dealing 
with us as murderers and enemies. We used to give them flowers 
and make them coffee and even food, but they thanked us with 
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bullets and breaking into our houses. We never understood their 
behaviour and therefore we forgot about the short term 
achievements of 2007, and after that we just noticed failures and a 
different sort of insecurity. They addressed the chaos by a greater 
one, however this time in the name of inducing “law and order”. 
Another respondent argued, with a sarcastic tone: 
Have you ever seen the PA doing anything until the end, or 
complete any project? Never. And they will never do .There is 
nothing systematic or structured in the PA, and security campaigns 
are not an exception. They are just random and this is why they 
have created problems between families and within the 
community. They are just making holes in our cause and national 
struggle, and even in our bodies –literally- and they never try to 
close these holes. With the incomplete security campaigns, the PA 
made our communities like Swiss cheese full of holes. 
Reflecting on the consequences of incomplete security campaigns, a local leader of 
Fatah in Balata camp exposed the campaigns and warned of their implications:         
The security campaigns were very thin and fragile. Unless the 
occupation ends, it will remain fragile and thin by its design. It 
remained unsquared and incomplete and characterised by 
corruption and nepotism. It did not prosecute thieves; it did not 
answer the questions: who killed whom and who put fire in this or 
that? Even though the Khawaat (a group of armed men who go to 
shops and forcefully ask for a sum of money) do not exist 
anymore, but the security campaigns lacked any punishment 
mechanisms against the criminals, they are free but the fighters are 
arrested and tortured. People can see that, and this is what is 
putting them off and affecting the legitimacy of these campaigns. 
People could revolt against the PA now. We don’t need campaigns; 
we need the regular and routine work of the security forces 
because, after all, having one unified authority is better than having 
tens of groups and networks. I am worried about the consequences 
of these security campaigns on civil and social peace, those who 
were tortured will never forgive and will one day revenge in one 
way or another. 
The dynamics of corruption and lack of accountability in these security campaigns 
were apparent. A civil society actor directing a local NGO in Balata raised the 
dilemma of mistrust:  
In principle, the security campaigns should be great news for all, 
but not for the small group of militant gangs who benefited from 
the chaos few years ago. Their monthly income was 10,000 JOD, 
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now they are unemployed with zero income. So they have a vested 
interest in the continuation of the anarchy and chaos. However the 
PA forces who are conducting the security campaigns are not 
“clean” either. They are part of the corruption and people do not 
trust them either.  
A respondent from the youth club in Jenin camp tackled the legitimacy gap that 
resulted from the incomplete security campaign from a legal dimension. He told me: 
We have paid a high price to feel a little bit more secure. The 
security campaigns were ok, but lacking at many dimensions 
including the lack of legal and legislative framework. We need to 
have legislation to enforce the law. However, these enforcement 
tools have to be perceived as legitimate by the people to be 
implemented voluntarily, not forcefully and aggressively by the 
security forces. We, as people, are able to rule ourselves by 
ourselves, our values, customs and traditions in addition to our 
sense of unity are valuable assets that we have. But on the other 
hand, in the absence of a unifying national formwork, any weapon 
outside the domain and control of the PA can be harmful. I trust the 
armed resistance groups, but not everyone who is carrying a gun is 
a freedom fighter. The leader of the camp was killed in the midst of 
the security campaign, so this is a criminal activity that also shows 
the limitation of the security campaign.  Jenin camp was targeted 
not because we are bunch of thugs or criminals, but because we are 
like a tree full of fruits, everyone wants to throw a stone on it and 
collect one of the fruits.          
The lack of trust between PA security forces and the residents of the camp is 
tangible. The language of “them” and “us” is dominant, and a number of 
interviewees revealed different attempts made aimed at bridging this gap. An 
unemployed 23 year-old youth from Jenin camp, who is a footballer as well, argued 
that to address the tense relationship between the PA forces and the people, more 
social activities are needed. “The people were really delighted the other day when 
the PA forces organised a health-day and showed the people that they are also kind 
and helpful. We are an emotional society and such incident means a lot for us”, he 
added. Additionally, a local female leader and member of the Women Centre in 
Jenin camp added:  
We tried to bridge the trust gap through organizing trips for the 
kids between 8-14 years old to the police station in the city of 
Jenin. We wanted to teach the kids from that these forces are not 
ghosts or sources of threats. We would like these kids to welcome 
the police with flowers, not stones when they come to the camp. 
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3.3.3. Using Informality to Induce Formality  
Interestingly, in their attempts to implement the mission of “one gun, one law, one 
authority”, the PA security forces used informal mechanisms, networks, and tools to 
achieve such formality. In the cases of Balata and Jenin camps, the PA security 
forces relied on a number of local leaders to facilitate the security campaigns and 
operations, and to grant them some legitimacy. Local leaders were not only 
facilitators but also an integral part of the disarmament and weapons collection 
processes, and they were witness to the financial compensation procedures that took 
place when weapons were handed in to the PA. The role of local leaders was 
contested by many people in the camps, and they were accused of being complicit 
and financial beneficiaries from the security campaigns. Such technique of co-opting 
informal routes to the service of formal goals is not unique to the Palestinian case. A 
local Fatah leader, and the head of Jenin camp, told me: 
I was the first one in the camp who handed in my weapon to the 
PA so to be an example for others, I helped the PA forces in the 
security operations, I helped the PA Presidential Forces to be 
spread on the roofs of the houses in the camp. I took wanted people 
from their hands to the police offices to hand in their weapons and 
receive cash as a compensation for that. 
At the commencement of a security campaign, a member of the PLC, and leader of 
the 2002 Jenin Battle, appealed to the public to cooperate with the Palestinian 
security forces that were surrounding the camp. He wrote: "These soldiers are your 
brothers and dear ones...Your enemy is the Zionist occupiers who will pay a price 
every time they enter the camp". However, and ironically, when the PA security 
forces gained power they dismissed the local leaders and arrested many of them. To 
this end, the head of Jenin camp, quoted above, was arrested and held for five 
months in 2012; and the PLC member who encouraged cooperation with the PA 
security forces was regularly subjected to harassments, but never arrested due to his 
parliamentary immunity. The head of Jenin camp, anxious to tell his story, told me: 
After we were done with handing in Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
people, and indeed all the gang members, things got calmer. 
However, we were not aware of what would follow was that it was 
our turn: Fatah members who helped the PA in their campaigns. 
They dismantled our armed wing, they confiscated our weapons, 
and we said ok. Now they are arresting us to change our beliefs and 
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threaten that we will lose our jobs. 200 members in the PA forces 
who are from the camp lost their jobs and salaries just because they 
wanted to collectively punish us. In May 2012, after the death of 
the governor of Jenin, 700 residents of the camp were arrested and 
tortured by the PA security forces (500 were interrogated for a few 
days, while the remaining 200 stayed in jails for months). They 
have arrested and tortured my son who is 19 years old, to 
blackmail and pressure me to confess something I never  did. In a 
nutshell, the PA lost its legitimacy in the camp, if it ever had it, 
because of its un-needed security operations. 
This use of security reform and campaigns to deal with intra-Fatah factional politics 
was also echoed by a former member of the dissolved Fatah’s military wing, al-Aqsa 
Martyrs' Brigades, in Balata camp: 
We are the ones who protected the PA institutions from a Hamas 
take-over in the West Bank. The PA forces did not have rifles or 
any authority by then. We arrested, killed, and tortured Hamas 
people, and then the PA did with us exactly what we did with 
Hamas a few years ago. 
This use of informal tools to enforce formality went beyond the operational 
dimension of the security campaigns and was extended to the judicial one. Many of 
the human rights violations committed by the PA forces were addressed by families 
and clans vis-à-vis security forces and not through courts or the formal judicial 
system. A 35 year-old woman told me: 
My husband was arrested and tortured by the PA for 45 days. 
When we wanted to go and litigate the PA, the elder of the family 
came to our house with 50 men to pressure my husband to solve 
the issue in a friendly manner. They killed us and now they tell us 
to solve it friendly. We did not have any choice but to address it 
this way. But of course this means nothing other than we carry this 
suffering and humiliation with us until we die. I will never forgive 
anyone who forces us to give up our rights.  
The use of informality to enforce formality was also extended to the domain of 
security collaboration vis-à-vis armed resistance. In June 2014, for instance, three 
Israeli settlers were allegedly kidnapped by Palestinian militants in the West Bank. 
The PA security leadership used the elder Muktars to pressure the youngsters into 
providing information to Israel, via the PA security forces, about the potential 
kidnappers. A Palestinian high-ranking security official declared: “we are worried 
that criminality will increase in the West Bank and this is why we are seeking help 
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from the Muktars”. Similar examples manifested differently in other locations using 
similar informal tools, particularly when popular resistance against the occupation 
accelerates as it did in June and July 2014. This was also the case during the peak of 
security campaigns in Jenin for instance, where the governor and other security 
personnel held meetings with Israeli counterparts in the presence of local leaders and 
Muktars of Jenin.         
3.3.4. Taming Camps, Taming Resistance  
The security campaigns were not only ineffective and insufficient in protecting 
Palestinians’ rights, but they also had detrimental effects on the resistance 
movement; in fact, this was the core message of the voices from below. This failure, 
or “intentional error” as one respondent argued, of the PA to make a clear distinction 
between chaos weapons and armed resistance weapons meant that criminal gangs 
and resistance fighters were targeted in a similar way. One respondent passionately 
argued during our long conversation: 
How come a thief could be the same as a muqaom (freedom 
fighter)? How come they could be even in the same cell in jail? 
Those muqaomeen (freedom fighters) represent our pride, dignity 
and the protection front for our cause.      
This criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation was a common 
theme among respondents. A former member in al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, who was 
arrested by the PA during the security campaigns, argued:   
They view us as criminal and they put us in front of the judges in 
military courts because we resist the occupation. Is it a crime to 
resist the occupation? Of course it is not, it is a duty for the 
occupied people. But the PA, Abbas, Fayyad and the rest of the 
gang believe it is a crime. They want us to be slaves and people 
without dignity. They just want all of us to protect the security of 
the Israelis. Aren’t we human beings as well? In this weapon 
[holding his gun in his hand] we protect ourselves, our nation and 
our cause. When Arafat was alive our weapons and resistance were 
our pride, now we are ashamed of that and they see us as criminals 
and gangs. I was tortured in the Jericho jail of the PA for 83 days 
without court or lawyer. Then they assign a lawyer for me 
themselves. The lawyer advised me to confess and sign the form 
that I will not engage in any “criminal” activities. I am a freedom 
fighter, I am not a thief.               
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Another former member of the Fatah’s dissolved military wing al-Aqsa 
Martyrs' Brigades, who was integrated into the Civil Police force and is a father of 4 
children, was arrested during one of the security campaigns; he was held for 54 days 
in the PA’s Al-Jneed prison in Nablus, and then in Al-Thairyha prison in Hebron 
from 25 June until 27 July 2012. He was accused of ambiguous and contradictory 
crimes, including: being a security threat to his community; a drug addict and a 
dealer; a criminal engaged in illegal activities and corruption; a weapons trader and 
keeper; a follower of Mohammad Dahlan; and  even of being a member of Hamas 
(despite having fought Hamas for the PA in 2007 in Nablus). In November 2007, 
Naser handed in two rifles to the PA, one short M16 with an Israeli logo, and one 
long M16 with the cedar of Lebanon; he received $18,500 as compensation for these 
two pieces, as well as conditional amnesty from Israel after one month of handing in 
his rifles. The amnesty document, which he carries with him at all times (and 
presented it to me during the interview), states that if any other person reported him, 
or if he is seen walking with people wanted by the authorities, or if he carries any 
weapon including the official PA one during his service, the amnesty will be 
cancelled.  
In the three hours I spoke with him, he said:  
It was a terrorism party in Al-Thairyha prison. They just want to 
scare you there. Blood is all over the walls and torturing sings 
everywhere. Screaming and shouting and loud slapping of doors 
and hitting on walls, all while your eyes are covered is what you 
hear. It was a scary welcome indeed. I never witnessed something 
like that in Israeli jails, even though I was arrested there for years. I 
am wondering from where they have learned all of this aggression? 
They enjoyed torturing me. I spent my days in tiny small cells (120 
cm x 200 cm). One day they came with a carrier of dirty water and 
pour it in the cell. It was a nightmare: torturing, interrogating, 
stretching for hours on a chair or wall, controlling via cameras and 
sound sensors all over, preventing sleep at night, raiding cells after 
midnight, changing interrogators every day, and much more. All of 
this is because they wanted to stop me from resisting the 
occupation. 
Our conversation was interrupted by a very loud war siren, which happened to be the 
tune of his mobile phone. Continuing in a tone of bitterness, with very shaky legs, 
and sweating profusely, he said:  
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These 54 days were the hardest in my life. In these days I had long 
conversations with the spiders, ants, and mosquitos in my cell. I 
was telling them: take your portion of my blood and just leave me 
alone please. I was looking intensely at the slow movements of the 
ants in my cell, and then I drove them crazy. I was feeding them 
and then kill them. This is exactly what the PA is doing with us. 
They pay us our salaries and then they kill us. 
Suddenly, he stopped. He held is stomach, felt dizzy, and was sweating and shaking 
further. He said, “whenever I talk about this topic, I get huge pains in my stomach 
and all over my body”. He was released from the jail after the PA President, Abbas, 
ordered the security forces to offer amnesties because of the month of Ramadan and 
Eid Al-Fitir. Fearing that he may approach a human rights organisation and litigate 
the PA and its security forces, they asked him for a fiscal guarantee of 7000 
Jordanian Dinars (around £6000) to be obtained from the Chambers of Commerce of 
Nablus. Also they asked him to sign a commitment form, which was written in 
Arabic, English and Hebrew, not to carry any weapon, not to travel or move within 
the West Bank, and to stay every night from 8 pm – 8 am in the PA’s main police 
station in Nablus. Naser’s story is just one example, but I am using it as a microsom 
to illustrate multiple dynamics in the disarmament process, its financial costs and 
implications, the security collaboration with Israel, the human right violations in the 
name of law and order, the co-opting attempts of the military groups in to the PA 
security statuary bodies, and the complicit role of the military judicial system in 
entrenching the human rights violations. “The bottom line is clear”, one respondent 
stated, “It is a process of domestication and eradicating resistance from Palestinian 
society. The PA, Fayyad, and Abbas want to transform us from warriors and tigers 
into cowards and chickens”.    
Another former member of the dissolved al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, a thirty-year 
old  who was integrated in the Criminal Detection Force, told me during our 2-hour 
interview: 
I was tortured in the PA jails for 90 days as the torture we heard 
about in Abu Ghraib in Iraq. For 15 days I was not allowed to 
sleep. Instead of saluting and supporting us and our families, the 
PA humiliated us. I was arrested because I am preserving the rifle 
of my cousin who was killed by Israel in this camp. We are the true 
legitimate group, or how can you explain that people in more than 
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50 cars were waiting for me and my fellows when we were 
released from the PA prisons? 
I also spoke with Zakaria Zubeidi, who was one of the leaders of the 2002 Jenin 
Battle and, as the former leader of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in Jenin,
58
 also Israel’s 
most wanted person during the second intifada. Presently, in the aftermath of the 
security campaigns, Zakaria is a director with level-A at a PA’s ministry and is also 
co-founder of The Freedom Theatre in Jenin camp. He insisted I mention his name in 
my research and in our two-hour conversation, Zakaria described his arrest and 
subsequent detention in the PA’s Jericho prison between May until October 2012: 
I received a call from the head of the Civil Police to go and have 
coffee together. I went there but it was a trap. All of a sudden, a 
group of Preventive Security forces invaded the office. They tied 
my hands behind my back aggressively, covered my head, and 
dragged me like an animal down the stairs to the jeep all the way to 
Jericho and through all the Israeli checkpoints. All the checkpoints 
were open for me when I was arrested by the PA, how ironic is 
this?  I even heard them speaking on the phone in Hebrew saying 
“we got him”. I do have health issues. I still have 5 bullets in my 
legs and 4 bullets in my back from the year 2002. A bomb 
exploded in my face as well, “look at my face”’; however, they 
[the PA security forces] refused to allow the doctors to see me at 
the prison. After one week of being on the dirty wet floor in my 
cell, I got a bacterial infection in my back. Then they started to 
torture me physically and violently, such as pushing me so 
aggressively to the wall and stretching me on a chair for three days. 
After 8 days of this, I had my mattress but they refused to offer it 
to me unless I confess that I killed the governor of Jenin, even 
though they know very well that I had nothing to do with that. In 
my five months in the prison, I was not questioned by the public 
prosecutor. They used me to show all the other “security prisons” 
that no one is an exception, and that even the leaders of armed 
resistance are arrested and tortured. They covered my eyes, laid me 
on the ground with the boots of the integrator on my head, and they 
opened the door’s window so the other prisoners can see me in this 
situation. It is too humiliating, and therefore I decided to start a 
hunger strike. Talking about this makes me very sad and 
devastated. All this lead me to one conclusion, which is the need to 
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 In July 2004, Zubeidi had told a Western reporter, “I am the highest authority” (Bennett 2004). A 
week later, he told another Western journalist “I’m in charge. The police? They just disturb the traffic. 
If there’s a problem, people come to me. If I catch a thief, I make him return what he steals – and 
sometimes we get him to join the brigades, so he can help us catch the other thieves. A while ago, 
someone shot at me, so I broke his hands” (Prusher 2004). In early 2005, while Abbas and Zubeidi 
went about Jenin together during a presidential election campaign, crowds chanted Zubeidi’s name 
and not Abbas’s (Toomey 2006 cited in Marten 2014) . 
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dismantle the PA. We stayed 60 years under occupation and we 
never heard the words “security chaos- falatan amni”.  
The culture of resistance is palpable in the camps among the people. Expressions of 
resistance are highly valued and socially respected, and by extension resistance is 
embedded in the everyday life dynamics of people at both Balata and Jenin camps. 
Notably, people are able to distinguish rather easily between those who claim to 
represent the resistance movements, or “the fake resistance” as one respondent put it, 
and the genuine resistance movements and freedom fighters. While I was 
interviewing her husband, and after one and half hours of her silence, his wife (Um 
Mohammad) joined the conversation and said: 
Listen, it is simple and straightforward. I want the armed wings to 
be back. The more of them around my house, the merrier. When 
those fighters spent the nights in the camps’ streets protecting us, 
they also spread love over all. They are genuine, they are not 
strangers or brainwashed, they are one of us. 
3.3.5. Authoritarian Transformations: Arbitrary Detention and 
Torturing 
Violations of human rights, which are regularly marginalised by the mainstream 
narratives, was one of the most dominant dimensions discussed by the people in both 
camps. A local field researcher for a major Palestinian human rights organisation 
told me:  
In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 security campaigns, a 
presidential decree was issued in September 2009 prohibiting 
torture in the PA’s prisons, but it was never applied. In February 
2010 there was a wave of violence and the number of complaints 
had increased. In early 2011, new stricter orders from the PA 
regarding torture of prisoners were issued and stated it was 
prohibited to use the military courts and instead all stakeholders 
were asked to use the civil courts. However, violation of the 
regulations continued as was evident in the May 2012 security 
campaign. Arrest and house raids without legal court memos, 
interrogation for a long time in a security force compound without 
trial, and appearance in a court after weeks of detention without 
indictment, formal charge, or specific accusation of a crime, are 
just few examples of legal violations. Actually, I just received a 
call from the preventive security to go and see them. I know what 
they want. They want to question me about the latest report that I 
wrote.  
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The following observations were testified by respondents who had been previously 
arrested during security campaigns and detained in PA prisons over the years. A few 
weeks after his release, an 18 year-old youth from Jenin camp, with the marks of 
torturing still visible on many parts of his body, told me: 
I was arrested and detained twice in Jericho prison. I was accused 
of causing social unrest and threats through leading “the devils 
gang”. They accused me of writing a statement and spreading it all 
over in the camp; however, I can’t read or write! I was detained 82 
days first, and then 15 days. I was released after paying 5000JD in 
cash and 2000JD in guarantee.  
Another 24 year-old youth, a carpenter, had a similar story to tell, and he too had 
visible signs of torture months after his release. In the midst of his workshop he told 
me sadly face with shaky hands and legs: 
In 2012, I was arrested and detained three times in the PA jails in 
Jericho and Jenin. I was never ever humiliated in my life like I was 
that year. 12 days without sleep, stretched on a broken and painful 
chair. The chains in my hand ate my skin and bones. 17 days alone 
in a very cold cell with a rotten and disgusting mattress and the 
worst possible meals. I felt I was in Guantanamo. The ICRC 
visited us but did nothing. In the underground Jericho prison there 
are 28 cells, 3 bigger rooms, a kitchen that is often used for 
torturing, a room for interrogators which includes a “health-care” 
unit.  It is the same design as the Israeli prisons. 
It was very difficult for this young man, at the psychological level, to describe the 
jail, so I asked him instead if he would like to draw it on my notebook. While 
dropping tears, he managed to draw this. 
Figure 5: A Sketch of the Palestinian Authority’s Prison in Jericho, West Bank 
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He continued by saying: 
After 40 days in jail, I thought it was over, but after less than three 
weeks I was arrested and detained for 17 days in Jenin “jail”. It is 
basically a big room opposite to the PA’s interrogators room. The 
place is not prepared to be a prison; it is an office for the military 
intelligence force but became a prison due to the lack space in 
other jails. The kitchen and the stairwell became rooms for 
prisoners, and the toilets became small cells (4 cells, each one is 1 
x 2 meters). I spent 17 days in Jenin prison without knowing why 
and without any list of accusations. Nothing but interrogation about 
random stuff. Then in May 2012, I was arrested again and detained 
for 16 days with the same ill-treatment. They fired me from my job 
in the PA security service. After all of this suffering I feel 
physiologically broken. I am taking medicine to cure my nerves 
and stay calm. I can’t even work as a carpenter because I keep 
shaking, and I injured myself twice and already lost two fingers 
while cutting wood. I don’t know what to do with myself or my 
family and kids.        
A civil society actor running a local NGO in Balata expressed his feelings about the 
culture of fear that the PA has created through its security operations and campaigns. 
In his office, full of foreigner volunteers who came to Palestine to help educate the 
kids, he reflected on the many horror stories he heard about in relation to the 
arbitrary detention and torturing, stating:  
The PA security forces are trying to create a police state. They 
want to create a state within a state. We don’t trust the security 
forces. Even when I go to Paris, as part of my work, when I see a 
police man on one side, I cross the road to walk on the other side. I 
do have a phobia because of them and I feel so awkward whenever 
I see a group of people in a uniform. The PA forces created lots of 
fears inside of me. 
3.3.6. Security Collaboration: Domination as Cooperation  
As noted in previous sections, security collaboration remains until today the defining 
feature of the PA security doctrine and is a major source of tension (Dana 2014). It 
could be argued that this is an outcome of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which is true. 
However, under the leadership of Abbas and Fayyad it was dramatically entrenched 
and gained dominance in both rhetoric and actions. Abbas declared in May 2014 that 
“security coordination [with Israel] is sacred, is sacred. And we’ll continue it 
whether we disagree or agree over policy” (Abbas 2014). Additionally, in June 2014, 
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Tawfiq Al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah central committee and long-standing security 
leader, stated that “there is nothing called security coordination. It is merely security 
communication” (Al-Tirawi 2014). The vast majority of people simply disagree, and 
the above-mentioned two statements by Abbas and Al-Tirawi caused major public 
anger and led to protests in the streets; however, protestors were violently attacked 
by the PA security forces.
59
  
Such anger at the PA over the paradigm of security collaboration was also reflected 
in the way security forces were perceived. Many people called the PA security forces 
during the era of Fayyadism “the Dayton forces”, in reference to US General Keith 
Dayton. Dayton led the US security mission and was responsible for the training of 
the nine battalions which participated in the security campaigns in Balata and Jenin 
refugee camps. In his infamous 2009 speech in Washington, Dayton saluted the 
“new Palestinian men” he had created and hailed their ability to restrain mass 
uprisings, arguing that those men turn their guns now not against Israel but on the 
real enemies from within Palestinian society (Dayton 2009). This caused major anger 
and outrage among the Palestinian people, as well as a feeling of humiliation. 
Additionally, this security collaboration with Israel was saluted by Israel over the 
years, to the extent that on 28 November 2010 the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz 
reported that the number of occupation soldiers in the West Bank is the lowest since 
the First Intifada of 1987, thanks to the security coordination (Zaid 2013). 
A small number of people in Balata and Jenin camps recognised the Palestinian 
benefit from the security coordination with Israel. During a focus group discussion, a 
30 year-old male stated “I am a realist, coordination with Israel is the oxygen to 
Palestinian life. We are completely dependent on Israel on all fronts, and security is 
not an exception”. However, the vast majority of the people in these camps hold a 
different view, as expressed by a community leader in Jenin camp: 
I don’t have a problem with the security coordination if it is 
reciprocal. However this is not the case. When the PA can ask 
Israel to arrest a settler to protect the Palestinian peoples’ security, 
                                                          
59
 From an Israeli perspective, the Israeli president Shimon Peres, in a speech before the European 
Parliament in 2013, expressed Israel’s satisfaction with the state of Palestinian security. He stated “a 
Palestinian security force was formed. You and the Americans trained it. And now we work together 
to prevent terror and crime” (Peres 2013). 
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this will be a different story. Security coordination occurs between 
countries, like when France hands over accused murderers to 
Britain, but between us and Israel are seas of blood and the 
freedom fighters are not criminals. There is no sense of 
coordination, there is domination only. 
Another community leader from Balata camp echoed the above perspective, and 
talked about the division of labour between Israel and the PA as a result of the 
security coordination. He bluntly stated: 
The security campaigns and SSR venture did one thing: minimised 
the direct daily Israeli aggression and outsourced the PA security 
forces to perform the role of the occupation force. It created a 
division of labour. Israel used to confiscate weapons, now the PA 
is doing that in the name of protecting the Palestinian society. This 
is so surreal because we all know it is to protect Israeli security.  
At the operational levels, the “revolving door/al-bab al-dawar” phenomenon in the 
security collaboration domain was particularly suspicious to those who were arrested 
and detained in both PA and Israeli jails. A respondent from Jenin camp told me:  
After I was arrested and detained for 9 months in the PA’s 
Preventative Security Forces prison because I am a member of 
Hamas, after 3 weeks of my release from the PA prison Israel 
arrested me and accused me of the same exact crimes. Literally 
they used the same words. 
Another respondent from Balata camp told me, 
After six months administrative detention in an Israeli prison, and 
before I enjoyed the flavour of freedom, the PA forces raided our 
house after midnight, arrested me, and detained me for eight 
months. They did not ask me any question in the jail. They showed 
me a document and told me in Hebrew beseder [which means 
alright], your file is ready and just wait for God until he comes and 
recuses you.        
3.3.7. No Space for Opposition  
The authoritarian transformations induced by the security reforms also meant that 
there was little space for those opposed to the path dictated by the PA. A local leader 
of Hamas in Balata argued that ultimately the security campaigns meant further 
internal Palestinian fragmentation and caused harm to the Palestinian cause and 
struggle. He stated:  
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The PA’s security campaigns failed at the operational and strategic 
levels. The 2007 campaign, for instance, is like the 1996 one. I was 
arrested in both campaigns for the same reasons: being at the 
opposition camp of the PA. The so-called security campaigns 
aimed to empty the Palestinians of their content and the values that 
support resistance as a way of living under military occupation. In 
2009, I was arrested again by the PA forces and they accused me of 
being active and influential in Hamas’ social work within the 
camp’s community. Of course they accused me of having an illegal 
rifle, but honestly I don’t know how to use it. In 2009, I was 
arrested and detained for six months including 45 days of 
interrogation, and I was tortured violently. I was crying while 
being stretched and tied to the chair and in the end God’s will was 
bigger and I was released. But I don’t feel free because I know that 
I am being followed by the PA’s intelligence forces all the time. 
Now after you leave this house, they will report that a foreigner 
was at my home for two hours and they will come or stop me in 
street and ask me about you and about everything we talked about. 
Additionally, they tried to impact my job and push my employer to 
fire me. Additionally, my youngest son, Omar, who was born while 
I was in the PA’s jails does not accept me yet as his dad. Overall, 
these security campaigns had created social fragmentation and 
problems. 
Opposition from the Left was also exposed to the PA’s repressive authoritarian 
measures. A local leftist leader in Jenin camp pointed out the authoritarian 
transformation that took place under Fayyadism, and argued: 
The various security operations and the arrest of local leaders in 
the camp indicate one conclusion: No justice. The justice system is 
not effective, partisan and defunct and therefore the security forces 
have the first and last word. In other words: what they want, will 
happen. These forces’ became more corrupted. One reasons for this 
corruption was due to the buy-in of security personnel by offering 
them higher positions and higher salaries. The PA security forces 
have more officers and generals than the British army! However, 
people don’t trust the PA security forces. The PA and its security 
forces are only a big bureaucracy that offer people jobs. 
According to a community leader in Jenin camp, demobilisation, dis-empowerment, 
and dis-encouragement of political participation were consequences of the Fayyadist 
security reforms.  He went on to state:  
Before 2007 all factions were allowed to enjoy free political 
participation. After 2007, one could not protest without permission 
from the Ministry of Interior and without providing details about 
the location, invitees, speeches, and so on. Under Fayyad rule, you 
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can’t print a manifesto or a poster and distribute it freely. We as 
Palestinians express our political views through writing on the 
walls, which today we are not allowed to do anymore because it 
will cause pollution. Today, we will be arrested for defacing the 
public space. Even in the Friday prayer, the PA distributes to the 
Shieks their speeches. The list of repression methods is really long. 
Furthermore, a local leader of Islamic Jihad in Jenin camp insisted that despite all the 
PA’s repression ultimately God’s will prevail and resistance will dominate. Despite 
his bad health conditions, he argued passionately that: 
There is a systematic program by the PA to weaken the resistance 
movement. I was arrested because I helped and visited some of the 
prisoners’ families in the Israeli jails. This is an integral part of our 
culture, now it is on the list of forbidden activities. Thanks to the 
security campaigns, I feel that the PA informants are everywhere. 
Since 2007, public gathering are only allowed in three occasions: 
wedding, funeral, or a gathering in the prison. The PA arrested me 
three times. In 2010, I was arrested for distributing an assistance of 
180 NIS (£30) to 63 prisoner’s families in the Israeli jails, and then 
twice in 2012 I was detained for seven months. In these months I 
reached clear conclusions: a) when the PA was weak, they offered 
$10,000 for the M16 rifle. Now they are in a powerful position so 
they confiscate the rifle, arrest you, and fire you from your job if 
you have one, b) the security forces had a proper brainwash by the 
US army officer Keith Dayton and colleagues, to work for the 
exclusive benefit of Israel, and c) the security collaboration with 
Israel is huge national betrayal. 
With his highly religious discourse, and after smoking 16 cigarettes in a matter of 
two hours despite his five heart operations, he concluded by saying: “God harnesses 
2-4 people in each area to defend resistance and his will. Fayyad and the PA want us 
to follow the peaceful resistance path against God’s will. This is farce, farce, farce”. 
3.3.8. Reflecting an Intra-Fatah Factional Crises  
Not only did the space for opposition in the Palestinian political scene shrink for the 
opposition, but also for some Fatah cadres as well. The observations from the camps 
and the conversations with the people revealed that particularly after 2010 the 
security campaigns were used mainly to tackle intra-Fatah politics, and therefore 
entrenched its fragmentation. A member of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC) from Jenin camp argued: 
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The security operations, whether justified or unjustified, resulted in 
mistrust between the PA forces and the people, and created a 
hostile atmosphere in the camp against the PA and its security 
forces. How come can you arrest people because you suspect they 
are engaged in criminal activities? You need to have proof before 
doing that. I survived two assassination attempts, by Palestinians, 
and I am a leader of Fatah and a member of the Parliament, but the 
PA security forces did not care to follow-up on my case. Why? 
Because I am from the intra-Fatah opposition voices. Is this an 
inclusive security agenda?     
Unanswered, this question was echoed by another leader of Fatah in Jenin who 
argued that the security campaigns were an internal Fatah issue, particularly from 
2011 onwards, and that these security campaigns affected Fatah negatively first and 
foremast. While keeping in mind the 2006 parliamentary election results, he argued: 
Security is a science, not an arbitrary practice. The crisis of the 
security campaigns reflects the internal crisis of Fatah itself. It is 
the responsibility of Fatah to evaluate the consequences of these 
security campaigns on its cadres and the unity of the movement. 
After all, weapons are pieces of metal and they come and go. What 
matters the most are the spirit and the attached beliefs. If the latter 
are broken, then a whole nation and a liberation movement are 
broken too.        
Interestingly, others pointed out the harmful effects of these security campaigns on 
the trajectories of any future elections. Many Fatah members, particularly in Balata 
camp, stated that their first step in revenging the PA will occur through the ballot 
box. Furthermore, others pointed out that they know when and how to violently 
revenge the PA, its security forces, and most importantly from its interrogators. In 
her late 70s, a mother of a martyr and a prisoner in the PA’s jails, stated: 
Listen my dear son, we are Fatah. Why is the PA arresting us? We 
used the same rifle to shot the Israeli army and later on Hamas 
militant to defend its mere existence. Now the PA took our 
weapons, so who will defend us from Israel and Hamas? Is this 
how we get rewarded? 
Sitting in her house, surrounded by television screens and security cameras, she 
continued:  
This house is a martyr house and they [PA forces] stepped in and 
defiled it many times. My other son, Ahmad, was just released 
from the PA’s jails after spending 35 days in his cell is looking for 
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options to migrate. They promised us better security, but they did 
not tell us that the cost will be migration. I want to have my kids 
around me, not in jails or abroad that I will never see again. This is 
a Zionist-American plan implemented by the PA forces. I will 
never elect Fatah again.  
Other non-Fatah voices expressed the same conclusion concerning the use of 
security reform to address factional politics and rivalries within Fatah. An activist 
from the Palestinian Left told me:  
Well, security campaigns didn’t uproot the causes of the chaos 
falatan wa fawda [a mix of chaos with the might of gun-toting 
militants trying to impose their own brand of law and order]. Who 
caused the chaos are the PA personnel themselves, 90% of them 
serve in the PA security forces.  
A civil society actor from Balata confirmed the above, stating: 
In 2007, the PA targeted everyone including those involved in 
resisting Israel, those whom are creating chaos, and gangs engaged 
in criminal activities. In 2012, it was more about dealing with 
internal Fatah issues and factional politics. However, the people of 
the camp paid the price. The campaigns were purposively 
incomplete and stopped at certain threshold so popular anger do 
not transform and spill over into a movement against the PA and 
Israel. 
3.3.9. “We Are Doing Our Job”60 
Despite the realities discussed above, security personnel were of a different opinion. 
They understood their job in technical terms, and cared about the rules they had 
received from their leaders. “Business is business, and I am doing my job”, a 
security personnel told me in Nablus. He continued, “go and ask the people and you 
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 Brief observations from the short visit to the Jneed security compound/prison in Nablus in 
September 2012: After witnessing the operations and the number of security leaders, I thought of two 
things: either this is a military state, or that Palestinians are in the midst of the revolution and all the 
commanders are on the fighting front. Because my security check-up and clearance took weeks 
without any good luck, I used the network that I have developed to visit Al-Jneed. I was welcomed by 
the head of security forces for Nablus region and 12 high ranking security personnel. I explained that 
my questions are about the security campaigns, PA’s security doctrine, and the conditions of the 
prisoners. “Oh, you are one of those who asks the difficult questions. Enjoy your coffee, it is a better 
topic.” This answer was quite telling and was reinforced when I visited the common operations room. 
Fully equipped by Canadian aid, security personnel were following up on a shooting incident. “We 
have to report back to our Israeli counterparts”, one respondent told me. When I asked to visit the 
underground prison, or to get just closer to it, I was faced by laughs, warnings that I may hear scary 
stuff, and I was gently requested to leave the compound. 
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will know that we are right and the rest are wrong”; however, the people did not 
support the security narrative. Notably, those few who believed that the security 
campaigns and reforms had achieved miraculous results took care and expressed 
their satisfaction in a careful and cautious way.
61
 
A female member in Balata camp’s popular committee argued, “we do not live in 
secure conditions, however we witnessed a dramatic shift. At least we are able to 
sleep at night and experience less dominance of the thugs’ activities. But will this be 
sustainable? We don’t know, maybe not”.  A female Fatah activist and director of a 
local TV channel in Jenin camp argued, “I support confiscating the weapons 100% 
and that the rule of law governs our lives. We do not live in a forest. However, this is 
hard to achieve”.  In turn, a respondent from the Women's Worker Centre at Jenin 
camp told me, “I don’t want armed resistance to revive. I don’t want to lose my 
children. I want to offer them a better future; I want to live in a normal country under 
the rule of law in peace and stability. But we are very far from this vision”. 
From the perspective of the security personnel, a local security official stated with 
confidence: “You can’t have two roosters in the same coop. It is either the PA 
security forces or the military gangs. There is no justification for the existence of the 
PA if it does not perform security as its major task”. To operationalise these 
thoughts, the deputy-head of the camp’s popular committee in Balata, and an officer 
in the Preventive Security forces, put it like this: 
There is no such thing as resistance, and this is why security 
conditions are better. In 2012, shooting by Palestinians on houses 
in the camp occurred only 60 times. However, the execution of 
security campaigns meant that the PA has to eat its own sons. I 
mean everyone talks about prisoners and torturing, even though 
there is no torturing at all, and no one talks about the problems that 
interrogators face. This is their job and they need to interrogate the 
prisoners, but no one protects them if the prisoners decide to 
revenge later on. The most effective security force/Jihaz in the 
security campaigns over the years was the Preventive Security 
Force. We are the most equipped and trained ones and we 
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 In both camps, there was rather a dominant feeling among the people and local leaders that “the PA 
and its security forces hate us”. The head of Jenin camp, offered one explanation for this and stated, 
“The PA was isolated, marginalized and absent over the last 8 years when the intifada committees led 
the society. Now the PA is back, stronger and they want to compensate all the years of missing 
leadership and they also want to revenge”. 
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discovered tens of military networks of Hamas and handed the 
details to Israel in accordance with the security and political 
agreements.  
When I asked about the aggression and use of violence in the campaigns, and later 
on in the PA’s prisons, the head of the liaison office for the Nablus Police told me:  
Well, excessive use of violence may be a problem, but in some 
cases you have to use it. International humanitarian law allows us 
to use a certain level of violence. Those laws are very biased and 
they should be amended to offer a larger space for the use of 
physical violence against prisoners. The European and Palestinian 
trainers told us how we can deal with issues related to human 
rights.    
When I stated the above view to the head of Balata camp’s popular committee, and a 
Level-A director at the Ministry of Interior, his first reaction was, “why you are 
surprised? This is our job”. He expanded, and told me: 
Currently the security conditions are much better in the aftermath 
of the security campaigns. It was a complete chaos before that. If 
20% of people felt safe before the security campaigns, now the 
percentage is 70%. Security is not only a police jeep touring 
around, security is letting the people feel that you are around them 
all the time and for them. Security is offering all the requirements 
to disallow any person to think of killing or stealing or hurting each 
other. However, having Palestinian security forces under 
occupation is embarrassing for everyone because people wish that 
these security forces will protect them from the Israeli aggression. 
This will never be the case.  
While there was consensus among the security personnel that they have done their 
job very well in terms of uprooting the “forests of weapons” in the camps, the 
camp’s leader had a different view that challenged those of the PA. When I asked 
directly if weapons still exist in the camps after all the security campaigns, one of the 
first reactions I received was a smile, followed by few statements.   
A community leader who formerly led the 2002 Jenin Battle and is currently a 
parliament member, who also spent seven years in the Israeli jails between 2002 and 
2009, told me that “the camp is a dynamite barrel that can explode at any time. And 
weapons are available and hidden”.  Moreover, despite calm appearances “the camp 
is on fire. We know when and how to set that fire”, I was told by a local leader in 
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Balata, before our conversation was interrupted by a youth who came in to his office 
screaming after he sold his kidney to repay his loan. Others in Jenin camp associated 
leadership with the existence of weapons, as expressed by a respondent who 
claimed: “the camp is full of weapons, different sorts of weapons. Whatever you 
need we have! I can’t be a leader without having the power of weapons. It is a must 
to have a weapon if you live in a forest of weapons. Weapons are the authority”. 
The celebration of weapons as a symbol of authority was echoed in most 
conversations in the camps. One respondent made this analogy to illustrate the 
normalcy of weapons in any context under occupation: “I will give you the bottom 
line: if I am a cook, then you will find cooking utensils in my house; if I am a 
construction worker, then you will find constructing materials and tools in my house; 
and if I am a freedom fighter/Munadil, then the weapons are my tools and you will 
find them in my house. I assure you every house has a weapon of some kind”. Other 
interviewees summarised it simply: “Jenin camp is the power, power is the authority, 
and authority is the weapon”.  
In the end, capturing the narrative of the people during fieldwork is a challenging 
and daunting task. This case is particularly difficult not only because security issues 
are sensitive per se, but also because of the high level of frustration and despair 
among the people that results from Israeli occupation and the practices of the PA. 
One respondent from Balata told me, “the West Bank is like a rotten and carious 
bean, and the security campaigns are making it even worst. Still they ask us to eat it, 
and accept to live in such conditions”. Another respondent from Jenin camp 
compared the PA’s leadership to a drunken bus driver who will either crash or end in 
nowhere, and stated: 
I feel as if we are very quiet and respectful passengers, but the bus 
driver (the PA) is drunk. We are unemployed, with no jobs in the 
horizon and dependent on our families who are dependent on their 
small salary and large loan. Still they ask us to deal with security 
campaigns and their consequences, and give us nothing in return. 
Actually they are leading us to a mysterious future. We don’t know 
where this drunken bus driver will stop so we can take off safely 
and pursue our lives. It seems to me that the driver (the PA) will 
keep driving until we crash or end in nowhere. We are sick and 
tired of the many vicious circles that we live in, and these security 
campaigns are yet another one. 
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Human suffering in these camps is manifested everywhere, and its antecedents are 
consistently connected to the security campaigns. On my way out of Jenin camp in 
the last day of my fieldwork, a number of people gathered around a man who tried to 
set fire to himself and his young daughter. He screamed loudly, “when my child 
wishes to die, it is so painful to hear such wish. When I don’t have one Shekel to 
give her, then I better go and kill myself. When the Palestinian leadership is hanging 
us up-side-down in the air, then what is left out of this life?” Holding the gasoline 
bottle and matches in one hand, and his daughter in the other hand, it was only the 
screams and cries of the frightened young girl that broke him, and he fell on the floor 
without setting fire to the bottle. Such dramatic and tragic incidents are not 
particularly exceptional when misery, anger, and injustice are the defining features 
of daily life. 
 Conclusion 3.4.
This chapter examined and analysed the consequences of the security campaigns on 
the people’s security, as well as the broader dynamics of the resistance against Israeli 
occupation from the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. 
These two ethnographic case studies were used to unpack and problematise the 
security reform under Fayyadism by giving voice to those below, and this is the 
primary scholarly contribution of this chapter. The original ethnographic data 
presented and analysed in this chapter aimed to challenge and expand the existing 
contestation in the literature surrounding the security reform under Fayyadism 
between the proponents and critics. The powerful narrative of the people 
deconstructed and unpacked the complex dynamics of security reform and expressed 
in simple words that the security reforms failed to fundamentally alter their life 
under occupation. In his evaluation of the PA’s 2007 security campaign to induce 
law and order, one respondent succinctly stated: “the security campaigns are like 
giving someone paracetamol to cure cancer”. 
Security reform under Fayyadism not only aimed to enhance the functionality of the 
PA’s security forces, to ensure stability and security for Israel, but it also focused on 
taming resistance against Israeli occupation and colonial subjugation by 
criminalising resistance and by striping it from its infrastructure; the former was 
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accomplished through harassing, marginalizing, arresting, detaining, and torturing 
anyone engaged in militantly resisting Israel, and the latter was accomplished by 
conducting aggressive security and disarmament campaigns in the West Bank. From 
the perspective of the people, as the ethnographic evidence from Balata and Jenin 
refugee camps suggests, these security campaigns and disarmament processes were 
incomplete, unorganised, and therefore ineffective.  Furthermore, these campaigns 
were perceived to be used as a tool to address intra-Fatah factional conflicts and 
infighting. While the PA’s security personnel argued that they have been “doing 
their job to maintain law and order”, the voices from below fundamentality 
challenged this claim and argued that instead of feeling secure they witnessed an 
authoritarian transformations in the PA and its security forces approaches; citing the 
police-state practices of the PA, such as arbitrary detention, excessive torturing, 
suppression of opposition voices, as evidence. 
Furthermore, the ethnographic evidence suggests that criminalising resistance was 
practiced as a result of the security doctrine being defined by security collaboration 
and coordination with Israel and other international and regional actors. In this way, 
the top-down narrative and claims of the authorities viewed the achievements of the 
PA’s security reform in shallow terms that ultimately failed to recognise the 
repercussions and consequences of these campaigns on people’s lives. These 
implications are elucidated by the voices from below, and the perspectives of the 
residents of Jenin and Balata camps facilitated the unpacking and problematisation 
of the security reforms under Fayyadism beyond the conception of authorities. These 
voices from below not only clarified the link between security reform and resistance 
against Israel, but they also these illustrated how and why resistance against Israel 
has been criminalised. In sum, while the benchmark of security reform under 
Fayyadism was to build a professional security establishment, the people wanted 
protection from the major source for their insecurity, the Israeli military occupation. 
As one respondent put it “It does not mean anything to me if we have the best 
security forces and army in the world if they are not able to protect me”. 
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Chapter Four 
4. Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in 
Occupied Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab 
Uprisings 
 
Abstract 
This chapter addresses the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid 
industry through an aid-dependency lens, particularly in the aftermath 
of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. The dependency of the Fayyadist 
paradigm on donors’ aid and policy prescriptions was manifested by 
the dominance of the donors’ instrumentalist aid framework, and by 
the fact that the Palestinian Authority received more aid specifically 
allocated for the Fayyadism state-building project, in comparison with 
the total aid received between 1993 and 2006. The investment of 
donors in the Fayyadist paradigm characterised the paradigm and 
stripped it of its local legitimacy, ownership, and accountability. 
 
While examining donor operations, priorities, and the “aid-for-peace” 
agenda, this chapter investigates whether patterns of donor aid in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) have changed following the 
Arab uprisings of 2011. Differently stated, have the transformations 
that occurred under the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ 
operations and the overall framework of the aid industry? Building on 
thirty original semi-structured interviews with Palestine aid actors, 
this chapters argues that aid patterns remain unchanged and that 
donors remain transfixed on a long-failed “Investment in Peace” 
framework that was designed by the World Bank in 1993. By 
comparing these research findings with the literature on Palestine aid, 
this chapters argues that donors are not ready to alter a framework 
dominated by policy instrumentalists who emphasise pre-determined 
normative values over actual results, quietly trading financial 
inducements to Palestinians to forego political rights within a “peace 
dividends” model. Meanwhile, critics of the existing aid framework 
remain largely ignored and have little influence on aid policy. 
 
Ultimately, this demonstrates that the proclaimed institutional 
successes of Fayyadism not only fail to trickle down and positively 
affect Palestinian people’s lives, but it also failed to change the flawed 
patterns of aid dictated by the instrumentals donors from the top. 
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 Introduction and Contextual Background 4.1.
The year 2011 saw protests in nearly all the Arab countries. By comparison with its 
neighbours, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) witnessed fewer protests and 
less general turmoil. Those protests that did take place were on a smaller scale, when 
compared to those in countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. Yet, the Palestinian 
protests uniquely targeted international donors and foreign aid, a specificity which 
alone justifies including a chapter on Palestine. Since the envelope of aid disbursed 
in the OPT is vast, and bearing in mind the importance of both military and civilian 
aid to states in the region, it is worth assessing what link exists between the Arab 
uprisings and donor aid in Palestine. This is particularly poignant considering the 
long-standing importance of the Palestinian question on politics in the Middle East. 
The goal of this chapter is to determine whether or not there was a change in the way 
aid was disbursed by donors in the international community to Palestinians in the 
OPT following the Arab Uprisings of 2011. This has been done bearing in mind 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates indicating a sizeable drop in 
development and budget support to Palestinians in the OPT between 2010 and 2013 
as compared to 2006 to 2009. Between those periods, funding went from an average 
annual allotment of $1.5 - 2 billion down to $1.1 - 1.3 billion respectively (IMF 
2013a). However, beyond this quantitative shift downward, overall funding remained 
significant while there are qualitative indicators of consistency with past patterns in 
the way aid was structured. For example, the IMF has estimated that prior to 2001, 
roughly one-third of aid was disbursed as budget support to the Palestinian Authority 
(PA), while after 2007 more than eighty per cent was allocated to budget support on 
an annual basis, despite an overall drop in funding after 2009 (IMF 2013b). This 
structural consistency seems to indicate an entrenchment of existing patterns rather 
than change. To find out whether or not change to the OPT aid regime took place we 
approached 44 experts working in or conducting research on Palestinian aid. We 
classified each interviewee into one of two types of aid actor, based on two different 
development aid viewpoints outlined in David Mosse’s ethnography of aid policy 
and practice Cultivating Development (Mosse 2005): critics and instrumentalists.  
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The international community has used foreign aid to fund development in the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza for decades. Following the 1993 Oslo Accord, this 
was done to encourage Palestinians to “buy into” a peace plan with the state of 
Israel. Poor results though have sparked a profound debate over the very nature of 
aid, whose antecedents can be placed on the normative fault line that exists between 
critics and instrumentalists in development aid literature. Critics, on one hand, 
consider development policy to be a rationalising technical discourse that conceals a 
hidden bureaucratic power, or dominance. That power is sustained by unspoken and 
unwritten intent that constitutes a hidden reality, which is the true reason 
development aid is given. As such, critics argue that aid is not simply policy to be 
implemented, but domination to be resisted (Mosse 2005). By contrast, policy 
instrumentalists are persistently optimistic about the power of policy design as a 
rational problem solving exercise to remedy real world problems (Mosse 2005). In 
the OPT aid instrumentalists dominate the way funding is disbursed, first as 
researchers and policy analysts designing models for how Palestinian aid should be 
given at institutions such as the IMF and World Bank; and then as aid workers 
within the major donor organisations. 
The relationship between aid and development is particularly problematic in the 
Palestinian context. Since the aim of the international community was to foster 
economic development in the OPT to stimulate the peace process (Keating, Le More, 
and Lowe 2005), there is fairly broad agreement among researchers that aid has 
failed (Roy 1999; BISAN 2011; Nakhleh 2004, 2011; Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 
2009; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Tartir and Wildeman 2012; Barghouti 2012). The 
post-Oslo “peace process” has been characterised by economic decline, large 
increases in unemployment, intense violence and a moribund peace process. Israeli 
settlement building and the confiscation of Palestinian land accelerated after Oslo, 
along with closure policies that restrict Palestinians from working in Israel or 
moving freely in the OPT. This policy of closure contravened the spirit of the peace 
process, and took place almost immediately after it began (Halper 2010; OCHA 
2013; UNDP 2010). It is a primary reason for the sharp decline of the Palestinian 
economy, owing to the subsequent loss of remittances from Palestinian workers in 
Israel and the inability of Palestinians to move freely to engage in commerce at 
home, in Israel or abroad. Simultaneous Israeli settlement building undid Palestinian 
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territorial contiguity, which became further fragmented into separate communities 
governed by Hamas in Gaza and a donor-backed PA in the West Bank. As a result 
Palestinians have developed a deep-set dependency relying on aid to sustain the 
economy of their isolated enclaves, which are contained by and dependent on Israel 
for all commerce (Hever 2010). 
International aid disbursements to Palestinians are therefore high and one calculation 
put total aid at around US$ 24.6 billion between 1993 and 2012. Aid inflows 
increased from an annual average of US$ 656 million between 1993 and 2003, to 
over US$ 1.9 billion since 2004; and international aid increased by seventeen times 
overall between 1993 and 2009. To illustrate the intensity of aid dependency, from 
2004 onward aid was equal to between 24 per cent and 42 per cent of GDP. Per 
capita aid for the same period averaged around $530 per year, ranging from a low of 
$US 306 in 2005 to $US 761 in 2009 to $US 498 in 2012 (OECD-DAC 2014). 
Figure 1 and 2 show the total amount of aid to Palestinian over the last two decades 
and its percentage of the West Bank and Gaza’s Gross National Income (GNI). 
Figure 6: Total International Aid to Palestinians 1993-2012  
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Figure 7: Aid as percentage of the West Bank and Gaza’s GNI 1994-2012 
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Yet despite the sheer volume of aid which has poured into the Palestinian economy, 
ordinary Palestinians still lack basic economic rights and personal security from 
violence (Tartir 2012a). Socio-economic indicators provide an impression of failure 
by aid to at least improve the economic and living circumstances of ordinary 
Palestinians. The neoliberal economic model enforced with vigour by a donor-
backed Fayyad government from 2007 to 2013 was fuelled by aid, but also by 
personal and government debt, and drove up the cost of living for Palestinians in an 
economy that had already shrunk and de-developed during the peace process. Using 
a consumption-based definition of poverty, 26.2 per cent of the Palestinians lived in 
poverty in 2009 and 2010: 19 per cent in the West Bank and 38 per cent in Gaza. By 
using an income-based definition of poverty, the reality can be understood to be 
much worse with 50 per cent of Palestinians living in poverty in 2009 and 2010: 38 
per cent in the West Bank and 70 per cent in Gaza (MAS 2012). According to the 
World Food Programme (WFP 2011), 50 per cent of Palestinian households suffered 
from food insecurity: 33 per cent being food-insecure and 17 per cent vulnerable to 
food insecurity.  
Conservative figures estimate unemployment has remained stuck at around 30 per 
cent since 2009, with 47 per cent unemployed in Gaza in 2010 and 20 per cent in the 
West Bank. A 2014 published report on labour rights listed the OPT as one of the 
eight worst countries to work in alongside countries like Somalia and the Central 
African Republic, and below countries infamous for poor working conditions like 
Bangladesh, China and the United Arab Emirates (ITUC 2014). The income and 
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opportunities inequality gap continues to widen not only between the West Bank and 
Gaza, but also within the West Bank. Manufacturing and production capacities 
continue to erode, as had been predicted by Sara Roy’s mid-1990s theory of “De-
development” (Roy 1995), while the vital agriculture sector remains sorely 
neglected. Public debt has doubled, while private debts for Palestinians have 
ballooned because of easier access to credit – itself a type of “market of 
dispossession” (Elyachar 2005; Hanieh 2013). Real income per capita is in need of a 
proper deconstruction to take account of an unbearable increase in the cost of living 
and consumer price index (PCBS 2013). At the macro-economic level, vaunted 
economic growth of 7.1 per cent in 2008, 7.4 per cent in 2009 and 9.3 per cent in 
2010,12.2 per cent in 2011, 5.9 per cent in 2012, and 4.5 per cent in 2013 (IMF 
2013b) was a jobless growth, aid driven, with an eroded productive base 
(deindustrialised), is non-Jerusalemite, anti-poor and reflects an economy recovering 
from a low base (Bahour 2011; UNCTAD 2011; Khalidi 2011; Tartir 2012b).  
This is an aid driven economy surviving under occupation. Aid induced inflation, 
personal debt and rising costs-of-living have now been linked to the stalled peace 
process they were supposed to support; a process that has seen life for Palestinians 
get steadily worse along with an erosion on their claim to a sovereign territory 
(Khalidi 2012). That aid is guided by a 1993 World Bank development plan, An 
Investment in Peace (World Bank 1993), which informs major bilateral donors on 
how to disburse their aid to Palestinians. The instrumentalist approach adopted by 
the Bank and major donors is highly bureaucratic (Challand 2008) and has been the 
visibly dominant aid viewpoint throughout the Oslo peace process. As implied by the 
name of the plan, it was developed for Palestinians to improve their standard of 
living and encourage them to participate in the peace process, producing “peace 
dividends” (Le More 2008). Similar to other programs developed by International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) for the developing world in the 1990s (Hickel 2012), it 
aims to build institutions (in fact an entire Palestinian state) on a “good governance” 
model to “prepare” Palestinians for statehood. The core normative values behind that 
plan include open markets, economic integration with Israel, regional economic 
integration, financial liberalisation, “good governance” and support for “democracy” 
(Khan, Giacaman, and Amundsen 2004; Hanieh 2011).  
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Within this economically neoliberal framework some key aims include: encouraging 
closer economic integration between the OPT and Israel, establishing a semi-
autonomous Palestinian regional government based on principles of good 
governance, for that government to police Palestinians in lieu of the Israeli military, 
and for the economy to open up to international trade and investment (Taghdisi-Rad 
2010). An early success for these instrumentalists was the 1994 Paris Economic 
Protocol, an annex to the Oslo Accords. The Protocol created a customs-envelope for 
Israel and the OPT, meaning that all foreign aid donated to the Palestinians was 
required to pass through Israeli customs, which allows the Israeli government to take 
tariffs from that aid. The agreement stipulated that Palestinian workers be allowed to 
enter Israel to seek employment, yet Israel never fulfilled that part of the agreement, 
instead imposing blanket closures on the pretext of security (Farsakh 2002) and 
preventing Palestinians from getting to their jobs in Israel, stimulating further aid 
dependency (Hever 2008, 2010). An Israeli negotiator involved in designing the 
protocol noted: “the Paris Protocol basically legalised the forced marriage of the two 
economies since 1967” (Kleiman 2013). 
While the good governance project failed to deliver the desired outcomes, the World 
Bank and other instrumentalists continued to argue that the fundamentals of the 
program were sound. Instead they preferred to blame “exogenous” factors, 
complicating political events such as violence during the second intifada or the PA 
for not implementing policy well enough,
62
 thereby placing disproportionate blame 
on a nominally autonomous PA for not achieving results (Brynen 2000). Yet 
blaming politics ignores a well-established understanding that aid becomes a 
political factor in any conflict situation it is exposed to (Anderson 1999). Critics will 
also point out that the PA is an institution of the donors’ creation, and that the Israeli 
and OPT economies had already been deeply intertwined through decades of 
occupation before Oslo, all facts which pose “a serious challenge to [donors’] 
uniform analytical frameworks and rigid assumptions” (Taghdisi-Rad 2010). Critics 
argue that the fundamentals behind the World Bank model are wrong, such as 
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 The following World Bank report only rarely mentions the role of Israel in destabilising the 
Palestinian economy and completely ignores the critical role the occupation plays to that effect. 
Rather, it often blames politics as an exogenous factor separate from aid, sabotaging an otherwise 
‘sound’ World Bank-led aid model: Government of Japan and World Bank. (2000) Aid Effectiveness 
in the West Bank and Gaza. 
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miscategorising Israel-Palestine as a post-conflict situation, even though it never left 
the conflict stage. They also charge that the major donors and IFIs are sanitising and 
muting their criticism of Israel (CDS-BZU 2011). By contrast with instrumentalists, 
the critics are certain that Israeli settler-colonialism in the OPT is the fundamental 
problem which needs to be addressed before peace or development can take place. 
 Research Interviews 4.2.
This chapter takes into consideration what change has taken place with the way 
donors work in the OPT following 2011 and whether there are any links between the 
protest movements that did take place in the OPT post 2011 with protests elsewhere 
in the Arab world. It does this by providing an analysis of original interviews 
conducted in May, June and July of 2013 with OPT donors and aid observers to 
learn from them how aid has changed, or how it has not. To determine whether there 
is a link between recent Palestinian protests and the Arab uprisings, or if there has 
been any change to the way in which foreign aid has been disbursed, we approached 
44 experts working directly in the aid industry or studying it. Some were 
international donors or aid experts, while others included Palestinians working for 
local or international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Those that responded 
represented International Financial Institutions (IFIs), government aid agencies, 
International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), International Non-governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), as well as researchers associated with policy units that 
helped design aid packages or economic plans like the Paris Protocol. Meanwhile we 
found non-donor experts represented the critical view of how aid is disbursed. They 
include IGOs, Palestinian Non-governmental Organisations (PNGOs), the 
Palestinian private sector, representatives of the Palestinian youth movement, and 
researchers working on foreign aid associated with a university or policy unit. 
All interviews were kept anonymous, to protect the identity of interviewees. 
Interviews were semi-structured and completed in English or Arabic via Skype, 
telephone, face-to-face, or written by email. Of our requests, 22 were made to donors 
and we received just 8 responses. Several major donors did not respond to our 
request, while two felt they were not well suited to provide an opinion. Of those 
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donors who accepted our request for an interview, 2 represented an IFI, 1 an IGO, 2 
a government aid agency, 2 INGO donors and finally 1 researcher.
63
 
Meanwhile, a total of 22 requests were made to non-donors, of which 20 provided 
feedback, one refused to participate due to a theoretical disagreement over the 
research question, and only a PA Ministry did not reply. Of the respondents, 2 
represented an IGO, 5 a PNGO, 1 the Palestinian private sector, 2 the youth 
movement and 10 researchers.  
We found that the donors who interviewed with us nearly all took an instrumentalist 
approach to aid, either as a funding agent or as an aid policy designer. At the 
opposite end, the answers we received from the non-donors fell into what Mosse 
described as the “critics”. Since there happened to be a neat overlap of the donors (as 
instrumentalists) away from the non-donors (as critics), we decided that the overall 
identifier Instrumentalist – Critic was a useful shortcut to locate the type of 
responses given on the impact of the Arab uprisings. Since the material gathered has 
been kept anonymous, we will list respondents with the letter [C] for Critic and [I] 
for Instrumentalist, followed by an identifying number, and a generic description of 
the type of interviewee (I, PNGO, donor, etc.).  
The interview guide for each differed slightly, with two general questions asked to 
all interviewees.
64
 
For donors, the interview guide consisted of two specific questions:   
1. How have your operations or priorities changed since the start of the Arab 
Spring of 2011? 
2. Have you seen a difference in how Palestinian partners work with you since 
the start of the Arab Spring? In what way is it different? 
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 The researchers were affiliated with various Palestinian and international research institutions or 
centres.  
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 Note that we used the term Arab “Spring” in the interviews, in lieu of “uprising”. One interviewee, 
[C15 - Researcher] objected to the use of the phrase Arab Spring: “Overall, I don’t think that the use 
of phrase Arab Spring is appropriate; it decontextualizes what is happening in relation to the history 
and it is a very depoliticizing term. The mainstream media repackaged what these revolutions are 
about: they are popular uprisings/intifadas”. 
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For non-donors, these two questions were adapted as follow:  
1. How have the operations and priorities of donors changed since the Arab 
Spring of 2011? 
2. Have you seen a change in the way international donors work with 
Palestinian organisations since the start of the Arab Spring? In what way has 
this changed? 
To both groups, we asked the final two identical questions: 
1. Do you believe there is a link between recent protests against the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and aid donors, with the Arab Spring? 
2. What is the key for effective aid in the OPT after the Arab Spring? 
 Protesting Aid: A Link to the Arab Uprisings?  4.3.
Palestinian attitudes toward aid may have soured. Growing anger toward 
international aid agencies has moved beyond elite circles to the street level, with 
protests targeting not only USAID but also aid given by sectors of the EU delegation 
and the ICRC.
65
 In June 2013 Palestinian youth called for mass protests against the 
Paris Protocol in Ramallah (Palestinians for Dignity 2012). So to start we wanted to 
determine if there were any links between these protests and the Arab uprisings, 
before seeing if the uprisings impacted on the way aid is given in the OPT. We found 
that interviewees gave conflicting accounts for why they think the protests took 
place, and disagreed as to whether or what degree there was a link to the Arab 
uprisings.   
Many interviewees, particularly donors, felt there was no link or at most a tenuous 
link between the aid-related Palestinian protests and the Arab uprisings. Often they 
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 Other than the protest against the Paris Protocol, there had been protests organized by the youth 
movements against USAID and their role brainwashing Palestinian youth 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=oa.159277987491886&type=1. During Obama’s visit to 
the OPT in 2013 many slogans were against USAID http://on.fb.me/1beCCaq. In September 2012, the 
European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) offices were 
closed by the youth http://bit.ly/1beCJCK. A protest was organized in June 2013 in front of the Japan 
International Co-operation Agency (JICA) for supporting normalization activities 
http://bit.ly/1beCTu5. A few protests were organized against The International Committee of the Red 
Cross http://on.fb.me/1kWhmFI and one of the messages was ‘the prisoners need a decision, not 
financial assistance’ http://on.fb.me/JJeIYA. 
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felt the Palestinian case was unique and that the protests reflected pre-existing 
realities. One instrumentalist [I10 - Researcher] said: “No, I don’t see any connection 
at all between the protests which have occurred in OPT and the Arab Spring. 
Palestinian protests pre-existed the Arab Spring and have their own causes and 
dynamics”. Instrumentalist [I9 - INGO] postulated that:  
There could be a link, especially because the Arab Spring 
empowered people and made them believe they have influence. 
Nonetheless … because our situation is unique to other Arab 
countries, and because our preoccupation is the Israeli occupation, 
people are more tolerant of the leadership but nevertheless critical 
and sceptical of the leadership. 
A number of interviewees suggested that there could be several different pre-existing 
points of origin for the protests, related to economy and occupation, not the Arab 
uprisings. One critic [C7 - PNGO] provided three different reasons: the high cost of 
living, protests for unpaid salaries and protests against the existence of the PA itself. 
C7 went on argue that that donor aid, which the IMF has characterised as budgetary 
support for the PA, is used for political reasons to keep the donor-backed PA in 
existence for fear Hamas might gain power and confront Israel:  
Israel has shown that it considers the PA’s existence, if not its 
flourishing, to be in its own national interest. … Western diplomats 
and many Palestinians believe that, for the foreseeable future, 
enough money will continue to flow to keep the PA alive, and 
President Abbas will stick around and do what he can to delay 
much-feared steps toward confrontation with Israel (ICG 2013:ii).  
Another critic [C6 – Youth Movement] also noted a connection between the protests 
and the role of the PA within the occupation:  
Donor aid to the PA has started 20 years ago with Oslo, and the 
wave of protests in some Arab countries gave a push forward and 
encouraged the Palestinians to come to the streets against the PA – 
which has increasingly been considered an arm of the Israeli 
occupation. However we should not be so optimistic about the link 
between all of them because the Arab Spring has turned to 
something not really related to any spring. Donor aid to the PA, 
especially to the enlarged security forces is definitely one of the 
reasons for the protests. 
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Economic reasons were often given as the basis for the protests. A prominent 
government aid instrumentalist [I1 – Government Aid Agency] supported the idea 
that economics and politics may both have played a role, related to the 
aforementioned reduction in overall funding to the PA from 2010 to 2013:  
Protests against the PA have largely been against the backdrop of 
the crisis in the PA’s finances. The Government of Israel’s 
withholding of clearance revenues was a major factor. The decline 
in donor funding has been another factor, at a time of domestic 
economic difficulties in donor countries, and increasing calls on 
donor funds in the region linked to the Syria crisis and other events 
in the region. So you could say there was some indirect link [to the 
Arab uprisings]. But the wider backdrop remains frustrations over 
the lack of political progress in the peace process. 
Referring to the different points of origin for the OPT protests, instrumentalist [I9 - 
INGO] felt the Palestinian protests focused on limited issues that do not really 
challenge the central political problem, the occupation:  
PA finances and hunger-striking prisoners were the issues that 
galvanised large protests [which] illustrates the timidity and limited 
horizons of Palestinian politics. While both are vital for individuals 
and in national life, there are reasons political activity crystallised 
around them. They excite little dissent or rancour (beyond that 
directed at Fayyad).  
That donor went on to suggest that secondary issues have traction precisely because 
it is only there that the major Palestinian factions allow mobilisation to make 
ordinary Palestinians feel empowered to demand change, but that once protests 
threaten to exceed the boundaries the leadership set, they get reined back in: “Those 
are tactical actions with limited goals, not bids for a strategic readjustment internally 
or vis-à-vis Israel”. Critic [C3 – Private Sector] provided a similar explanation:  
I actually think the recent protests against the PA have more to do 
with internal politics, namely Fatah trying to topple the Fayyad 
government to take his place in the West Bank. There is nothing 
here to do with better managing of donor aid and interventions, but 
more like how to get more of the pie, or should I say crumbs.  
The possibility of government backed protests contrasts sharply with the initial anti-
government protests of the Arab uprisings. 
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The protests may have been petering out by mid-2013, with critic [C7 – PNGO] 
validating the possibility that they are limited in nature while suggesting that, in 
addition to not challenging the occupation, they do not challenge the main economic 
problems. C7 felt that the youth movement may have been energised by the Arab 
uprisings and acknowledged upsurges in protest. However, C7 notes that those 
protests were intermittent, not unified, and believed that there is a great deal of 
complacency over economic issues. C7 surmises that: “The Arab Spring seems to 
have shown how entrenched the neoliberal economic development agenda of 
Israel/PA has truly become”. Critic [C13 - Researcher] felt that while the Arab 
uprisings made the general population realise that they can do things and 
demonstrate, people in Palestine have seen many times that different forms of 
protests against Israel, or settlements, or the PA, has not changed much. For this 
reason C13 does not know if it is possible to link the protests to the Arab uprisings. 
Although we conducted semi-structured interviews that do not require “yes” or “no” 
answers to specific questions, many interviewees offered direct answers. Of the 
instrumentalists and critics interviewed, the 11 that felt there was no link between the 
Palestinian protests and Arab uprisings comprised 3 instrumentalists and 8 critics. 
The 9 that felt there was a link comprised 2 instrumentalists and 7 critics. This 
revealed a fairly even split, though it must be warned this was done without 
elaborating the degree to which they felt there was or was not a connection, which as 
we saw with C7 and C13 may be a limited connection.
66
 Even so, the interviewees 
generally felt the protests were not on a scale that seriously challenges the central 
economic and political issues, or how donors interact with Palestinians. 
 Aid Industry in the OPT: Transfixed on the Same Old Rules  4.4.
There was a prevailing feeling among interviewees that little had changed in the way 
aid was given after 2011. For example, a major donor-instrumentalist [I1 – 
Government Aid Agency] noted that they made no specific change other than to re-
emphasise the regional importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
the relevance of their approach to Palestinian state building. Critic [C8 - PNGO] 
noted that few major donors added new programs to their operations and often 
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 Four instrumentalists and three critics did not provide a direct answer. 
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entrenched existing ones, while any new programs were directly linked to concepts 
of peace and normalisation that are intrinsic to the existing peace dividends 
approach.  
Some interviewees felt donors in Europe were aware of the failure of aid, yet 
remained transfixed on old programs. Critic [C3 – Private Sector] said:  
I did note the Europeans are becoming much more aware of the 
failure of the political paradigm that they have built their entire 
intervention around, a two state solution (Witney 2013). That 
noted, they remain transfixed on following the US’s cue while all 
the while continuing to foot the bill of sustained occupation. 
One of the reasons for a lack of change may be a dearth of innovation or 
unwillingness to change, which has been noted by many researchers as characteristic 
of aid over the past twenty years and is consistent with the instrumentalist approach 
to development. Critic [C13 - Researcher] said:  
The Arab Spring has not changed anything for Palestine, on any 
level. Politically it has not, and in terms therefore of what aid does 
and does not do, and can and cannot do, has not changed one iota 
since 1993 or 1994. Basically the donors are stuck in the rut of 
pretending to hope that somehow by improving the economic 
conditions, peace will somehow miraculously happen. 
Critic [C16 - Researcher] noted that:  
Since Oslo, donor operations and priorities have been strictly 
associated with the Oslo framework. To date changes in operations 
and priorities remain subject to the same paradigm and I cannot 
really perceive any serious changes in the way donors relate to the 
Palestinian political cause, economy and society.  
Critic [C1 - IGO] working at a prominent research agency stated that:  
The basic dynamic between PA-Donors relations was established 
10 years ago: Budget Support. In one sentence, Fayyad policies 
equal running to the wall of reality. Democracy and governance 
programs will flourish even better than before: they are the donor-
darling subjects, so this should not be surprising if it is happening 
or will happen.  
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Interestingly, critic C1 went on to state that Palestinians do no need these good 
governance projects, but rather efficient public institutions, suggesting that the donor 
good governance project is not producing anything institutionally useful. 
A number of critics did feel that there was a rebalancing of priorities with donors 
shifting funds out of the OPT to other countries caught up in the Arab uprisings, 
particularly Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. For example critic [C4 - PNGO], an aid 
provider in the West Bank, said: “Well, they [donors] got really interested in Egypt. 
Everybody went there (meaning they left here) or became less important than their 
colleagues covering Egypt. Everyone wanted to give money because it was hot and 
exciting”. However, these claims were not corroborated by donors and often based 
on hearsay without evidence, a potential fallacy noted by many critics themselves. 
Some donors and critics did suggest that any change in funding levels might be 
linked to the financial crisis in Europe.
67
 A number of critics such as critic [C19 - 
PNGO] also noted that even if donors had moved funding elsewhere in the Middle 
East, or were hit by the financial crisis, donors also seemed to be hesitating, taking a 
“wait and see” approach to gauge the impact of the Arab uprisings on Palestinians.  
Meanwhile, interviewee instrumentalist [I6 - IFI] working at an important donor 
institution noted that even if there is no change to Palestinian aid, it does provide a 
model for intervention elsewhere in the Arab world:  
Basically Palestine teaches lessons to the region and provides 
expertise. In the aftermath of the Arab spring it is questionable how 
much change had happened in Palestine. For us, we are part of 
regional strategy, and I can tell you that we are well advanced in 
terms of our projects and policies here in Palestine than the rest of 
the Arab world. We have civil society engagement and also [the] 
inclusion of social protection programs. So we can export the last 
two decades’ models to the new Arab world and Palestine is 
teaching lessons in this regards, since we are doing this here for so 
many years. But there is no paradigm shift of course. Maybe the 
lists of demands from the government had changed after the Arab 
Spring, however the PA has not changed its plan mainly due to 
financial problems.  
So while many donors admit aid has failed and critics often consider its impact an 
unmitigated disaster, this donor considers the Investment in Peace model to be a 
                                                          
67
 Many INGOs or donors, notably from Spain, Italy and Greece, closed their offices in the OPT. 
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successful model that can be exported to other Arab Spring countries, illustrating the 
diffusion of common patterns of aid in the Mediterranean basin. 
For the rare interviewee who felt change had taken place, critic [C6 – Youth 
Movement] said it was becoming more negative. This standpoint may make sense, 
because so many critics in the interviews and literature feel that aid is being used to 
keep the Palestinians quiet while sustaining the occupation:  
I think donors realise even more the power of economics in 
suppressing peoples' desires to revolt and ask for change. For 
example, the Arab Spring increased the urgency by donor countries 
(and Israel) to come to the rescue of the Palestinian Authority in 
September 2012 when economic protests began against austerity 
measures imposed by Fayyad's government.  
This may be because, as critic [C9 - PNGO] concluded:  
The overall framework has not changed and the operations after the 
Arab spring remain within the European understanding to the 
nature of the region that is based on keeping the same regional 
balances on one hand, while on the other hand assuring stability 
and preserving the interests of Israel. 
Of those interviewees who answered directly whether or not they felt aid had 
changed after 2011, those who felt donor operations or priorities had not changed 
numbered an overwhelming 21: 6 instrumentalists and 15 critics. Only 4 felt there 
was a change: 1 instrumentalist and 3 critics.
68
 Of those four, it is important to note 
that critic [C15 - Researcher] felt the changes were only minor, while critic [C10 - 
Researcher] felt there was a withdrawal of funding and change for the worse.  
Meanwhile, 5 instrumentalists did not notice a change in the way Palestinian partners 
work with them since the Arab uprisings, while 0 noted a change. Of the critics 
interviewed, 9 offered the view that they did not perceive a change in the way 
international donors work with Palestinian organisations, while just 3 perceived a 
change. There seems to be little evidence that there was change in the way aid and 
Palestinians interact with one another after 2011, and the interviewees create an 
overwhelming impression of continuity in the OPT aid model. 
                                                          
68
 Two critics and one donor did not provide a direct answer. 
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 Aid Patterns in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings  4.5.
To conclude each interview we asked the interviewees what they think are the keys 
to effective aid in the OPT following the Arab uprisings. So while the aim of this 
chapter is not to speculate on ways Palestinian aid can be reformed to make it more 
effective, some of the responses provided by the interviewees shed further light on 
the aid process in the OPT. This is especially important bearing in mind the general 
consensus of interviewees that aid has not changed in response to the uprisings, and 
that the Palestinian protests are likely linked to long-standing socio-political and 
economic factors tied to their unresolved conflict with Israel. These factors accrue 
value when taking into consideration the importance of the Palestinian issue in 
Middle East relations, geo-political stability, US and EU management of conflict in 
the region, that the OPT represents the largest and deepest penetration of long-
standing Western aid in an Arab country, and how this experience might affect 
Western policy-makers designing policy for the region. 
Instrumentalists and critics hold fundamentally different views on how aid should be 
given in the OPT, linked more to historical processes for which the Arab uprisings 
may or may not be relevant. Instrumentalists sustain a very bureaucratised and 
securitised institutional approach, which the critics argue should be openly resisted 
in favour of indigenous leadership and self-determination. Thus the impression 
conveyed by instrumentalist donors was to “stay the course”, that the original policy 
model is sound and should simply be applied with renewed vigour. Critics on the 
other hand believe that aid is reinforcing the occupation, the colonisation of 
Palestinian land and ultimately the destruction of Palestinian society. This process is 
enabled by a donor-backed PA which operates without legislative or open 
accountability in the OPT. 
Instrumentalist policy recommendations appear not to have evolved since the start of 
Oslo-aid in 1993, or at all following the Arab uprisings (Tartir and Wildeman 2013). 
They display the same normative values organised into the same processes for 
intervention. Instrumentalist [I1 – Government Aid Agency] said the: “key for 
effective aid is to focus on state building with an emphasis on effective, transparent 
and accountable governance and human rights”. For instrumentalist [I10 - INGO] 
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these policy prescriptions included: “identifying the most vulnerable groups, 
effective co-ordination with all stakeholders, participatory planning, accountability 
mechanisms, and unfettered humanitarian access”. Another prominent 
instrumentalist [I14 - IFI] said: “the key issues for effective aid are: predictability, 
clear priorities and ownership”.  
Critics focused on the need to dramatically reform aid to strive toward Palestinian 
self-determination. As part of that process of liberation, that aid needs to be 
structured in a way to challenge the forces that sustain the status quo, such as an 
authoritarian PA and the Israeli military occupation. Critic [C9 - PNGO] made it 
clear that aid needs to challenge Israel, support democracy, and not sustain a 
repressive PA. In complete contradiction to instrumentalists, most critics have little 
faith in the PA because it is dependent on donors and a failed Oslo paradigm. Some 
critics, such as critic [C8 – PNGO] call for the abolition of the PA and Oslo 
altogether, considering them to be part of the problem rather than the solution. A 
participant in the protests that hit the OPT in 2011, critic [C6 – Youth Movement] 
was unequivocal that the occupation needs to be challenged: “Any effective aid 
model needs to challenge Israel’s control over the resources and borders”. 
Critics further demonstrate a deep-held cynicism about the aid process, disclosing a 
belief that donors have hidden aims, which constitute the real reason for aid being 
given. Critic [C6 – Youth Movement] argued that aid is another tool of colonisation: 
In my view international aid as it is applied in the West Bank and 
Gaza is just one of many tools used to colonise what remains of 
Palestine and subdue the Palestinian population under occupation. 
This is not only true when talking about aid from Western 
countries, but to some extent the aid given by Qatar to Gaza serves 
a similar purpose.  
Building on these suspicions, critics such as [C7 - PNGO] consider donors complicit 
in the occupation: “Most conscious, young Palestinians, activists, etc. see the 
international community as completely complicit in the occupation”.69 Critic [C8 - 
PNGO] felt that aid is used to weaken Palestinian civil society and nonviolent 
resistance to the occupation. Critic [C14 - Researcher] points out that donors provide 
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 For further analysis on the complicity of the donor community in occupation, please refer to Lester-
Murad (2014). 
Chapter Four: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine 
182 
 
aid for self-interests that contradict the spirit of the peace process: “Donors 
undeniably have vested interest[s] in the region, whether it is the strategic 
relationship with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, their co-operation with 
Israel, or the lucrative relationship with oil rich gulf countries”. Critic [C11 - 
Researcher] went so far as to express a feeling that donor reports cannot be trusted 
because they do not reveal their real intentions, while musing that aid may actually 
be quite effective for cynical reasons because it keeps the Palestinians under 
control.
70 
 
Overall these points about effective aid are remarkably consistent with the 
viewpoints held by instrumentalists and critics elsewhere in the development 
literature. The instrumentalist approach to aid intervention in Palestine retains a very 
centralised and bureaucratic model that is based on liberal economic principals used 
to “modernise” a “less developed” society. Instrumentalists are famous for their 
unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to change,
71
 as per their response to the Arab 
uprisings. This could reflect some form of institutional path dependency, 
bureaucratic sluggishness or gaps in the co-ordination between various bodies. 
Critics on the other hand attribute this lack of change to the hidden intentions of 
donors. Those donors, far from being neutral observers, are effectively using aid to 
keep the Palestinians quiet during on-going Israeli colonisation of their land. That 
aid is aimed less at the elimination of poverty than the expansion of PA power used 
to dominate OPT Palestinians while simultaneously depoliticising the Palestinian 
struggle. James Ferguson observed a very similar process in Lesotho in the 1970s in 
the Anti-Politics Machine, where he suspected World Bank / IFI transformation of 
the agricultural sector, and other aid intervention, was simply a point of entry for an 
intervention that included the expansion and entrenchment of a donor-backed state’s 
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 Critic [C11 - Researcher] said: “Western aid is being very effective, don’t you think? It is keeping 
the Palestinians relatively acquiescent, and ensuring Israel’s security. I consider it misguided to regard 
the goal of Western aid as being to build a viable Palestinian state and economy. I no longer believe 
what is written in donor reports as in essence actions speak louder than words, and the actions are 
about ensuring Palestinian acquiescence and Israeli security”. 
71
 One criticism of the instrumentalists is that they habitually confirm self-fulfilling prophecies about 
the viability of the programs they have designed. In the case of Palestinian aid based on the normative 
values laid out in the Oslo aid model, support for programs is renewed based less on results than the 
values and norms the intervention supports, such as good governance and free markets (Mosse 2005: 
3-4). 
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power (Ferguson 1994). From either perspective, there is no argument about why 
instrumentalist donors are slow to react to the Arab uprisings, because for the 
instrumentalists aid is working just fine. For critics aid is working, but for all the 
wrong reasons. Either way, inertia exists because there is no need to change, 
meaning there is no sluggishness and no gap in co-ordination. 
 Conclusion: Business as Usual 4.6.
Taken in the context of the Arab uprisings that began in 2011, protests in the OPT 
have been muted by comparison. While opposition to foreign aid, the Oslo Accord 
and the World Bank economic model moved tentatively beyond elite circles to the 
Palestinian street, it is not immediately apparent why this has happened or if there is 
any link to the uprisings. Many interviewees noted that the OPT exists under unique 
conditions for the region, and that Palestinian protestors were responding to long-
standing problems linked to the occupation. Those protests may or may not have 
been encouraged by the broader regional uprisings. If anything, a stalled political 
process and economic difficulties spurred forth the protests, while the interviews 
with the critics provide some insight into the dynamics behind the protestors’ way of 
reasoning. Meanwhile, instrumentalist donors seem unfazed by the protests and 
have, as our interviews indicated, not changed their approach following the Arab 
uprisings, indicative of faith in the path laid out well before 2011. There was not 
even an increase in the amount of aid spent in the OPT after 2011, which may 
indicate that donors were not concerned that the Palestinian protests would grow and 
pose a threat to regional stability. Donors instead seem content sticking with the 
same Investment in Peace aid model they have followed since 1993. The absence of 
a clear connection between the Arab uprisings and Palestinian protests only further 
decouples any notion that the uprisings affected donor-funding patterns. 
The most notable shift may be a slight rebalancing of contributors to the existing aid 
model with Arab donors stepping in to support it, such as Qatari investment in Gaza 
noted by critic [C16 - Researcher] (Ephron 2012). Otherwise, United States 
Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest economic peace initiative (Greenwood 2013) 
exhibits remarkable continuity with the long-standing American policy of funding a 
“peace dividend” to buy Palestinians into a peace process. The 2013 Kerry 
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investment plan (Palestinian Economic Initiative) means to increase OPT GDP by 50 
per cent over three years, and crucially to pacify the conflict (Tartir 2014). It 
parallels the “Breaking the Impasse” initiative where 200 - 300 Palestinian and 
Israeli businessmen gathered to work together and put pressure on their respective 
governments, kick-starting a new wave of economic normalisation. A process of 
normalisation that critics argue is part of the problem. And while the Kerry plan aims 
to enhance the economic situation, Kerry makes it clear that “the proposal would 
depend on progress on a peace deal between the Palestinians and Israel”, 
emphasising the conditional nature of aid linked to the Oslo peace paradigm and that 
rejects any radical departure (Breaking the Impasse 2013; Kerry 2013). 
Meanwhile an argument has emerged, set forth by some critics, that OPT aid may be 
having unintended, unwritten benefits for donors. From a national interest and 
security perspective, aid may be working because it is pacifying the Palestinians and 
promoting regional security. Whether or not the aid model is sustaining development 
and peace then becomes irrelevant, and instrumentalist policy only obscures the real 
dynamics behind Palestinian aid. Whether those critics are right or wrong, it is 
possible to conclude with confidence that the model and the normative values of 
donor aid in the OPT appear set to remain unchanged despite minor variations 
discussed above, and regardless of aid’s failure to sustain peace or development.  
Decoupling aside, it is the very resilience of the Palestinian aid model and the scale 
of that intervention, which marks out its importance in the story about Middle East 
regional aid. At the same time, the OPT has acted as a ‘laboratory’ where donors 
have been able to test a model which not only seems secure but successful enough 
that a major donor, instrumentalist [I6 - IFI], would consider exporting the post-Oslo 
Palestinian aid model to other Arab states in the wake of the 2011 uprisings. Even 
rich Gulf Arab donors are showing interest in what that model has to offer, as 
evidenced by the recent Qatari investment in Gaza. Rather than massive Arab 
uprisings being exported to the OPT and changing the approach of donors there, it is 
past Palestinian aid recipes focused on security priorities and neoliberal solutions 
which may be exported out of the OPT and around the Mediterranean. Thus the 
inclusion of Palestine, a polity generally considered inactive in the 2011 uprisings, 
helps us rethink patterns of aid for the whole region.  
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Chapter Five 
5. Contentious Economics in Occupied Palestine 
 
Abstract 
This chapter utilises theories of contentious politics to analyse the 
implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic model 
and the authoritarian transformations it induced. In the aftermath of 
the post-2011 Arab uprisings, this chapter problematises the economic 
neoliberal policies and the failing patterns of aid as root causes for the 
contention in the era of Fayyadism. It argues that protests against the 
neoliberal policies, the international aid industry, and the economic 
framework of the Oslo Peace Accords, albeit fragmented or repressed, 
constituted forms of contentious collective actions and formed cycles 
of contention where different actors joined forces to confront, 
challenge, and expose repressive authorities and proposed alternatives. 
However, these cycles of contention failed to transform into a social 
movement for political and economic rights due to their failure to 
draw on social networks, common purposes, or cultural frameworks, 
and thus failed to build solidarity or collective identities.  
 
Theoretically, this chapter uses the case of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory to operationalise the notion of contentious economics as an 
integral but distinctive feature in the theories of contentious politics. 
This chapter defines the notion of contentious economics through the 
Palestinian indigenous notion of resistance economy, an alternative 
model that is emerging as an output of the cycles of contentions and 
contentious collective actions. Therefore, based on the concepts of 
contentious politics and the exercise of contentious collective actions, 
and inspired by the empirical and ethnographic evidence of this 
research, this chapter proposes the model of resistance economy as 
opposed to the neoliberal Fayyadism model.  
 
This chapter uses empirical evidences to contribute to the expansion 
of theoretical debates, and as such the interaction between the theories 
of contentious politics, the concept of contentious economics, and the 
empirical dimensions of resistance economy constitute the primary 
contributions of this chapter to the corpus of literature.   
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 Introduction 5.1.
The case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) constitutes a prime example 
from which to explore and expand the dynamics of contentious politics and social 
movement theories, both from a historical and contemporary perspective. As an 
occupied, fragmented, ethnically-cleansed (Pappe 2006), dispossessed, and resilient 
nation, Palestinians could be seen as a social movement society. By resisting 
different forms of dominance, military occupations, and repressive authorities for 
several decades, Palestinians accumulated multiple cycles of contention and engaged 
in contentious collective actions to give birth to the Palestinian revolution (Al-
Thawra Al-Filstiniya). This revolution and its characteristics has changed 
dramatically over the years, particularly with the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords 
in 1993 (Shlaim 2010; Nusseibeh 2011; Kabha 2014). At that point, the Palestinian 
liberation movement declared the beginning of the end for the Palestinian national 
project (Khalil 2013). The revolution’s institutions transformed gradually into the 
bureaucracy run by the nascent and non-sovereign governing body, the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). 
These institutions suffered from a profound identity crisis, impacting their 
functionality. But despite this, their mere existence induced changes to how the 
colonisation of Palestinian land is understood, and how social and resistance 
movements are constructed (Peters and Newman 2013). The PA’s pragmatic 
political position, the absence of a vision for a self-reliant economy, and the 
prioritisation of the Israeli security demands, resulted in a number of outcomes; a 
gradual erosion of the PA’s legitimacy, a complete dependency on international aid, 
a forced dependency on the Israeli economy, and an authoritarian trend in the PA’s 
character and in the operations of its security forces. Therefore, the authority’s 
institutions became a burden on the Palestinian people and added another layer of 
repression. The Palestinian people were further alienated and marginalised from the 
national decision-making process while a handful élite, largely undemocratic and 
illegitimate, claimed the representation. The combination of these factors formed a 
base for cycles of contention over the last two decades.        
Chapter Five: Contentious Economics in Occupied Palestine 
187 
 
The process of alienation and marginalisation was entrenched in the era of 
Fayyadism (Leech 2012). Fayyadism, in reference to the former Palestinian Prime 
Minister Salam Fayyad, is the term used to describe the style of governance and 
state-building in the West Bank from 2007 until the present time. Fayyadism is a 
strategy for state-building through good governance, and an outcome for the status of 
aid dependency, the weak PA, and the limited political options which Palestinians 
have. Fayyadism is home-grown, even though it is an externally funded and 
sponsored paradigm, one which has been deeply influenced by donor’s prescriptions 
and funds (Khalidi and Samour 2011). It is aimed at establishing a Weberian 
monopoly of violence in the security sphere and a post-Washington Consensus 
neoliberal agenda in the economic sphere. Both are seen as the fundamental pillars 
for the Palestinian state, despite the existence of the Israeli occupation and the intra-
Palestinian fragmentation.  
The PA, Israel and the international community have decided that the best and only 
route for state-building to occur is through achieving four pillars: security sector 
reform and enforcement of the rule of law; building accountable PA institutions; 
provision of effective public service delivery; and achievement of private sector led 
economic growth in an open and free market economy (PA 2008, 2009, 2011a,b). In 
the words of Fayyad himself, Fayyadism is about “focusing on establishing solid 
institutions, guided by the principles of good governance, respect for human rights, 
rule of law, and the efficient and effective delivery of public services” (PA 2011:7). 
Some celebrate Fayyad’s reforms and argue that the improved performance of the 
PA has contributed to peace-building and the enhancement of Palestinians lives 
(World Bank 2011a,b, 2013a,b; IMF 2011a,b); while others argue that it has 
sustained the occupation, reengineered parts of the Palestinian society, created a new 
élite and revised the national goals (Khan 2010; Brown 2010a,b).  
During this Fayyadist era, and in particular in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, 
Palestinians have hardly been able to mobilise and act collectively en masse, and in 
instance where they have been able to do so, their collective actions were 
unsustainable (Hoigilt 2013).
72
 This is largely attributed to the authoritarian 
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 Apart from the civil society led Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement which is 
gaining more momentum over the years and achieving remarkable successes (Barghouti 2011). The 
BDS is an international campaign led by Palestinian activists and calling for the boycott of Israel. In 
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transformation of the PA’s security forces, but is also due to a set of reasons, 
including the Israeli occupation, the political divide between Gaza and West Bank, 
the lack of legitimate representative leadership, the consequences of the neoliberal 
economic agenda, and the failure of international aid (Pace 2013; Haddad 2013). 
However, as argued by Adam Hanieh, despite the relative success of the neoliberal 
Fayyadist project in demobilizing social movements, 
It would be wrong to assume its permanent ability to pacify the 
Palestinian population. In many ways, these neoliberal structures 
act to undermine their own conditions of existence. Most notably, 
they have clarified the role of the PA to a degree not previously 
witnessed in the West Bank (Hanieh 2013:120). 
The emergence of the youth movement in 2011 is just a case in point that directly 
confronted the policies of the PA and the dire economic conditions. The exposure of 
the real roles of the authorities through the collective actions of the opponents goes 
in harmony with the theories of contentious politics. 
Multiple common political and economic challenges exist between Palestine and the 
Arab world. These challenges came to be correlated or causally linked following the 
2011 Arab uprisings (Hanieh 2013; Gerges 2013), but Palestinians remained largely 
silent and failed to gather in masses against the regime, the layers of oppression and 
repression, or the neoliberal economic policies. Inspired by the theoretical 
underpinnings of contentious politics discussed below, this chapter therefore argues 
that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Palestinian political and/or 
economic protests constituted cycles of contention, but failed to effectively 
transform into a social movement. In particular, protests against the economic 
policies of the PA, the international aid industry, and the economic framework of the 
Oslo Accords all constitute a form of contentious collective action where different 
actors join forces to confront and challenge authorities and élite around their claims 
to represent. These contentious collective actions were triggered by political 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2005, and inspired by the South African experience and the apartheid nature of the Israeli state, 
Palestinian civil society issued a call for a global campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions 
against Israel until it complies with international law by: “ending its occupation and colonization of 
all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall; recognizing the fundamental rights of 
the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and respecting, protecting and promoting the 
rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 
194” (BDS, Introducing the BDS Movement, [Online], Available: 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/bdsintro). 
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opportunities and constraints or threats which urged those actors lacking in resources 
to act. However, the actions were not “backed by well-structured social networks 
[nor] galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols,” (Tarrow 2012:6) 
and therefore did not allow this form of contention to lead to a sustained interaction 
with the opponents. In other words, it did not develop into a social movement for 
political and economic rights. 
Consequently, in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the protests against the 
repressing authorities in the OPT indicated that a movement was in the process of 
formation; however these protests failed to draw on the social networks, common 
purposes, or cultural frameworks, and failed to build solidarity through connective 
structures and collective identities to sustain the mounting collective challenges and 
actions. According to the theoretical framework of contentious politics developed by 
Sidney Tarrow, the protests failed to transform into “collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 2012:9). 
At the theoretical level, this chapter aims to use the case of Palestine to expand the 
dynamics of the contentious politics theories through engaging with the notion of 
contentious economics. At the empirical level, this chapter aims to discuss the 
implications of the neoliberal paradigm during the Fayyadism era, and problematise 
them as root causes for contention. Additionally, this chapter will provide a critique 
for the international aid industry in the OPT, which forms a source of contention, 
through engaging with scholarly literature and also through activism at the street 
level. Finally, this chapter will propose the notion of resistance economy as a model 
that is based on the concepts of contentious politics and the exercise of the 
contentious collective actions. It is a model that challenges the repressive authorities 
and faces the multiple layers of oppression to reverse the cycles of de-development 
and fulfil economic rights in an ultimate expression of self-determination. It is 
argued here that the marriage of the concepts of contentious politics theories with the 
empirical dimensions of the resistance economy model constitutes the original 
contribution of this chapter to scholarly work. This is operationalised through the 
initial effort, presented here, to engage with the concept of contentious economics.  
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 Conceptualising Contentious Politics and Economics 5.2.
Contentious politics can be defined as “what happens when collective actors join 
forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or 
the claims of those they claim to represent” (Tarrow 2012:4). It is triggered by 
“changing political opportunities and constraints [which] create incentives to take 
action for actors who lack resources on their own” (Tarrow 2012:6). Contentious 
politics occurs “when threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when 
the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of 
opponents is exposed” (Tarrow 2012:33). Repressed people resisted and contend 
through locally built repertoires of contention which are expanded through 
innovation and technologies of networking. Contentious politics, based on these 
repertoires of contention, lead to sustained interaction with opponents and to social 
movements when they are “backed by well-structured social networks and 
galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols” (Tarrow 2012:6). 
According to the theories of contentious politics, the basis of social movements, 
protests, and uprisings, is the contentious collective action. Collective action can be 
“brief or sustained, institutionalised or disruptive, humdrum or dramatic” (Tarrow 
2012:7); however it becomes contentious when “it is used by people who lack 
regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or 
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or 
authorities” (Tarrow 2012:7). In particular, contentious forms of collective action 
“bring ordinary people into confrontation with opponents, elites, or authorities” 
(Tarrow 2012:8). Those contentious collective actions could be upgraded into the 
social movement level if they involve mounting collective challenges; drawing on 
social networks, common purposes, and cultural frameworks; and build solidarity 
through connective structures and collective identities to sustain collective action 
(Tarrow 2012:8). 
Therefore, as argued by Sidney Tarrow, “rather than defining social movements as 
expressions of extremism, violence, and deprivation, they are better defined as 
collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 2012:9). With the change 
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in the political opportunities and constraints or threats, people engage in contentious 
politics by 
strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating 
new opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of 
contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in 
society; when they bring people together around inherited cultural 
symbols; and when they can build on – or construct – dense social 
networks and connective structures, these episodes of contention 
result in sustained interactions with opponents in social movements 
(Tarrow 2012:28-29). 
This highlights that contentious politics are “culturally inscribed and socially 
communicated” (Tarrow 2012:29). It also reflects the centrality of the notion of the 
repertoire of contention and social movements as repertoires of knowledge of certain 
routines in a nation’s history and traditions.  
Other than the way social movements are embedded in the theories of contentious 
politics, the concept of cycles of contention is another crucial element and building 
bloc. Beinin and Vairel credit Tarrow for inventing this term and define it as “a 
structured process by which social movements formed, mobilised, and declined due 
to political opportunities, innovations in forms of contention, successful articulation 
of collective action frames, coexistence of organised and unorganised activities, and 
increased interaction between challengers and constituted authority” (Beinin and 
Vairel 2013:19).   
However, these concepts of contention are also disputed theoretically and 
empirically. Most recently by the edited volume Social Movements, Mobilization, 
and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa edited by Joel Beinin and 
Frédéric Vairel. They argue that Tilly’s notion of repertories of collective action best 
links the logics of actions and the logics of context, and they argue that the concept 
of repertoire “also assumes a universe of shared meaning, prior to mobilization” 
(Siméant 1993:315).
 It includes “routines that are learned, shared and acted out 
through a relatively deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1986:26). The repertoire is 
also a “‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use 
in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler 1986:273). 
But perhaps most importantly, Beinin and Vairel argue that “analysing repertories 
allows us to examine anticipations, perceptions, and self-definitions of contentious 
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actors and how they take up a position in the political field”. Finally the notion of 
repertories leads to a dynamic perspective on collective action and “facilities 
adopting a relational perspective on contentious politics. It is all the more important 
in authoritarian situations where activists feel more heavily the authorities’ arbitrary 
behaviour and violence” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:15). This is the case in Palestine 
particularly in the era of Fayyadism, with the entrenchment of the authoritarian 
transformations in the character, practices and policies of the Palestinian Authority 
(Brown 2010a,b; Leech 2012; Sayigh 2011). 
In these authoritarian contexts, it is crucial to look at the “politics under the 
threshold” as argued by Steven Heydemann (cited in Beinin and Vairel 2013:25). 
This implies a better understanding of the configurations and transformations of the 
authoritarian regime and how collective action functions, where “contention faces 
huge constraints, the collective dimension of protest is far from given, and the 
security apparatus are omnipresent” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:25). This conceptual 
expansion and critique confirms that “repertoires of contention, social networks, and 
cultural frames lower the costs of bringing people into collective action, induce 
confidence that they are not alone, and give broader meaning to their claims” 
(Tarrow 2012:33). 
Beinin and Vairel and the contributing authors to the edited volume mentioned 
earlier provide a constructive critique to the ideas of and conceptualisation offered 
by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly. They expand the McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s ideas 
using empirical evidence from the Middle East in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings. They righty argue that Tarrow,
73
 McAdam, and Tilly’s revised conceptual 
model is “far better suited [for] studying social and political mobilisations and 
contestations in the Middle East and North Africa than classical SMT and PPM 
[Political Process Model]” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:7). Their justification for this 
overarching conclusion is based on a number of reasons: a) most of the social 
                                                          
73
 Tarrow’s views on Palestine seem to be problematic, misguided and fraught with contradictions. In 
his 3
rd
 edition of his Power in Movement, Tarrow views the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a “civil war 
between Jews and Arabs” (p.107), and views the first Palestinian intifada as a “phase of 
radicalization” (p.174). Further, the narrative about the 2010 Turkish-led flotilla to Gaza presented in 
the introduction of the book (p.1-4) is one-sided in support of the Israeli narrative, subjective, 
dismisses crucial facts, and contains major factual inaccuracies. These understandings completely 
dismiss the Israeli settler colonial project and military occupation, and the ongoing process of ethnic 
cleansing by Israel taking place since 1948.   
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movements in the Middle East operate in the interstices of persisting 
authoritarianism that subject them to varying degrees of coercion and offer them few 
openings for mobilisation; b) many of social movements have very limited resources 
and weak formal organisations; and c) social movements typically rely on informal 
networks and innovative repertories to mobilise. These remarks resonate in the case 
of Palestine, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. This chapter argues 
that the Palestinian case adds a further dimension to the dynamics of contentious 
politics theories through the additional particularity and complexity of colonial 
conditions and the multiple layers of oppression and repression Palestinians have 
been, and continue to be exposed to. Additionally, the case of Palestine emphasises 
the importance of a perceived collective threat, rather than an “opportunity,” as the 
impetus for action (Beinin and Vairel 2013:8-9).    
The case of Palestine is positioned within this broader Middle Eastern context and its 
interaction with the contentious politics theories. As Adam Hanieh argued, the 
question of Palestine “cannot be reduced to a purely “humanitarian” issue or simply 
an issue of national liberation; it is an essential component of the broader struggle 
against the uneven development and control of wealth across the Middle East” 
(Hanieh 2013:122). The utilisation of the classical concepts of the Social Movements 
Theory (SMT) in the case of Palestine-Israel, can be found in the work of Amal 
Jamal (2005), Eitan Alimi (2006, 2007, 2009), Elisabeth Marteu (2009), Julie 
Norman (2010), and Wendy Pearlman (2011); however their major shortcoming as 
cited in Beinin and Vairel is their failure to engage critically and take a step back 
from the classical concepts of the SMT. In addition, the social movements and the 
movements for self-determination are not homogenous, and their subjugation to a 
colonial actor adds a further layer of complicity that is still not absorbed sufficiently 
by the classical dynamics of the SMT. 
This chapter argues that the concepts, dynamics, processes and tools of contentious 
politics are also applicable to the economic domain. Political protests have their own 
political economy dynamics, and economic reasons are often cited for the emergence 
of political contention. The intrinsic relationship between politics and economics is 
particularly explicit in the trajectory of the Arab uprisings. Protests based on 
economic justification also form a contentious form of collective action that 
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principally clashes with the authorities, elite and their economic policies which have 
political underpinnings and implications that have a profound effect on the everyday 
lives of people. The impact is particularly problematic in authoritarian contexts, 
thereby adding another level of economic repression to the political one. Changes in 
the trajectories of repression, rather than opportunities, could trigger the contention. 
The contentious collective actions that make up a form of resistance are not merely 
protests against, for instance, privatisation policies, tax laws, inflation, or high 
unemployment. Rather they have their own political bases that challenge, among 
other issues, the effectiveness of the ruling authorities, and the policy prescriptions 
proposed or dictated in the majority of the cases by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) through their “reform agendas”. The economic neoliberal packages 
adopted by the Arab governments prior to the Arab uprisings had been one of the 
major reasons for the emergence of the uprisings themselves with their political, 
economic, and social demands. Therefore, the centrality of the political economy 
dimension in the theories of contentious politics sheds light on another form of 
contention in the economic domain, which I refer to in this chapter as contentious 
economics.  
This chapter uses the case of Palestine, in particular in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings, to operationalise and expand the notion of contentious economics as an 
integral but also distinctive feature in the theories of contentious politics. This 
chapter uses existing empirical evidence to contribute to the expansion of the 
theoretical debates. Therefore, this chapter defines the notion of contentious 
economics through the concept of resistance and a steadfastness economy (resistant 
and steadfast economy
)74
- an alternative model that is emerging as an output of the 
cycles of contentions and contentious collective actions.
75
 This model, as discussed 
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 In the field of Palestinian studies, a stream of critical scholarly literature addresses dimensions of 
the concepts of economic resistance and steadfastness. It includes the work of Antonie Mansour 
(1984), George Kurzom (2001), Fadle Al-Naqib (2003, 2007), Adel Samara (2005), Khalil Nakhleh 
(2011), Adam Hanieh (2011), Khalidi and Samour (2011), Tartir et al. (2012), and Tartir and Shikaki 
(2013). Additionally, a number of institutional publications exists such as CDS-BZU (2011), Dalia 
Association (2011), Bisan Centre (2011, 2013), Al-Shabaka (2011-2014). 
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 Many scholars and practitioners, mainly from the mainstream domains, view the concept of 
resistance economy as a concept that implies negativity, violence, and aggression. They view it as a 
pessimistic, backwards, and old-fashioned idea. They go further in viewing it as unrealistic, 
fantastical, and unviable in both economic and political terms. Additionally, they argue that it is 
merely a nostalgic concept to romanticize old indigenous approaches.  However, I simply argue that 
the notion of resistance economy represents a complete opposite of what the counter-argument 
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later in the chapter, is based on confronting neoliberalism as a panacea for solving 
economic deterioration and de-development.
76
 This model advances the concepts of 
freedom and dignity as integral parts in exercising self-determination, and in 
fulfilling and acquiring economic rights. Therefore, in essence, this model is based 
on confronting the multiple authorities of repression, oppression and 
authoritarianism. This model, and the concept of contentious economics, are not 
exclusive or particular to the case of Palestine. In fact, comparable experiences can 
be found in other parts of the world, for instance the notions of solidarity and self-
reliance in the economies of Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and even villages in Spain. 
Of particular interest are the alternative economic models developed by liberation or 
social movements which demand for political rights. The dynamics and processes of 
contentious economics are particularly vivid in such settings.       
The application of the theories of contentious politics to the Palestinian case in the 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings can be depicted in the below figure based on the 
theoretical elaboration developed by Sidney Tarrow. This figure visualises the 
theoretical framework of this chapter. On one hand, the Palestinian society can be 
seen as a “social movement society” in a permanent status of confrontation with the 
authorities and occupying forces, that has lasted for at least the last century. On the 
other hand, the Palestinian context is characterised by the existence of multiple 
cycles of contention over the decades. Either way, the contentious collective actions 
                                                                                                                                                                    
proponents are proposing. It is an approach that has its  roots in the local context and which was built 
up to react to the realities of the ground through acknowledging the potential of the people and aiming 
to expand their capabilities. It is an approach that understands development as freedom and dignity. It 
is based on clashing with repressive authorities in the short term, but with an optimistic and strategic 
vision for the economic and political spheres. It is a concept that celebrates resistance through practice 
as the main source of achieving rights under colonial subjugation and authoritarian conditions. The 
legacy of this concept is based on the legacy of the resistance movement itself  in the Palestinian 
context. Intellectually, it is also based on a rich legacy of a revolution-based research and knowledge 
production, as Faris Giacaman (2014) reminded us recently through the utilization of the concept of 
“militant researchers.” Further elaboration on the notion of resistance economy can be found in the 
last section of this chapter. For further elaboration on nostalgia and mass mobilisation, please refer to 
Al-Azzeh (2015). 
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 De-development is “the deliberate, systematic and progressive dismemberment of an indigenous 
economy by a dominant one, where economic – and by extension, societal – potential is not only 
distorted but denied’ (Roy 2007). Therefore, de-development is a process that forestalls development 
by “depriving or ridding the economy of its capacity and potential for rational structural 
transformation [i.e., natural patterns of growth and development] and preventing the emergence of 
any self-correcting measures.” (Roy 1995). De-development, occurs when normal economic relations 
are impaired or abandoned, preventing any logical or rational arrangement of the economy or its 
constituent parts, diminishing productive capacity and precluding sustainable growth. Over time, de-
development represents nothing less than the denial of economic potential (Roy 2014). 
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were always present in the Palestinian case by utilizing different ways and 
approaches to express the contentious feature of the collective actions. These cycles 
of contention and contentious collective actions, however, have to be put into a 
historical context and contextualised by the legacy of the Palestinian liberation 
movement, the ongoing Israeli military occupation and the colonisation of 
Palestinian land.  
As indicated above, the accumulation of contentious collective actions, and the 
continuation of cycles of contention, lead to the emergence of social movements or a 
status where elements of contentious politics are expressed. The latter took place in 
Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, as the contention in the economic 
domain was featured. This provides the reasoning for the use of the contentious 
economics concept. However, the expressions of contention were either repressed or 
fragmented in Palestine’s case, and therefore failed to emerge as a social movement, 
as they did in other parts of the Arab world. Reasons for the failure to create a social 
movement include a repression by the authoritarian tendencies of the PA, and the 
continuous oppression by Israel. Alternatively, they were fragmented as a result of 
internal Palestinian politics, a lack of leadership, the absence of a unifying strategy, 
or the bleak horizon for the future, amongst others. Either way, cycles of contention 
were the output and result of the fragmentation and repression trajectories and 
dynamics. This does not mean an absolute negativity or a failure of the opposition 
front. In fact, and in line with the theoretical underpinnings, the cycles of contention 
were successful in exposing the vulnerabilities, fragilities and failures of the 
authorities and to clash with them at the intellectual, policy, and strategy levels, as 
well as at the street level. A clash which illustrated the changing political 
opportunities and threats. The local-level initiatives on the ground, coupled with the 
intellectual efforts to develop the notion of a resistance economy, as opposed to 
neoliberalism, the failed aid industry, and the rejection of the economic policies of 
the PA, are ultimate expressions of contentious economics. 
The figure below, prepared by the author, depicts the application of the theories of 
contentious politics to the Palestinian case in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings 
based on the theoretical elaboration developed by Sidney Tarrow. 
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Figure 8: Visualising the Theoretical Framework of Contentious Politics 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on the theoretical foundation of Sidney Tarrow (2012). 
 Explaining the Roots of Contentious Economics: 5.3.
Neoliberalism with a Palestinian Flavour  
The signature of the Oslo Peace Accords and the establishment of the PA two 
decades ago gave rise to the roots of economic neoliberalism as a defining feature of 
the Palestinian economy and development process (Haddad 2012; Abunimah 2014). 
Therefore, the roots of contentious economics in the OPT are political (Hanieh 
2013b). The Oslo economic framework implied that the PA had to adopt 
neoliberalism as its leading and defining ideology in both the political and economic 
spheres.
77
 Article 21 of the Palestinian Basic Law specifies that “the economic 
system in Palestine shall be based on the principles of a free market economy” (The 
2003 Amended Palestinian Basic Law 2003). This secures the leading role of the 
private sector and the capitalist élite through offering them monopolies and political 
influence (Tartir 2012a; Dana 2014; Nakhleh 2014). In addition, the international 
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 For further reading about the Oslo economic framework, please refer to Tartir and Wildeman 
(2013). 
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community assured that such adoption was inherent in the PA’s structure and in its 
state of dependency on aid (Hamdan 2010).  
The philosophical rationale of the Oslo economic framework was to improve 
Palestinians’ standard of living, encourage them to participate in the peace process 
and to sustain peace by cashing in on peace dividends. The mantra for this model 
was a linear equation: invest more money to make Palestinians feel better 
economically to make it easier for them to compromise politically (Le More 2008). 
This notion of peace dividends is a derivative of the economic peace framework that 
seeks economic solutions for political problems and for normalcy between the 
colonisers and the colonised through joint ventures, cooperation and collaboration 
(Hever 2010). 
By adopting such a model, the PA failed to play a crucial developmental role as a 
state-like body, and operated within a framework characterised by a complex 
network of corruption, nepotism, and a personalised style of governance that adopted 
a rent and rent seeking economic model (Khan et al. 2004; Hanafi and Tabar 2005; 
Le More 2008). This distorted neoliberal economic model suppressed the indigenous 
calls that any form of economic thinking must acknowledge that the dynamics of the 
free market are dictated by the dynamics of the real power. By ignoring this demand, 
the PA helped, directly and indirectly, in achieving one of the aims of the colonial 
power through realizing individual richness for few and national impoverishment for 
all. 
The economic neoliberal agendas, as a major root for contention, were further 
entrenched during the Fayyadism era and gained a momentum due to the political 
transformations in the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian divide between West Bank 
and Gaza. Under Fayyad’s rule, the PA used the neoliberal ideology explicitly for 
packaging its state-building project and seeking the approval of the international 
community and broad segment of the Palestinian society (Samour 2014:68). Fayyad 
was the right person to implement the renewed rules of the game (political 
conditionality) as dictated by the international community and Israel. The Palestinian 
economic vision according to Fayyad’s plan 
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…is to have a diversified and thriving free market economy led by 
a pioneering private sector that is in harmony with the Arab world, 
is open to regional and global markets, and that provides the 
economic basis for a free, democratic and equitable society (PA 
2007:18). 
In addition, due to the condition of Israeli settler colonialism, Palestinian 
neoliberalism has its own flavour. Palestinians do not have basic pillars to implement 
the one-size-fit-all post-Washington consensus neoliberal policies since they lack 
sovereignty, control over borders, national currency, independent trade policy, 
central bank, protection of property rights or freedom of movement for labour or 
goods (Khan 2010).   
Neoliberalism with its Palestinian flavour meant the superiority of the technocratic 
model over the national one, the accomplishment of the economic peace pillars 
through the private security led growth, the establishment of bureaucratic institutions 
for a liberation movement as a prerequisite for independence, the acceptance of 
normalcy of life under occupation, and the shift toward authoritarianism and 
securitised-development. In other words, and as was argued by Sobhi Samour: 
The significance of the PA’s neoliberalism -be it as an economic 
doctrine, discursive instrument, class project, or form of social 
engineering- consists not so much in its failure to build a state and 
its inability to deliver sustainable economic growth, or in the biting 
austerity measures that it has imposed and the rising number of 
indebted households. None of this is an aberration of 
neoliberalism. Its significance, rather, lies in its political 
implication in a context of an objective reality that remains an anti-
colonial struggle…the outcome of the PA’s neoliberalism is to 
erode further the basis of collective political power, the investment 
in and reliance on community resources, and the sense of solidarity 
among a people fighting for their freedom (Samour 2014:70). 
The technocratic government model, as opposed to the national one, became the 
synonym for peace-loving and moderate governments that denounce ‘terror’ and 
view the world as a small village. They rely on the western governments and the US 
administration, to speak their language, promote the trappings of democracy, and 
master the jargon of transparency and accountability. These technocratic 
governments were the panacea for the PA’s reform and enjoyed the support of Israel 
as credible partners for peace. All this resulted in a further widening of the 
legitimacy gap between the Palestinian society and the ruling authority. Eroding 
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legitimacy is a source of contention and a justification for clashing with the élite. 
Adam Hanieh argues that the term technocrat was used to convoy a sense of 
neutrality, 
describing someone allegedly disinterested in “politics” and 
therefore supposedly [a] more responsible leader.’ By extension, 
this meant that the development process had to be an apolitical one, 
despite Israeli settler-colonialism, which meant that Israeli settler-
colonialism was ‘portrayed as merely a set of administrative 
regulations that may (or may not) “hinder” Palestinian 
development (Hanieh 2013:118). 
Therefore, the Israeli military occupation was framed “as a partner of Palestinian 
development rather than its antithesis” (Hanieh 2013:118).  
The prevalence of market dynamics was translated into benefits for the powerful 
actors, Palestinian capitalists, PA élite, and Israeli firms. These actors engaged in 
joint businesses either voluntarily or compulsorily as required by the economic peace 
framework. The rationale was that the economic benefits would trickle down from 
the stronger economy in Israel to the weaker economy in Palestine; however, the 
result was a subaltern Palestinian economy forcefully contained by the Israeli one. 
Therefore, as a consequence of the way the PA and its economic élite intersected and 
gained their power from the occupation and the Oslo Accords structures, a new élite 
has emerged (Hilal 2014b). This chapter refers to this new elite as “the new 
entrepreneurs”. With the rapid accumulation of wealth, they transformed into the 
new rich category as a direct consequence of benefiting from the status quo. The 
failure of neoliberalism to address the inequality gap meant the rise of a new 
category in the Palestinian society, referred to as “the new poor". The profits 
calculus of economic viability, which meant the commodification of resources or 
services such as agriculture and education, that led the private sector in their 
operations was in many cases at the expense of the Palestinian national project. 
Hence, this had implications on the cycles of contention and the clashes with a 
powerful economic élite covered by the political leadership and peace-building 
arrangements.     
In addition to Palestine’s complete dependency on international aid, the economic 
growth achieved during the Fayyadism era was fuelled by easier access to credit 
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facilities. The PA, with the support of the donor community, launched credit 
programmes which came to be known locally as the “Americanization of the 
Palestinian society”. In 2010, the overall consumption in the West Bank and Gaza 
totalled US$7.3 billion, while GDP was merely US$5.7 billon. This meant that 
consumption as a percentage of GDP was 128 percent, making it one of the highest 
ratios in the world. Additionally, since 2006 the lending rate increased by 13% 
annually, while the growth in GDP per capita never exceeded 2%. Therefore, the 
ratio of the bank loans to deposits increased from 28% in 2008 to 45% in 2011. 
According to the May 2013 data from Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), loans to 
the agriculture sector did not exceed US$10 million, while credit cards loans were 
around US$45 million, consumption loans totalled US$99 million, and cars loan 
recorded US$239 million (Shikaki 2014; Hilal 2014).  
From 2008 to 2011, the amount of credit extended for real estate, automobile 
purchases and credit cards increased by a remarkable 245 percent (Hanieh 
2013:119). Hanieh rightly warns that “these forms of individual consumer and 
household debt had a deep impact on how people viewed their capacities for social 
struggle and their relation to society. Increasingly caught in the web of financial 
relationships, individuals are taught to satisfy needs through the market – usually 
through borrowing money - rather than through collective struggle for social rights” 
(Hanieh 2013:119). Therefore, “much of the population became more concerned 
with “stability” and the ability to pay off debt rather than the possibility of popular 
resistance” (Hanieh 2013:120). This implication of neoliberalism accepts the 
normalcy of life under the military occupation and has a major impact on the social 
structures, not only in terms of class, but also in terms of enforcing the superiority of 
individualism over collectivism. If social movements require collective actions, then 
such neoliberal measures undermine a major pillar for mobility and for sustainable 
cycles of contention. 
Finally, a more stultifying Palestinian authoritarianism was coupled with the 
execution of economic neoliberalism. Authoritarianism was manifested at the 
planning and economic thinking level, as well as in its pure (in)security-focused 
meaning. PA officials during the Fayyadism era were convinced that there was only 
one right way for economic planning; the one prescribed by the international 
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financial institutions. This resulted in various clashes with the authorities and fuelled 
protests in the West Bank, including those which related to the income tax law, early 
retirement law, and water and electricity meters in 2012. In the pure security-focused 
sense, the whole development industry was securitised, with more than a third of 
international aid and governmental spending being allocated to the security sector as 
a pillar for the securitised-development approach. The operations of the Palestinian 
security forces and security sector reform, which was implemented as part of the aid 
conditionality and political decisions, resulted in an authoritarian regime that 
suppressed any form of contentious collective actions, including those in the 
economic domain. This is particularly the case in the aftermath of the post-2011 
Arab uprisings. Nathan Brown argues that under Fayyadism, the maintenance of 
institutions was done “in an authoritarian context that robs the results of domestic 
legitimacy. Hence, the entire program is based not simply on de-emphasizing or 
postponing democracy and human rights but on actively denying them for the 
present” (Brown 2010a:2). This is what distinguished the present PA 
authoritarianism  from Arafat’s: being “regularised and softened” and “less venal 
and probably less capricious. But it is also more stultifying” (Brown 2010a:10).  
To better contextualise this authoritarian transformation, the neoliberal Fayyadism 
linked the Israeli security demands with the Palestinian economic growth (Samour 
2014:67). This exchange between the security of the coloniser and the economic 
growth of the colonised meant the economic (and military) dominance of Israel and 
the entrenchment of Palestinian authoritarianism to fulfil the Israeli security demand.      
 Aiding Occupation: Critiquing the Aid Industry as a Source 5.4.
of Contention 
The industry of international aid is a major source of contention, particularly in 
conflict-affected areas. The OPT is not an exception (Calis 2013). But with the 
existence of the Israeli military occupation, aid was “as much aid to Israel as it was 
to Palestinians” (Hanieh 2013:110). Despite the US$24 billion of aid given to 
Palestinians over the last two decades, aid has not brought peace, development, or 
security for the Palestinian people, let alone justice. Between 1993 and 2012, 
international aid disbursements to Palestinians totalled around US$ 24.6 billion. Aid 
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inflows increased from an annual average of US$ 656 million between 1993 and 
2003, to over US$1.9 billion since 2004. International aid increased by seventeen 
times overall between 1993 and 2009. To illustrate the intensity of aid dependency, 
from 2004 onwards aid represented between 24% and 42% of GDP. Per capita aid 
for the same period averaged around US$530 per year, ranging from a low of 
US$306 in 2005 to US$761 in 2009 (OECD-DAC 2014). 
Yet despite the sheer volume of aid, the socio-economic indicators show an ultimate 
failure in Palestine’s case. Using the consumption-based definition of poverty, 
26.2% of the Palestinians lived in poverty in 2009 and 2010: 19% in the West Bank 
and 38% in Gaza. By using the income-based definition of poverty, the reality can be 
understood to be much worse, with 50% of Palestinians living in poverty in 2009 and 
2010: 38% in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza (MAS 2012).
78
 According to the 
World Food Programme (2011), 50% of Palestinian households suffered from food 
insecurity: 33% were food-insecure and 17% were vulnerable to food insecurity. 
Unemployment has remained constant at around 30% since 2009, with 47% 
unemployed in Gaza in 2010 and 20% in the West Bank. The unemployment rate for 
Palestinian youth under 30 is particularly alarming at 43% (Bisan 2011; UNRWA 
2011). The income and opportunities inequality gap continues to widen not only 
between the West Bank and Gaza, but also within the West Bank (Khalidi 2011a). 
Manufacturing and production capacities continue to erode (Smith 2011), while the 
vital agriculture sector remains sorely neglected (Abdelnour et al. 2012). The 
celebrated economic growth of 7.1% in 2008, 7.4% in 2009 and 9.3% in 2010, was a 
jobless growth driven by aid with an eroded productive base, anti-poor, and reflected 
an economy which was recovering from a low base (PASSIA 2009; Bahour 2011; 
UNCTAD 2011; IMF 2013).  
The aid-development dilemma exemplifies outcomes of the de-development process, 
despite all international aid (Roy 1987, 1999). Aid administered as a “gap-filler” and 
“fire extinguisher solution for persistent crisis” (Nakhleh 2004, 2011) served as a 
major pillar to guarantee the existence of the PA, and rescued the Palestinian society 
                                                          
78
 Despite the claims of enhanced ownership in the process of development planning, particularly in 
anti-poverty policies, Safadi et al. (2015:34) based on original set of interviews with policy makers 
unsurprisingly concluded that “international donor organizations continue to exert extraordinary 
influence on the policy-making process through financial and technical assistance”. 
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from further deteriorating of living conditions (Barsalou 2003; Said 2005; Abdel 
Majeed 2010; Tartir 2011). However, aid helped to sustain the status quo, subsidise 
the occupation, and contribute to the de-development process as a result of the 
diplomatic failures (Anderson 2005; Lasensky 2005; Keating et al. 2005). These 
failures exhibited an inability to understand or acknowledge the de-development 
process; unwillingness to address the main problems for such de-development (the 
Israeli military occupation); and finally the adoption of an irrelevant post-conflict 
conceptual framework (Abdel Karim 2005; Taghdisi-Rad 2011; Wildeman 2012; 
Tartir 2012b).  
At the scholarly level, four schools of thought can be identified to better understand 
the aid-related contention.
79
 One group can be termed “instrumentalist”. This mainly 
includes the international financial institutions and many bilateral government donor 
agencies, and argues that the fundamentals of the Oslo economic framework are 
sound and the model should be maintained but simply needs to be better applied. 
This group tends to sanitise the Israeli occupation and the settler colonial nature of 
the Israeli state. It also lays a disproportionate amount of blame on the PA for the 
failure of aid to achieve results. A second group, the “critical instrumentalists”, does 
focus on the occupation as the main obstacle to peace and development, and they 
consider aid and politics to be intrinsically linked. They are not however very critical 
of the neoliberal normative values that define Palestinian aid. They believe the 
policy should be re-evaluated and retooled, and they share the instrumentalist faith in 
the ability of policy to bring about positive change. 
The third group consists of “critics” of the Oslo aid model. Many in this group assert 
that the aid model is itself a part of the occupation, because it is designed in a way 
that subverts Palestinian development while reinforcing and subsidizing the Israeli 
occupation, along with longstanding Israeli policies dating back to the 1948 Nakba 
and beyond. For these critics, development is not a policy to be implemented, but 
domination to be resisted, because in the case of Israel-Palestine, the hidden intent 
behind development aid is to reinforce the occupation. The “critics” argue that 
economic integration benefits Israel at the expense of the Palestinian economy and 
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 The classification of critics and instrumentalists was outlined in David Mosse’s ethnography of aid 
policy and practice ‘Cultivating Development (Mosse 2005).   
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they view policy as a rationalising technical discourse that conceals a hidden 
bureaucratic power or dominance, and that this hidden reality is the true political 
intention of development (Nakhleh 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Khalidi and 
Taghdisi-Rad 2009; Tartir et al. 2012). 
A fourth group, which is not often considered when analysing the impact of aid, is  
the “neo-colonialists”, who consider aspects of foreign aid to have been a success. 
Particularly in the West Bank, Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation has 
largely been mollified and Israel’s policy aims have largely been achieved. This 
perspective is highly influential, especially in the US, and can be seen in the 
approach of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy advocating an approach to 
aid. This approach provides economic incentives to Palestinians in return for them 
giving up rights. Also, the Congressional Research Service reports spell out the duty 
of aid to Palestinians: combating terrorism against Israel; encouraging Palestinian 
peaceful coexistence with Israel while preparing Palestinians for self-governance; 
and meeting humanitarian needs to prevent further destabilisation (Zanotti 2013). 
Therefore, when aid to Palestinians is analysed from a neo-colonial perspective, it 
may not be failing at all.  
This chapter argues that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the debate and 
contention around the aid industry and donor policies in the OPT, and the PA 
economic policies, have moved beyond the scholarly and élite circles onto the 
Palestinian streets. As a result, there have been numerous protests which, despite 
being small in size, constitute a form of contentious collective action. They formed 
cycles of contention and were one of the driving forces behind the resignation of 
Prime Minister Fayyad in mid-2013. 
Targeting the aid industry and donors’ policies, multiple protests took place between 
2011 and 2013. There were mainly organised by the youth movements which 
emerged in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. USAID was the major target of the 
protests, particularly during the 2012 Obama visit to the OPT. “USAID go out”, 
“USAID is entrenching the occupation and hindering our development”, “we reject 
funding that undermines the exercise of our self-determination”, are a sample of the 
slogans that appeared in a protest against USAID on September 10, 2011 in 
Ramallah (Al-Herak Al-Shababi Al-Mustaqel 2011). Posters critical of USAID were 
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designed by youth activists and disseminated over social media, in activist circles 
and among the public.
80
 USAID was not the only target; the European Union 
Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) (Palestinians 
for Dignity 2012a) was targeted for their role in supporting Palestinian 
authoritarianism, and due to the European Union’s “hypocritical and duplicitous 
positions towards the Palestinian people and rights”. The youth even warned that 
they will escalate their actions to include direct confrontation with those who 
facilitate the work of the occupation and normalisation (Palestinians for Dignity 
2012a). The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Al-Quds Newspaper 
2013) and the European Union were targeted for their role in supporting and 
organizing normalisation activities and sponsoring joint Palestinian-Israeli projects. 
Even The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was under criticism for 
not assuming its responsibilities in protecting Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.  
Forms of protest included occupying offices (sit-ins) as in the case of ICRC, 
blocking entrances to offices and protesting at 7 a.m. in front of the EUPOL COPPS 
offices; waiting for USAID representatives with shoes in front of a conference they 
were sponsoring; holding slogans against USAID during Obama’s visit; and 
organizing a peaceful gathering in front of the Japanese embassy in Ramallah. A 
particular form of protest was designing posters and visuals to convey the message 
and spread it over social media. This proved to be a very influential tool to raise 
awareness among people and move the discussion about aid from the intellectual 
élite circles to the people in their homes in the form of a poster, song, or novel. 
Additionally, a number of youth-led initiatives were launched precisely to counter 
the status of aid dependency, promote concepts and practices of self-reliance, and 
revive the traditions of collective actions and voluntarism.      
The protests were not only against the donor community and their policies and 
practices, but also against the PA’s neoliberal economic policies and the rising cost 
of living. People protested against the income tax law, the increase in the value 
added taxes, the prices of fuel and gas, and the early retirement law. Public servants 
protested for not receiving their salaries due to the financial crisis of the PA. Other 
                                                          
80
 Posters designers Hafez Omar (Walls) and Walid Idris (Palestine Posters) were key figures in this 
domain.  
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economic demands of the protestors concerned price controls on basic goods, public 
investment, the protection of local producers, a cap on top earners in the public 
sector, and the introduction of minimum wage (Samour 2014:72). But most 
importantly, the overall Oslo economic framework and Paris Protocol (the economic 
annex of the Oslo Peace Accords) were major targets of the protesters.
81
 This formed 
the ultimate exemplification of the marriage between political and economic 
protests. In September 2012 for instance demonstrations took place throughout the 
West Bank. Protests were characterised by road closures, tire burning, self-
immolations or attempts to do so, peaceful demonstrations, stone throwing, clashes 
with the PA security forces, and workers' strikes. 
In a major protest against the Paris Protocol on September 11, 2012, Palestinians for 
Dignity (the umbrella for the youth movements post-2011) stated in their press 
release and call for action that, 
…building upon the popular anger that rejects being turned into 
beggars who are preoccupied with making a living instead of our 
national struggle, Palestinians for Dignity calls upon you to join a 
mass march to demand: Social justice and the termination of the 
Paris Economic Protocol…Let us all emerge from our silence and 
tolerance of the Palestinian Authority’s dependence on the 
Occupying State, the rampant corruption in our institutions, and 
our leadership that no longer has options, only justifications 
(Palestinians for Dignity 2012b). 
Meanwhile, as was argued by the economist Raja Khalidi in 2012, “a series of 
sarcastic, graphic postings and humorous songs on Palestinian youth 
internet/Facebook networks depict a series of accusations against the PA 
encompassing grievances about Ministerial privileges, urban and rural poverty, 
runaway prices, and political dysfunction” (Khalidi 2012:4). In turn, the protests 
against the rapid increase in the cost of living could be summarised by the words of a 
protestor who told me during a protest in Ramallah, “we receive the salaries of 
Somalia and pay the prices of Switzerland”. A poster that was widely circulated 
stated clearly that “subjugation will lead to a revolution”. 
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The results and implications of these protests were mixed depending on their 
sustainability and regularity, demands’ ceilings, repression and co-option attempts 
by the PA, and the political trajectories.
82
 A notable example includes the protests 
against the income tax law in January 2012. As noted by Raja Khalidi, “this Law is 
notable for being the most significant, if not first-ever, economic measure since 2005 
to be rejected by public outcry. In January, the PA was obliged to announce its 
suspension and reformulation after a “public dialogue””(Khalidi 2012:4). The 
protests against the Paris Protocol were not successful in changing that Protocol or 
dismissing it, but they accumulated enough anger that its rejection became a popular 
demand.
83
  
Regardless of the final results, the cycles of contention and contentious collective 
actions over the last three years indicate that despite the demobilizing policies of 
Fayyadism and the authoritarian transformation, Palestinians remain able to clash 
with the repressive authorities and engage in contentious collective actions, albeit at 
very small numbers if compared with the past. As Sobhi Samour summarised it: 
Within just a few days, the protests helped to counter the 
ubiquitous feeling of collective apathy, created a vehicle for 
widespread public discussion around the political economy of the 
Oslo framework, and produced initial victories by forcing the PA 
to reverse tax and price increases and its decision to table a 
proposal for a minimum wage law (Samour 2014:73). 
In this realm of contentious politics and economics, it is crucial to acknowledge the 
limitations and contradictions of the contention. A major challenge for the cycles of 
contention in the OPT, discussed above, is to overcome their very own 
contradictions, and face collectively the attempts of the authorities to suppress and 
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 With the emergence of the economic protests in the OPT, the Israeli government voluntarily 
transferred an advance payment of PA tax revenues collected by Israel, and Israel also asked the EU 
and the US to grant more funds to the PA. Additionally, they lifted a number of checkpoints in the 
West Bank and issued more permits for Palestinian workers to work in Israel and its colonies in the 
West Bank. This was due to Israeli fears that these economic protests could turn into an intifada 
against the PA and Israel and threaten the overall framework of the Oslo Peace Accords. 
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 Put simply, the Paris Protocol institutionalized Israel’s total control over the Palestinian economy 
and necessitated that the PA would follow the decisions taken by Israel in relation to taxes and prices. 
As summarized by Samour, the Paris Protocol “gave Israel the right to collect monthly trade taxes on 
the PA’ s behalf (thus seizing leverage over roughly two-thirds of the PA’ s total revenues); to set the 
PA’ s VAT rate at a level no less than two percentage points below that of Israel despite the enormous 
difference in the size of the two economies and personal incomes (so as not to threaten Israeli 
producers); and to force the PA to import fuel and electricity from Israel at Israeli consumer prices” 
(Samour 2014:72). For further elaboration, read Husseini and Khalidi (2013). 
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co-opt them. In the theories of contentious politics, Sidney Tarrow rightly reminds 
us that “although movements usually conceive of themselves as outside of and 
opposed to institutions, acting collectively inserts them into complex political 
networks, and thus within the reach of the state” (Tarrow 2012:34). This reminder is 
extremely relevant to the case of Palestine, particularly within the overall framework 
of Palestinian authoritarianism and Israeli colonisation. 
 Challenging Authorities: Towards a Viable Resistance 5.5.
Economy Model 
Critics of the aid industry, donors’ policy prescriptions, and the PA economic 
policies, have not only passively critiqued but also actively provided contributions, 
albeit fragmented, to an alternative paradigm that moves away from neoliberalism. 
These attempts illustrate an ultimate challenge to the authorities and their dominant 
models (Abdel Karim 2009; Abdel Karim and Sbieh 2011; Cali 2012; Bisan 2013; 
Farsakh 2014). They are acts of resistance that fit into contentious economics and 
politics frameworks. These contentious actions lay at the heart of reclaiming 
economic rights both in theory and practice. And therefore, this chapter views these 
efforts as contributing towards building a model of a resistance economy. 
This chapter defines the resistance economy, through a developmental lens, as a 
model that understands the development process as a cumulative, complementary, 
economic, social and political one that fundamentally seeks to liberate human beings 
from dependency and humiliation. Philosophically, the concept of a “resistance 
economy” is a process that sets out to emancipate human beings by freeing them 
from poverty, inequality, fear and oppression, empowering them to cultivate their 
lands, and expanding their options, capabilities and potentials to ensure their 
happiness. As such, this socially-inclusive model rejects economic unity with the 
colonizing power and resists attempts to sustain the status of asymmetric 
containment. In other words, the model is the opposite of the Paris Protocol, working 
at dismantling the regime of oppression and acting as a model that is socially 
inclusive, and which can ultimately play a role in ending the occupation and 
colonisation of Palestine.  
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On this basis, this chapter argues that a resistance economy is a very real alternative 
that can, through a good system of collaboration and creativity, be implemented and 
maintained for a sustainable and progressive Palestinian economy. It begins by 
understanding economy as more than a monetary transaction for financial profit. 
Instead, the economy should be understood and viewed as an extension of a people’s 
mode de vie that connects through the intersection of the global and local efforts. A 
resistance economy is an indigenous approach which is well-rooted in Palestinian 
history and in the pre-PA era, long before the monopolisation of the Palestinian 
economy by the development-industrial-complex (Tartir in Amrov 2013).  
Put differently, the neoliberal Fayyadism model and the resistance economy model 
are based on fundamentally different rationales and lead different paths. Neoliberal 
Fayyadism is a top-down approach, while resistance economy is socially inclusive 
and built from below. Neoliberal Fayyadism is a model that is inherently unable and 
unwilling to clash with the occupying power, but rather cooperates and lives with it. 
Neoliberal Fayyadism is a local phenomenon sponsored externally, while resistance 
economy is an indigenous, locally rooted and sponsored model. Neoliberal 
Fayyadism focuses on institution building while resistance economy is about the 
people. If neoliberal Fayyadism is about standards and neoliberal governance, 
resistance economy is about rights and the national struggle. While one is centred on 
individualism, the other is focused on collectivism. Resistance economy then is not 
only about resisting the Israeli control of Palestinian economy, but also about being 
courageous enough to self-reflect about mistakes that are being made within the 
Palestinian socio-economic environment. 
Interestingly, the youth movement in the OPT provided its own definition for the 
resistance economy model and spelled out a number of its pillars. In their 2012 press 
release, mentioned earlier, they were asked: What is the solution? Is there really a 
solution? This is what they answered: 
Of course there is an alternative. The alternative is an economic 
resistance that can achieve a redistribution of resources, social 
justice, and dignity for the Palestinian people. This is not just a 
slogan! The most important alternative steps we can take are: to 
start a comprehensive boycott of all Israeli products; to refuse to 
adhere to the Paris Protocol and to call on the Palestinian Authority 
to announce this explicitly; to impose high taxes on imported 
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products to protect our national products and agriculture; to 
reclaim the Palestinian lands dubbed “Areas C” that comprise 60% 
of the West Bank, to unite these areas with the rest of the West 
Bank; to work together to plant these lands; and to establish 
agricultural cooperatives to fulfil local needs. Furthermore, there 
are many other ideas that Palestinian economists can put forth if 
there is only the political will to implement suggestions and rid 
ourselves of economic dependency (Palestinians for Dignity 
2012b). 
Other scholars and practitioners defined resistance economy as part and parcel of the 
liberation process. In an interview with, Rena Zuabi, a sustainable human and 
environmental developmental specialist, she stated that:   
The goal of the resistance economy is to build Palestinian self-
determination and unification as part and parcel of the liberation 
process. It forges communities’ mechanisms and processes of 
resistance by increasing community interdependence and self-
sufficiency. Therefore, the resistance economy is not a prototypical 
economic development concept. The resistance economy does not 
expand vertically i.e. it is not in the business of neoliberal 
institution building and it is not building an industrialised, 
globalised economy. The goal of the resistance economy is not to 
measure productivity per se, but to measure levels of community 
interdependence and self-sufficiency. It requires horizontal growth 
across the grassroots, using local capital resources. The resistance 
economy undermines international obsession with the Palestinian 
victim, and instead focus on the strengths, power, and resources of 
the Palestinian people. It puts meaning back into the notion of 
agency in development. The resistance economy merges the 
economic, the political, the social. It is an organic product of the 
Palestinian reality (Zuabi 2014). 
From the same point of departure but from a different perspective, political 
economist, Ibrahim Shikaki, argued that:  
The goal of resistance economy is very much a political one; on the 
short run dismantling the dependency relations with the Israeli 
economy and satisfy local demand. And on the long run resistance 
economy is part of a wider strategy of resistance meant to end 
Israeli colonialism. Therefore, resistance economy is not envisaged 
to be a viable long-term alternative. The role of economic 
resistance is similar to that of military resistance, culture 
resistance, BDS and political resistance; attrition. The asymmetric 
balance of power is a core feature of the Palestinian liberation 
process; therefor the role of any resistance/steadfastness strategy is 
attrition of the coloniser on all arenas. After all, the social 
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component is also imperative, since the sense of collectiveness is 
crucial for any resistance/steadfastness strategy (Shikaki 2014). 
However, there are few prerequisites to ensure the viability of the resistance 
economy model. These prerequisites include, but are not limited to, the need to 
reinvent the aid industry practically; redefine development conceptually; utilise 
indigenous approaches for livelihood and governance; resist and reject the Israeli 
matrix of control beyond rhetoric; and resist and challenge any form of Palestinian 
authoritarianism. In other words, Palestinians need an economy that reinforces 
solidarity, social ties and accumulates social capital and national cohesion. This can 
be done through subjecting the market and its transactions and mechanisms to the 
principles of equality, justice and local democratic inclusive participation in the 
processes of decision-making. The economy should be placed within societal 
dynamics, rather than restricting and containing the society through economic 
dynamics. The challenge remains on how to operationalise these prerequisites. 
This alternative framework provides a different approach to the much-criticised aid 
industry that considers development as a technocratic, apolitical and neutral process. 
Shifting towards a model that recognises structures of power and relations of 
colonial dominance (Nagarajan 2012), and which rearticulates processes of 
development as being linked to the struggle for rights, resistance and emancipation 
requires problematizing the mainstream notion of development as one which is 
centred on free-market economy, toward shifting the focus into people-centred 
participatory democratic approaches and steadfastness/Al-Summud strategies 
(Barghouti 2011). Such an approach also implies shifting the framework of the 
humanitarian assistance from ‘destroying agency’ toward ‘promoting solidarity’ 
(Tabar 2012), and problematizing the liberal notion of individualism that is 
associated with and reproduced through donor democracy schemes as an alternative 
to the grassroots participatory democratic forms and processes (Nakhleh 2004, 2011; 
Samara 2005; CDS-BZU 2011; Al-Kadri 2011a,b; 2014). In other words, the 
alternative economic vision has to sit at the heart of the Palestinian struggle and 
follow a genuine bottom-up participatory citizen-centric development model. This 
model needs to be legitimate. Therefore there is also a need to think about how 
Palestinians can institutionalise and create a bureaucracy around a democratic 
people-driven development agenda.  
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These theoretical understandings and propositions were coupled with initiatives on 
the ground that aim to examine the viability of the resistance economy model, and as 
in, by extension the social mobilisation that practices contentious economics. These 
forms of mobilisation utilised different tools that are normally used in building-up 
social movements. Such tools include public awareness about certain issues; 
lobbying for change at the policy level; working with and mobilizing grassroots 
communities; working directly with neglected and marginalised actors; building-up 
different discourse through innovative media outlets, and finally publishing books, 
composing music and different forms of arts and poster designs. What is vital about 
these initiatives, as far as the contentious politics and economic theories are 
concerned, is their courageous determination to challenge and confront the 
authorities while representing and empowering others. 
These initiatives as a practice of contentious economics include for instance the work 
of Bisan Centre for Research and Development on the importance of raising public 
awareness to create cycles of contention. In particular, the initiative they took against 
the neoliberal joint industrial zones in the West Bank is a case in point. The work of 
Dalia Association through engagement with grassroots communities and 
marginalised women groups in rural areas, built the case for the importance of self-
determination in the aid industry and development process. Other civil society 
organisations working in the agriculture sector, such as MA'AN Development Center 
and The Union of Agricultural Work Committees, are particularly important in 
contributing to the building blocks of the resistance economy and the agriculture 
sector.  
The research production of critical institutions such as the Center for Development 
Studies at Birzeit University was a crucial base for informing the alternative agenda. 
The policy-oriented production of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian policy Network 
provided a cutting edge analysis that informed activism in the streets, in addition to 
the impact at the public policy level. Finally, newly established media outlets, 
particularly by youth, such as Quds News Network, played an invaluable role in 
disseminating information and increasing public awareness. Media was not the only 
form of communication, but also artists and writers devoted their effort to this 
matter. Novels which protested the consequence of neoliberalism were under 
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unprecedented demand. Posters’ designers who were among the youth activists were 
influential in their production to fuel activism, and the same goes for songs, films 
and theatre plays. Such micro-examples constitute a component of the overall 
framework of the resistance economy. However, these cycles of contention are still 
fragmented, and the channels which allow them to contribute to the framework of 
resistance economy are still a work-in-progress that had accelerated in the aftermath 
of the Arab uprisings. 
 Conclusion 5.6.
The entrenchment of the neoliberal economic policies during the Fayyadism era, 
backed with the international community and their financial assistance, triggered 
activism -despite limited- in the streets of the West Bank in the aftermath of the 2011 
Arab uprisings. The policies of the neoliberal Fayyadism deepened the crisis of 
legitimacy, sustained the de-development process, and directly and indirectly 
entrenched the Israeli military occupation and the colonial condition. The fragilities, 
limitations and harmful consequences of the Fayyadism paradigm, pointed out to the 
need for a viable alternative that is able to start a process of reversing the de-
development condition. Critical scholars and intellectuals, coupled with the work of 
a number of Palestinian institutions, initiated a process of operationalizing the 
concept of resistance economy.    
Using the theories of contentious politics and social movements, this chapter aimed 
to understand the economic-related protests in the OPT in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings. The analysis showed that these protests constituted cycles of contention 
but failed to transform into a social movement. However, these protests and the tools 
and approaches they used, showed that they illustrated a form of contentious 
collective actions where multiple actors joined forces to challenge and confront 
authorities of repression and oppression. Although protests were not backed by well-
structured social networks or galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented 
symbols, they managed to challenge neoliberalism and suggest an alternative 
paradigm through intellectual efforts and actions on the ground, one which could 
build towards a model of resistance economy. The notion of resistance economy was 
used to reflect on the broader dynamics of contentious politics theories and 
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contribute to its expansion through introducing the concept and the practice of 
contentious economics. 
The focus of this chapter was not on the analysis of the reasons that contributed to 
the failure of cycles of contention to transform into a social movement in the OPT in 
the aftermath of Arab uprising. Rather, the roots and sources of such contention were 
explored through discussing the consequences of the neoliberal economic policies, 
and the impact of international aid. The notion of a resistance economy was 
advanced as an ultimate expression of contentious politics and economics, and as a 
framework that theorises and operationalises the cycles of contention in the era of 
Arab uprisings and Fayyadism. However, efforts to establish an alternative model in 
an ultimate expression of clashing with the repressive authorities, remain fragmented 
or repressed. This is the reason why these contentious politics and economics in the 
OPT have not yet emerged as a social movement in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings. But as a social movement society, for Palestinians, the pillars and roots of 
contentious economics are political in nature and are subject to social dynamics that, 
in instances of contention, are stirred by injustice and inequality. 
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6. Conclusion  
This thesis consisted of five chapters/articles and explored the overarching themes of 
governance and state-building in the occupied West Bank, with particular focus on 
the time when Dr. Salam Fayyad was the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority 
between 2007 and 2013. It explored dimensions of the Fayyadist paradigm for state-
building and its associated style of governance that ruled the occupied West Bank 
primarily during this time. This home-grown but externally funded and sponsored 
paradigm had polarised scholars and practitioners, however it equally fascinated 
them. For its proponents, Fayyadism, or the Fayyadist paradigm, was a technocratic 
revolution that re-invented the Palestinian Authority’s institutions and put the 
Palestinian Authority on the path for statehood and independence. For its critics, 
Fayyadism was an approach that sustained the Israeli occupation through masking 
the reality of the Israeli settler colonial domination with a rhetoric of aid-dependent 
institutional and state building. Despite these polarised perspectives, Fayyadism 
induced and was also associated with shifts and transformations in the Palestinian 
polity and its systems of governance, especially when compared to the era of 
Arafatism particularly between 1993 (establishment of the PA) and 2004 (death of 
Arafat). Examining the consequences of some of these transformations in the 
security and economic spheres on the daily lives of people, their security, and their 
ability to resist the Israeli occupation and the broader dynamics of the Palestinian 
struggle for freedom and liberation, constituted the main line of inquiry for this 
thesis and contribution to the body of knowledge in this realm. 
A central tenet of the Fayyadist paradigm was the dominance of security reform as a 
major pre-requisite for state-building. Thus, under Fayyadism the West Bank became 
a space for security amplification and security campaigns to induce “law and order”. 
This security amplification also extended and dominated the economic development 
sphere and created a securitised-development paradigm reinforced by a set of 
classical neoliberal economic policies prescribed by the major international financial 
institutions, albeit with their Palestinian flavour. Therefore, Fayyadism aimed at 
establishing a Weberian monopoly of violence in the security sphere and a post-
Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda in the economic sphere, despite the Israeli 
occupation and intra-Palestinian fragmentation.    
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This thesis tackled the transformations in the security sphere at three levels. First, 
through contextually analysing the evolution and reform processes of the Palestinian 
security forces between 1993 and 2013 (Chapter one). Second, through critically 
assessing and unpacking the Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on the findings of an 
ethnographic fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West 
Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the associated relevant 
literatures (Chapter two). Third, through tackling in-depth the consequences of the 
Fayyadist security campaigns -from the perspectives of the people- on their security 
and the broader dynamics of resistance against Israel (Chapter three). 
Furthermore, this thesis examined and analysed the transformations in the economic 
sphere at two levels. It addressed the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid 
industry to examine whether the transformations that occurred under the Fayyadist 
paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall framework of the aid industry 
(Chapter four). This thesis also utilised theories of contentious politics to analyse the 
implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic framework and 
policies and also the associated authoritarian transformations it induced (Chapter 
five), to expand the conceptual underpinnings of the contentious politics theories 
through proposing the notions of contentious economics and resistance economy.    
In sum, the core unit of analysis is the Fayyadist paradigm, and each chapter/article 
was devoted to addressing one aspect of it: the first chapter was concerned with 
contextualizing Fayyadism; the second chapter focused on understanding the 
paradigm itself; the third chapter examined the consequences of Fayyadism on the 
security of the Palestinian people; the fourth chapter critically examined the role of 
international donors and the aid industry in its policies; and the fifth and final chapter 
analysed the implications of Fayyadism’s neoliberal economic model through the 
application of a contentious politics and economics framework.  
Methodologically, this thesis employed a number of research methods and 
approaches. Due to its empirical and ethnographic design and contribution, the 
research fieldtrips to the occupied West Bank between 2010 and 2014 constituted the 
major source of its original contribution to the scholarly knowledge. The chapters 
that addressed the transformations in the security sphere (Chapters one, two, and 
three) deployed a bottom-up ethnographic approach, while the chapters that 
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addressed the economic sphere (Chapters four and five) deployed an experts semi-
structured interviews model combined with action-research and observation 
approach.   
Conceptually, the basis of the strategy of change underpinning Fayyadism’s pillars 
was an outcome of a set of strategic, institutional, and operational transformations, 
induced by the main governance actors in the occupied West Bank. In particular, the 
relationship between the Fayyadist paradigm and the notion and practice of 
resistance was the main common theme between the five chapters. Resistance in its 
broad and all-encompassing meaning was a central common theme that always 
exposed the fragility of the Fayyadist paradigm in both the security and economy 
spheres, as discussed and revealed by the ethnographic and empirical evidence. This 
thesis argued that the tensions around resistance, demonstrate the fundamental flaw 
of executing a security reform and pursuing a disarmament strategy and security 
campaigns in the absence of sovereign national authority, and in the presence of a 
foreign military occupation, without fundamentally addressing the imbalances of 
power. After all, Fayyadism aimed and claimed to build a state, reform its security 
forces and security doctrine, and adopt a set of neoliberal economic policies; yet, all 
of this was meant to happen in the absence of sovereignty and state.   
The ethnographic data and empirical evidence discussed in chapters revealed that 
despite the proclaimed institutional successes of Fayyadism, these achievements 
failed to have a meaningful impact on the basic rights of Palestinians or to the 
overall framework of the international aid industry. The voices from below 
articulated the detrimental effects Fayyadism has on resistance against the Israeli 
military occupation, and by extension on their own protection and security. The 
ethnographic evidence also suggested that the Fayyadism security campaigns 
resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its security 
forces operations which was manifested in the excessive use of arbitrary detention 
and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for opposition voices or 
resistance in the Palestinian polity. The voices from below pointed out that 
conducting security reform within a context of colonial occupation and without 
addressing the imbalances of power can only ever have two outcomes: “better” 
collaboration with the occupying power, and a violation of the security and 
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(national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own government and (national) 
security forces. This was manifested in authoritarian transformations; this time 
framed in a state-building and good governance project. Therefore, the enhanced 
functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that 
was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in the criminalisation 
of resistance against the Israeli occupation; in this way, Fayyadism directly and 
indirectly sustained the occupation. Therefore, the shifts and transformations that 
occurred during the Fayyadist paradigm in occupied Palestine resulted in two major 
outcomes: criminalising resistance and entrenching neoliberalism. 
Beyond this fundamental and macro conclusion, the following sub-sections of this 
conclusion reflect further on the notion of the “new Palestinian” as an illustration of 
the transformation that occurred under Fayyadism, and also discuss and explain the 
Palestinian in-fighting. Additionally, this conclusion discusses in length the outcome 
of a very brief visit to both Balata and Jenin refugee camps in June 2015. It also 
engages in a discussion on the “self-assessment” exercise conducted by Fayyad to 
“self-evaluate” Fayyadism and test its philosophy further through the operations of 
his new development enterprise/foundation. The conclusion ends with a detailed 
reflection on the future avenues for research with some additional focus on the 
operationalisation of the notion of resistance economy.      
The “New Palestinian”  
The notion of the “new Palestinian- al-Falastini al-Jadeed” could encapsulate the 
transformation that the Palestinian society and its social fabric has gone through 
during the Fayyadism era, particularly in the security sphere. From the perspective of 
the Fayyadist paradigm and its international backers, the Palestinian Fidaie’ 
(freedom fighter) is a main obstacle for peace and state building and constitutes a 
backward element in this modern era. This “new Palestinian” meant that the leaders 
of the PA’s security establishment were upgraded to senior positions in the political 
leadership or in municipalities and governorates. The “old guards” of the PA’s 
security forces were replaced with new leadership, with fresh blood, new mentality, 
and western training. The technocratic approach extended to the PA’s security 
establishment as part of the new security doctrine of the PA. The “new Palestinians” 
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were not only the “moderate, peaceful, civil, and realistic/pragmatic” leaders at the 
top level, but also they exist at the micro level.  
For instance, the politics of recruiting in the PA’s security forces had new criteria. A 
process of security vetting became a pre-requisite for the recruited security 
personnel, particularly the ones who are selected for training in Jordan or Jericho 
under the supervision of the US Security Coordinator (USSC) mission. The recruited 
members in the national security forces must have a clear and clean security history 
with no political afflation in opposition parties or any past in armed groups, 
including the Fatah’s one, or any record in resisting the occupation even in peaceful 
ways. The recruited soldiers are young, mostly between 19-22 years old, who go 
through an intense training process, or what critics call, “brainwashing sessions”. 
The “new Palestinian” became to be the professional, well-trained security 
personnel, who follows a clear chain of command, and ensure the sustainability of 
security collaboration with Israel to impose stability and public order. The filtering 
process based on the security check-up and clean records, and the emergence of a 
new segment in the structure of Palestinian society, had its impact on the social 
dynamics as the “new Palestinians” were perceived by a considerable portion of the 
Palestinian population as a new repression tool in the hands of an authoritarian 
authority who claim to be build a state, but effectively, they argued, it entrenched 
and reinforced the Israeli occupation and the structures of control and oppression.           
Explaining and Contextualising Palestinian In-Fighting                  
Although it can be argued that the “new Palestinian” is an outcome of the Fayyadist 
paradigm, however, it is safe to conclude that the notion of the “Palestinian-against-
Palestinian” is not an outcome of the Fayyadist paradigm per se. It has existed 
historically, but was institutionalised and standardised and became officially 
embedded in the operations of the PA’s security apparatuses during the Fayyadism 
era. The trajectories that the Palestinian national movement passed through, and the 
politics of the PLO, led to multiple clashes among the Palestinians, mainly while in 
exile in the seventies and eighties. The leadership of the PLO, represented by Arafat, 
was accused of silencing and assassinating voices from the Palestinian opposition, 
which represented another form of the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” notion. With 
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the establishment of the PA, the intra-Palestinian fighting and torturing took on a 
new form, through for example, the creation of the PA Preventive Security Force’s 
Death Squad, which was tasked to arrest and torture the voices who opposed the 
Oslo Peace Accords during the Arafat era. The Palestinian authoritarian trends 
during Araftism were not only targeting political opposition, journalists or artists, but 
also other voices from the Palestinian civil society who called for accountability and 
transparency to tackle corruption. In 1999, twenty prominent academics, intellectuals 
and members of the PLC signed the “The Nation Calls Us" manifesto, to demand 
accountability and immediate tackling of corruption. The PA security forces arrested 
many of the signatories and accused them of threatening national unity. However, 
due to his popular legitimacy and as a legendary figure of the Palestinian revolution, 
Arafat considered himself as the father of the Palestinian nation/people and therefore 
dealt with such matters as the head of the family. It was a very common practice of 
Arafat to send one group to arrest, torture, threaten or harass someone, and the next 
day to send another group to check on that person and apologise indirectly. 
However, during the Fayyad era, these dynamics transformed to become further 
formalised and institutionalised in the security doctrine of the PA, as was explained 
in the previous chapters. These transformations were also associated with the further 
entrenchment of authoritarian trends and the criminalisation of resistance. The 
biggest and most harmful illustration of the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” 
happened in 2006 and 2007, and is lasting until today, when the two major political 
parties, Fatah and Hamas, engaged in a destructive process of internal-fighting that 
included horrific scenes of torturing and killing of Palestinians by Palestinians, that 
ultimately led to the intra Palestinian divide between West Bank and Gaza. It is 
precisely this fragmentation and the violence in Gaza during the intra-Palestinian 
clashes that led to Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, that triggered a new security doctrine in 
the West Bank under Fayyadism. This new security doctrine was defined by 
repressing any voices that aimed to question the PA, or threatened its rule, or impact 
the stability of the region and the security of Israel and the Israelis.
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domination of exclusion and fragmentation was fuelled, supported, and entrenched 
by regional and international actors through the conditionality of aid. In addition, 
Israel encouraged this divide as it makes its ability to rule and justify its aggression 
easier.  
The previous chapters illustrate how the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” notion was 
materialised and executed during the Fayyadism paradigm of state-building and 
security sector reform (a number of photos in the Appendix illustrate this further). 
The ultimate result was further fragmentation of the very fragmented Palestinian 
society. Territorial, social, political, and economic fragmentations became 
characteristics of the Palestinian reality. The lack of internal cohesion amongst 
Palestinians became a key reason for their weakness and their limited ability to 
exercise power to change the dynamics of the conflict and the imbalances of power 
embedded in it. The Israeli-induced fragmentation measures are also crucial for 
Israel to sustain its occupation and matrix of control. The UNDP’s Human 
Development Report (2010:15) argued that “the State of Israel has systematically 
segregated Palestinians communities into a series of fragmented archipelagos 
(referred to variously as isolated islands, enclaves, cantons, and Bantustans) under a 
system that has been deemed “one of the most intensively territorialized control 
systems ever created”. 
However, these elements of destructive fragmentation and Palestinian in-fighting do 
not exist in vacuum. The Palestinian society underwent major transformations over 
the last two decades. Sociologist Jamil Hilal argues that the Palestinian society 
underwent three major transformations, namely: the emergence of a political 
discourse that evicts Palestinians from history and geography and denies them a 
national identity; the escalation of collective repression, and settler-colonization; and 
the localization of Palestinian politics and the atomization of Palestinian society 
under the impact of settler-colonialism and neo-liberalism (Hilal 2015:1). These 
transformations had their repercussions on the collective resistance to settler-
colonialism, and the factors responsible for this regression in collective resistance are 
due to the “demise of national institutions, the vertical divisions within Palestinian 
politics, the atomization of society in the WBG, the accentuation of class inequality, 
the individualist and consumerist values in the prevailing neo-liberal setting, the 
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PA’s and NGOs’ dependency on external aid” (Hilal 2015:9). Anthropologist Ala 
Al-Azzeh due the lack of mass participation in anti-colonial resistance in the post-
Oslo Accords phase, to three internlinks factors: shifts in the mechanisms of colonial 
control, structural sociocultural changes, and discursive representations of popular 
resistance (Al-Azzeh 2015). These elements and outcomes have lasting implications 
on the Palestinian struggle for self-determination if they don’t be addressed urgently.   
Revisiting the Refugee Camps 
In June 2015, I went back to Palestine to put the final touches on this thesis. I visited 
both camps and met with some of the people that I interviewed during the main field 
research phase. I also managed to have a 30-minutes phone conversation with Dr. 
Salam Fayyad as he was travelling. The purpose of the follow-up visits to the camp 
was to pose a number of questions that emerged in the aftermath of the PhD viva, 
and to further validate some of my findings. “Business as usual”, is the main 
conclusion that emerged as a result of these visits. “All what had happened since we 
last met is that you and I got older, I was arrested by the PA for 17 days, I was fired 
from my job because of my political views, and I had a heart attack. Other than that, 
Al-Hamdulliah (thanks god) all is going well”, my 55 years old respondent with 
leftist political orientation from Jenin refugee camp told me. I asked my respondent 
about his neighbour whom I also interviewed earlier and promised him to come 
back, however my respondent smiled bitterly and answered, “well, he was fixing the 
washing machines two days ago [he is a technician], but now god knows what the 
PA security forces are doing with him. He was arrested from his workshop again for 
the same reason [being affiliate with Hamas] after the new collapse of the Fatah-
Hamas reconciliation”.  
At that point, I went to see the carpenter whom I also interviewed earlier in 2012 and 
who was suffering from deep psychological consequences due to his arrest and time 
spent in the PA jails. The workshop was closed, and the carpenter was at home in 
worse conditions and permanent disability in his hands [he used to shake severely 
when we met earlier and due to that he cut  his fingers], and unable to resume his 
life. I left his home heart-broken, but I still wanted to see some of the youth whom I 
had interviewed earlier in 2012. Many of them are still unemployed despite being 
Conclusion 
224 
 
university graduates, and another three migrated to Germany, Sweden, and Norway. 
One of the militants that I interviewed was killed by the Israeli army. I went to a 
number of women associations, but still faced similar trends of sadness and despair, 
and also some of their productive operations and initiatives that offered employment 
to women had stopped due to the lack of funding, support, or access to external 
markets. 
Fearing that I selected a biased and convenient sample, and wanting to avoid the 
usage of an anecdotal examples to generalise observations -while acknowledging 
that this follow up trip was mainly to sense what is going on-, I tried to listen to more 
promising stories. I talked to new people in the streets and narrow lanes of the camp 
and their shops, in the youth club, in the camp services committee, in the theatre, in 
front of the mosque, and even in the internet cafes. The overall picture hardly 
changed and the feeling of frustration was hitting me from everywhere. “Now we 
feel all the pain deep inside our bodies. Over the last few years, they [the PA’s 
security forces] were hitting our bodies through all their operations and we were just 
recipients of the shocked. Now it is sinking in and we feel what it means”, an angry 
Fatah member from Jenin refugee camp told me. I entered the internet café, two 
young men were sitting in the corner filling up an online application form to migrate 
to Canada. “There is nothing here, we need hope, security, work, and we deserve a 
better future. Enough suffering. Khalas, khalas, khalas (enough, enough, enough)”, 
one of the youth told me. I walked out of the camp to catch a taxi with the company 
of a key figure in the camp, and his message was straight-forward: “We live in 
vicious circles and in a permanent déjà vu. We are stuck, not only here in the camp, 
but all over Palestine. However, we as refugees, always –no matter what- pay the 
highest price”.  
Where is hope and how can we revive it, and where is the resilient and strong will 
spirit that characterises this camp? I asked him. “It is in our hearts, deep inside, and 
will never die” was the last sentence he told me before I jumped into the taxi, and 
left Jenin camp.  
In the previous chapters I argued that the structural transformations that occurred 
under the Fayyadist state-building project will have a long term and lasting impact, 
and the consequences will take some time to sink in and be felt further by the people. 
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The wide-spread feeling of frustration in Jenin refugee camp is due to multiple 
reasons and cannot be attributed to one reason only, or to the mere practices of the 
PA security forces. However, this points out to one of the main problems of the 
state-building project -which had an “expiry/completion date”- which is 
fundamentally problematic as the state-building venture is a process first and 
foremost. Additionally, people voiced out that if this state-building project is 
executed under a foreign military occupation in a settler colonial context, then this 
occupation and settler colonialism needs to vanish first, before a statehood is 
materialised. Otherwise, this state-building project will only create structural 
deficiencies in the overall societal dynamics in the short and long run, with some of 
these consequences more visible than others, and some requires more time to sink in 
and be felt as the above-mentioned brief elaboration clearly indicated.        
In contrast to the domination of authorities-made human suffering and frustration in 
Jenin refugee camp I witnessed in my “get-a-feel” ad-hoc trip in June 2015, the 
situation in Balata refugee camp was a little different and was clearly characterised 
by anger. The “traditional” security campaigns, political arrests, torturing practices, 
and other forms of resistance criminalisation are still taking place until today (this 
does not mean that it stopped in Jenin refugee camp, but it is extra intense in Balata 
as of summer 2015 (Mulder 2015)). Just the night before I visited the camp in June 
2015, the PA security forces and their head-covered commandos, under the 
supervision of the relatively new governor of Nablus who is also coming from the 
security establishment, raided the camp aggressively to arrest a number of ex-
militant/militant from Fatah, two affiliates with Hamas, and one affiliate with the 
Islamic Jihad. The main street of the camp was full of stones that people, youth, kids 
and women threw on the security forces, according to eye-witnessed I talked to. The 
next morning people closed the main street outside and in front of the camp as a sign 
of protest against the PA. From the perspective of the governorate and security 
forces, the rationale was straightforward: there are criminals and thugs in these 
camps who need to be arrested in order to induce law and order. 
The aggression and anger I felt in the camp against the governor and PA security 
personnel was remarkable, and in some cases very personal. During our 
conversation, a local Fatah leader in the camp who is known for his public criticism 
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of the governor and security forces stated bluntly: “we are truly bored of this 
continuous attempts to silence us and keep portraying us in the media and to the 
people and leadership that we are a group of thugs, criminals, drugs dealers, the boys 
of Mohammad Dahlan, and the trouble makers. I just don’t understand why we are 
under continuous attack. Is it because of our Facebook statuses that call for 
accountability and transparency and reform of Fatah?”. Another senior Fatah 
member told me, “well, earlier this year I took three wanted ex-militants to the PA 
security forces to have a conversation as they had requested, and as agreed after a 
mediation meeting with the governor. However, I still don’t understand why they 
tortured them, accuse them of threating the national security, and until today they are 
still in the prison. This is not how issues should be solved, neither how the rule of 
law should be enforced. This is a proper police state practices that generate and re-
generate repression and oppression, and with the absence of trust and a horizon for 
solutions, all this will lead to explosion eventually”. 
It was truly remarkable that some of the people remembered what they told me years 
ago, and they were proud of their ability to predict the future, despite it being an 
unpleasant future according to them. “We thought there would be an end to the 
aggression, however it has become part of the norm now to the extent that is 
embedded in our dreams/nightmares”, a theatre trainer and social activist told me. He 
continued by arguing, “there is an obvious political impasse and we are used as a 
scapegoat. Camps and marginalised refugees are always easy targets, but they 
exhausted us and exhausted everything here, and I just don’t understand why we are 
still targeted”. 
By visiting two women associations, three local NGOs, the clinic, and the youth 
club, the message was rather consistent: “things are similar to when we last met. It 
feels as if we are seeing the same movie over and over again”, was a statement by a 
local female community leader that  summarises the persistence of the status quo. 
The largest refugee camp in the West Bank, Balata, felt more crowded with further 
social tensions, and on the edge of explosion. “We, the people live in a pressure 
cooker that can explode anytime, and there are so many cooks around [PA security 
forces, governors, and also local camp leaders] fighting about when/if to open it. 
Sometimes they agree and we feel things are calmer, other times they disagree and 
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they start fighting and we, the people, get suffocated” was the last sentence I heard 
while leaving Balata refugee camp.  
The persistence of the dire status quo, and the cycles of oppression and repression, 
testified that indeed business is as usual and people continue to pay the highest price. 
This reflects the dynamics of a political system that does not give a space for the 
voices from below, for the people. The crisis of legitimacy and the trust gap, 
therefore, continue to expand, and as one respondent told me, “all of this is just to 
please the coloniser. In this settler-colonial context, we as Palestinians fight against 
each other to entrench the Israeli colonial dominance instead of uniting to address 
our fragmentation to resist the Israeli settler colonial regime”. With that sad reality 
check, I left Balata camp. 
Going back to the field for a very quick visit in June 2015 was indeed a challenging 
methodological choice. However the very brief visits to Balata and Jenin refugee 
camps illustrated even more explicitly than before the detrimental consequences and 
the multiple levels of contradictions and tensions as a result of conducting a standard 
Weberian security sector reform under a foreign military occupation and settler 
colonialism before addressing the asymmetry of power relations. Then, security 
reform, in the way it was conducted by the PA, can be seen at best as a tool that 
reinforced the status quo and therefore helped the occupying force and its colonial 
project in tightening the control on the occupied and colonised people using local 
tools and “national authorities”. The cases of Balata and Jenin refugee camps expose 
the fragility of a state-building project in the absence of a political solution, national 
sovereignty, and a representative and legitimate leadership. A distorted state-
building project, as the one of the Palestinian Authority in the post-2007 era, resulted 
in structural deficiencies and transformations that did not only bring detrimental 
consequences for the lives of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and their 
ability to resist the occupation, but they also had detrimental consequences on the 
overall Palestinian struggle for freedom and self-determination, this thesis concludes.   
Fayyadism Self-Assessment  
I intended to counter the voices from below, with the assessment of Fayyad himself 
after some time of being outside the prime minster office. In my phone conversation 
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with Dr. Salam Fayyad in June 2015, I mainly aimed for a reflection on Fayyadism 
by its creator. “The answer for this request is ready as we conducted an objective 
evaluation and wrote in the newly released UNDP’s Human Development Report for 
Palestine”, Fayyad answered. 
The UNDP’s Human Development Report 2015 for Palestine was written by a team 
led by Salam Fayyad. The team was mainly composed of a number of staff and 
board member of his newly established development company (Future for 
Palestine). While the selection of Fayyad’s team by the UNDP remains questionable 
and lacks transparency, the team selection poses methodological concerns and 
inherent biases. The report team is in complete harmony, and the report itself is akin 
to a self-assessment exercise for the post-2007 state-building project by those who 
executed that very state-building project. In a way, such setting, reflects the vicious 
circles of the development industry, I would argue. That said, the report concluded 
that the overall status “of human development in Palestine based on traditional 
indicators shows limited relative progress in recent years compared to earlier 
periods” (UNDP 2015:67); and that “while some have had a positive impact, on the 
whole there has been a marked deterioration in the state of Palestinian empowerment 
over the past four years” (UNDP 2015:18). The reasons for this deterioration is not 
the policies of Fayyadism though, according to Fayyad and his team, but due to other 
political reasons.        
For Fayyad, the plan for the state-building project under his premiership constituted 
“a fully integrated political vision in the sense of it being an instrument for 
capitalizing on the success in doing the necessary, namely, preparing for statehood, 
to bolster the case for ending the Israeli occupation by discrediting the various 
pretexts that had effectively, albeit unfairly, conditioned the Palestinians' 
fundamental right of self-determination on their success in demonstrating that they 
were state-worthy” (UNDP 2015:18). Therefore, the implementation of this plan 
“amounted to an act of Palestinian self-empowerment” (UNDP 2015:19), according 
to Fayyad. However, Fayyad argues that despite the successful implementation of 
the plan, “its ultimate political objective was not achieved” (UNDP 2015:19). This 
conclusion is rather puzzling as the state-building project is a political one par 
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excellence, and therefore the technical successes hardly means anything if the 
political objectives failed dramatically. 
In the best case scenario, these technical successes contributed to the international 
recognition of Palestinian readiness for statehood. This achievement had no impact 
on the lives of the people who live under occupation and therefore these are merely 
symbolic successes that will never trickle down to impact their lives positively. 
Therefore, following the line of argumentation of Fayyad, the question remains as to 
why and how this state-building plan did fail? Fayyad attributed the failure of the 
political dimension of the state-building plan to four main reasons (UNDP 2015:20-
22). First, contrary to the claimed and reported Israeli enthusiasm about the state-
building plan, Israel did very little to provide an enabling environment. Second, the 
PA's donor community failed to deliver adequate and timely aid at the critical 
junctures of the plan implementation (an average shortfall of nearly 30% annually 
over the period 2010-2012). Third, the persistent intra-Palestinian divide harmed the 
potential of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state on the 1967 borders and 
complicated the task of the top-down component of the “peace process”. Fourth, the 
international enthusiasm about the state-building plan was not matched by the extent 
of its adoption at the national level as the plan was not endorsed by key players of 
the Palestinian political system, particularly in the choice and the timing of 
Palestinian diplomatic moves. I would argue that this last point was the straw that 
broke the camel's back, and led to the clashes and eventually the disagreements 
between Fayyad and Abbas/Fatah that led to the resignation of Fayyad in mid-2013. 
However, as a continuation to his philosophy (Fayyadism), Fayyad pointed out and 
talked in length about the work of his development enterprise (Future for Palestine-
FFP). “I am implementing the same philosophy at FFP as the one during my tenure 
as prime minister: it is all about empowering people and creating new realities on the 
ground”, Fayyad stated. The motto of his private enterprise is “enhancing the 
resilience of the Palestinian people is not just a slogan”. Fayyad is persistent and 
believes in his philosophy, despite all the critique he and his philosophy are prone to. 
He makes this public and argues: 
Throughout my eleven years in government, I have promoted the 
principle of strengthening and empowering Palestinian institutions 
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in a context that aims principally at enhancing our citizens’ ability 
to remain on their land and persevere in the face of the occupation, 
on the path to ending it. After leaving office, I thought carefully of 
how best to continue serving our people and cause. I decided to 
work in the context of the very message I carried throughout my 
years of service in government, taking advantage of my 
understanding of the needs of the people, as well as capacity to 
mobilize the support and assistance needed to meet their needs. It 
is my belief that I can succeed in this endeavour. Hence, Future for 
Palestine was born.
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Indeed, the reader of the first annual report of the FFP can easily get confused 
whether the opening statement for FFP has been written by the chairman of the 
foundation or the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. Fayyad wrote: 
We are determined to build a state that is worthy of our people’s 
sacrifices and our children’s promise, a state that advances values 
that are universally shared: tolerance, equality, justice and human 
dignity. We want a state that derives its strength from its 
transformative potential by unleashing new ideas and empowering 
its citizens to create positive realities on the ground. This means 
building and equipping schools; providing access to new 
technologies that improve agricultural productivity; investing in 
renewable energy to enhance sustainability; revitalizing historic 
sites as a means of reclaiming our national heritage; and 
empowering the marginalized segments of our society by investing 
in small and medium-sized enterprises that harness their 
productivity and lift them out of poverty. In essence, not only do 
these initiatives cultivate ingenuity; they inspire a sense of 
possibility that stands in direct opposition to the sense of 
hopelessness and despair precipitated by a seemingly endless 
occupation. By enabling us to see a state in the making, they 
undercut the pervasive sentiment of defeatism that so often afflicts 
us…It is this fundamental principle—enduring, in spite of the 
occupation, to end it—that is the bedrock of Future for Palestine” 
(FFP 2015:2). 
The persistence of Fayyad and his ideological commitment to his values and 
principles, remain a feature that observes highlight about Fayyad. In an interview in 
June 2015 in Ramallah, a senior political analyst told me,  
Fayyad is very smart, and very ideologically committed to his 
philosophy and agenda. He will be back to the Palestinian polity 
soon. He is combining tools and approaches that were used by the 
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Palestinian Left and Hamas in terms of how to win the hearts and 
minds of the people. His work in his new foundation represents 
almost the work of a mini shadow government. Hundreds of 
millions of dollars were spent in 2014 on projects that increase his 
popular legitimacy, and he is depending on the psychological 
element that people still perceive him as a public figure. Look at 
his Facebook page with its 1.1 million likers, and you can tell that 
Fayyad as a politician never left the scene and he will be back in 
the near future, and maybe in a more powerful and aggressive 
way.
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Ironically, Fayyad and his foundation were exposed to the PA’s harassment as the 
PA’s Preventive Security Forces raided the offices of Fayyad’s Foundation in 
Summer 2014, interrogated two employees and checked internal documents, 
financial records, and personal laptops (Ravid and Khoury 2014). This was triggered 
by the efforts and campaigns of Fayyad’s foundation to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the people in Gaza in the aftermath of the 2014 summers attacked on 
the Strip. The main funding of Fayyad’s foundation comes from the United Arab 
Emirates, where former Fatah leader and current rival of Abbas, Mohammad Dahlan 
lives, and this is what triggered the investigation into possible connections between 
Dahlan and Fayyad. In June 2015, the Palestinian Attorney General issued an order 
to confiscate the funds of Fayyad’s foundation.87 Fayyad decided to go to the 
Palestinian High Court of Justice to appeal this decision. The question that remains 
open: Is Fayyad the victim of the authoritarian trends he built, and as a consequence, 
could the governance reform that he induced put an end to his political career?   
The self-assessment of Fayyadism as a governance paradigm, or as a philosophy that 
led Fayyad in his new organisation (FFP), need to be contrasted with the findings of 
the most recent critical scholarly production in order to develop a fuller picture and a 
more comprehensive understanding. Hilal (2015) argues that Salam Fayyad 
advocated a myth that contended “that Palestinian statehood would be hastened with 
the building of efficient and transparent institutions under occupation”. Hilal argues 
that this myth “asked Palestinians to prove that they are capable of managing a state. 
Apart from its ‘orientalist’ and racist implications, it denies Palestinians the right to 
self-determination” (Hilal 2015:3). Pogodda (2012:547) argues that “security, 
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democratization, and state-building have not been pursued simultaneously during 
any phase in the PA’s history”. While Mustafa (2015) argues that security sector 
reform under Fayyadism “actually perpetuates authoritarianism by advancing the 
security agendas of international stakeholders at the expense of target populations” 
(Mustafa 2015:3). Mustafa concludes by stating that security sector reform under 
Fayyadism “has produced a conflicted version of the security-led model of 
governance in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, entrenching rather than 
challenging or tempering the paradigm of Israeli occupation. As such, SSR under the 
PA has served to reinforce bio-political initiatives on both the micro-level of Israeli 
colonialism” (Mustafa 2015:16). 
Furthermore, Pogodda and Richmond (2015:892) argues that in the case of Palestine 
“external intervention through direct, structural and governmental power has 
systematically prevented the formation of a state”. Pogodda and Richmond 
(2015:892) concludes that 
internationally financed statebuilding efforts meanwhile remain 
within the liberal peace and subsequent neoliberal state framework: 
limited and focused on security and institution building, rather than 
on an emancipatory social contract and social justice. Even the 
liberal character of this enterprise is debatable, given that neither 
democratisation nor trade liberalisation has been pursued, while 
security measures are solely geared towards Israeli needs. In 
addition, the internationally sponsored Israeli–Palestinian peace 
process has tried to establish a governmentality that aimed to make 
the current ‘matrix of control’ acceptable as a step towards 
Palestinian sovereignty.  
In brief, Fayyadism needs to be understood within the overall context that considers 
the occupied West Bank as a “laboratory of technologies of control” (Weizman 
2007). It is a laboratory not only where advanced military technologies are tested, 
but also where technologies of governance, social engineering, economic 
development, and embedded institutionalization are tested and advanced by the 
technocrats and international donors community (Dana 2014). This thesis advanced 
the argument that “good governance” has been very selectively interpreted in the 
occupied West Bank, reinforcing the abuses of the Palestinian Authority and 
particularly and fundamentally its security forces.   
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Future Avenues for Research 
This thesis opened-up a number of avenues for future research in the security and 
development spheres. Firstly, the notion of resistance economy, as opposed to the 
neo-liberal economic model, was proposed and contextualised in this thesis, and a 
number of its elements and pillars were discussed. This attempt represented a major 
step towards operationalising the concept of resistance economy and towards 
transforming its applicability away from the theoretical and romantic domains to the 
practical ones. However, a considerable amount of work is still needed for a topic 
that is still very much in infancy, and a further construction and de-construction of 
the concept/model and its pillars is required. This represents a major space for future 
scholarly engagement and contribution, particularly when a comparative element is 
brought to the analysis. Through the work of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy 
Network, we tried to take the debate further and organised a virtual roundtable with 
the participation of ten experts in the field in late 2014. The idea was to engage with 
a number of questions in order to define and assess the workability of the resistance 
economy and its ability to address the root causes of the de-development process and 
the present disastrous Palestinian mode of socio-economic development under 
occupation. The questions, as far as the notion of resistance economy is concerned, 
included: 
 How could the concept of "resistance economy" be defined? What are its key 
attributes? Does it provide a viable option?   
 Assuming that the resistance economy model should not be understood 
purely in economic terms, but rather it should aim to lay the foundation of an 
emancipatory social order and solid political base to emerge, the question is: 
How can this happen, and what would be the social, political and economic 
dimensions and objectives of a resistance economy? 
 Arguing that Palestinians have engaged in economic forms of resistance for 
generations (we can go back to the thirties during the Arab general strike, in 
addition to the model of the first Palestinian intifada), the pending question 
remains: What does historical as well as present day experience have to tell 
us about alternatives that could be components of a comprehensive approach 
to economic resistance? 
Conclusion 
234 
 
 Is it true that agriculture would provide the backbone of a resistance 
economy? 
 How could the model of resistance economy be inspired by other models 
around the world such as the solidarity economy in Brazil, the experiences on 
South Africa, and from Gandhi’s non-violent and non-cooperation strategy? 
This set of questions opens the space for future research and points out to the need to 
go beyond Palestine and adopt a comparative approach to examine other cases 
particularly those persisted under settler-colonial rule. After all, resistance economy 
is a counterhegemonic strategy that challenges Israel’s colonial subjugation and the 
PA’s neoliberal agenda for economic development. The strategy of Swadeshi (self-
sufficiency) in India and the resistant economic model adopted by Gandhi, in 
addition to the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil, are two 
examples that come up as inspiring model towards further operationalisation of the 
notion of resistance economy in Palestine. The common principles between these 
experiences as solidarity, cooperation, self-determination, collective authority, 
reciprocity, and democratic participation, make the need for a comparative future 
research more apparent. 
The future research could start from the definition of resistance economy that 
emerged in the aftermath of the roundtable where resistance economy is defined as 
an institutionalized form of economic struggle that envisages a 
transitional reorganization of the economy and social relations to 
be in harmony with the political requirements and objectives of the 
Palestinian national liberation process. In other words, resistance 
economy is a politically driven economic development strategy, 
underpinned by a set of social values and norms. Therefore, by its 
very nature, resistance economy is a multifunctional and 
multidimensional strategy that aims to lay the foundation for the 
emergence of an emancipatory social order and solid political base 
in order to assist Palestinians in their struggle to achieve liberation 
and self-determination (Dana et al. 2014). 
The need for further operationalisation of resistance economy opens up another 
avenue for future research: the need for a new and alternative development doctrine 
in Palestine that reverses the cycles of de-development and the failing patterns of 
international aid. This new economic-development thinking/model needs to adopt 
fresh ideas that go beyond the limitations of the Oslo economic framework, and to 
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engage with the broader picture of the political economy of the one and two state 
solutions. A future research, rooted in an interdisciplinary academic approach, is 
envisaged to offer concrete, action-oriented, evidence-based, and policy-driven 
recommendations that are contextualised in the broader dynamics of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict and based on indigenous conceptions and approaches that take the 
facts on the ground and the voices of the civil society as its starting point. 
Additionally, in light of the regular failures on the political fronts, how can the 
dominance of the economic solutions to solve the political problems effectively 
entrench and sustain the very conflict it aims to resolve? 
By extension, this opens up the space for another much-needed research on the 
political economy of the one-state reality/solution. The Oslo Peace Accords 
framework succeeded, to a considerable extent, in limiting the horizon of the 
produced research to manoeuvre within its two-state solution frame, and to tackle the 
issue of development from the very fragmented spaces Oslo had created. Therefore, 
with the rising popularity of the one-state solution, which is the de facto situation, 
the economy of the one-state solution needs to be discussed and analysed in order to 
bridge a crucial gap in the literature.
88
  
In addition to these three further research avenues in the economic-development 
sphere (new aid and development doctrine; resistance economy operationalisation; 
and the economics of the one-state reality), this thesis also created a number of 
spaces for scholarly debate in the security-governance realm. How can the current 
security paradigm of the Palestinian Authority be democratised, and is this possible 
in the currently existing frameworks? This is a major question that requires tackling. 
What are the implications of resistance criminalisation and authoritarianism in the 
long run, and how do they impact the prospect of a future just negotiated peace, is 
another question requiring scholarly analytical answers. This macro-level question 
needs to be accompanied by another complementary avenue for future research that 
aims to understand and analyse the complex dynamics between the “securitised 
spaces” created by the Palestinian Authority’s security reform agenda in the 
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 A major RAND Corporation’s report in 2015 aimed to measure the costs of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict within the two-state framework. It found that “a two-state solution provides by far the best 
economic outcomes for both Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis would gain over two times more than 
the Palestinians in absolute terms — $123 billion versus $50 billion over ten years” (RAND 2015). 
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occupied West Bank and the trajectories of the people’s everyday lives. In other 
words, how does the state-building project of the Palestinian Authority interact with 
the everyday state-formation by the people? These are questions that need to be 
addressed in order to take the scholarly level on Palestine a step further. 
In addition to this, the thesis highlights the centrality of the Palestinian fragmentation 
and its severe consequences on the Palestinian people. Sufficient political analysis on 
this fragmentation exists, however the consequences of the entrenched fragmentation 
on the Palestinian society, particularly after the 2007’s West Bank-Gaza Strip divide, 
and their interaction with the societal relations and structures, represents another 
avenue for future research. Furthermore, with the emergence of the post-2007 
fragmentation, two opposing governance models were created: Fayyadism in the 
West Bank, and Hamasism in Gaza Strip. Both models were studied separately, and 
this thesis claims to be the most comprehensive one that studied Fayyadism, 
however there is no research effort yet that aims to compare and contrast both 
models and draw lessons for the future and for a third paradigm. This represents 
another vital dimension for future research. 
Finally, this thesis, with its focus on the voices from below, highlights the 
continuous marginalisation of the Palestinian people and particularly the refugees, 
and the repression of their aspirations. It also highlights the complex dynamics that 
could potentially explain the sustainability of the status quo and the persistence of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict overall. Accordingly, these observations opened-up 
the space for two overarching questions to be covered in a future research: Where are 
the Palestinian people in their own political system? And why is the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict so persistent and protracted and how could the complex dynamics that 
sustain this conflict be deconstructed towards opening up new avenues for lasting 
peace?
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8. List of Semi-Structured Interviews 
Table 2: List of Interviews-Balata Refugee Camp, August-December 2012 
Interview 
No. 
 
Specification of Interviewee 
 
Interview’s 
Duration-hour 
1 Director of a civil society organisation 1.30 
2 Community leader and director of cultural centre 1.45 
3 Psychologist and counsellor 0.40 
4 
Former member of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs' Brigades and prisoners in the PA jails 
2.00 
5 
Mother of a martyr and prisoners in both the Israeli 
and PA jails  
1.30 
6 Local leader of Hamas and educator  1.40 
7 
Member of the camps popular committee and officer 
in the Preventive Security forces 
1.10 
8 Local female leader and member of Women Centre 0.50 
9 Local Fatah leader and PLC member 1.00 
10 Officer at the liaison office, Nablus’s Police 1.00 
11 Theatre's trainer and leftist political activist  1.30 
12 Unemployed youth 0.30 
13 Local Fatah leader and member of the PNC 1.30 
14 
Member of the camps popular committee and director 
at the Ministry of Interior 
1.10 
15 
Member of the camps popular committee and leftist 
political activist 
1.20 
16 Female member of the camps popular committee 0.35 
17 
Former member of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs' Brigades and prisoners in the PA jails 
2.45 
18 Area leader-National Security forces 0.30 
19 
Security personnel serving at Aljneed security 
compound 
1.00 
20 
Security personnel serving at Aljneed security 
compound 
1.00 
21 Males focus group- 4 Participants 1.30 
22 Females focus group- 21 Participants 2.00 
23 Local UNRWA’s official  1.30 
 
Average Duration of the Interviews 1.20 
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Table 3: List of Interviews-Jenin Refugee Camp, August-December 2012 
Interview 
No. 
 
Specification of Interviewee 
 
Interview’s 
Duration-hour 
1 Doctor and local community leader  1.30 
2 
Member of the camps popular committee, former security 
personnel, and prisoner in the PA jails 
1.45 
3 Guard and leftist political activist 1.35 
4 Local leader of Hamas and mechanics  1.15 
5 Field researcher for human rights organisation  0.45 
6 Local female political activist 1.00 
7 
Iconic figure of the 2002 Jenin camp battle and former 
leader of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and prisoner in the 
PA jails 
2.00 
8 PLC member and local Fatah leader 1.15 
9 Local Fatah leader and member of the PNC 1.30 
10 Local leader of Islamic Jihad and prisoner in the PA jails 2.00 
11 Local female leader and member of Women Centre 1.15 
12 Local UNRWA’s official 2.45 
13 Males focus group- 4 Participants 3.00 
14 Journalist   2.30 
15 Local female leader and member of Women Centre 1.15 
16 PLC member and local Fatah leader 2.00 
17 Unemployed youth and prisoner in the PA jails 0.20 
18 Unemployed youth and prisoner in the PA jails 0.20 
19 Humanitarian assistance provider 2.10 
20 Unemployed youth and former member of militant group 1.15 
21 Community leader and employee in private sector 1.10 
22 Males focus group- 4 Participants 1.30 
23 Carpenter and prisoner in the PA jails 2.00 
24 Official from the Freedom Theatre 1.15 
25 Females focus group- 4 Participants 1.00 
26 
Unemployed youth and prisoner in the PA and Israeli 
jails 
0.45 
27 A father of a martyr and political activist  0.30 
 
Average Duration of the Interviews 1.30 
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Table 4: List of Interviews-Aid Industry Experts, May-July 2013 
Interview 
No. 
 
Specification of Interviewee 
 
1 Conflict Adviser, European development agency 
2 Deputy Director, UN institution  
3 Researcher, UN institution 
4 Palestinian Private sector representative  
5 Country Director, major International Financial Institutions  
6 Aid specialist, Northern American development agency 
7 Official in aid coordinating body  
8 Founder of a Palestinian NGO and researcher 
9 Youth activist  
10 Youth activist  
11 Development specialist, Palestinian NGO 
12 Director of a Palestinian research centre  
13 Palestinian Researcher and intellectual   
14 Program director, international donor organisation  
15 Economist and Director of a research centre 
16 European Academic and researcher  
17 Israeli Academic and researcher 
18 Israeli Academic and economist  
19 Researcher, international think tank 
20 Palestinian economist and Youth activist 
21 Former aid official, and researcher 
22 Country Director, major International Financial Institutions 
23 Associate Professor of economics   
24 Academic and researcher 
25 Academic and researcher 
26 Academic and researcher 
27 Academic and researcher 
28 Founder of a Palestinian NGO 
29 Founder of a Palestinian NGO 
30 Programs manager, UN institution 
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9. Appendix  
Table 5: Transformations in the Security Sector: Arafatism vs. Fayyadism 
 
Arafatism  
(Pro-Hybridity Paradigm) 
Fayyadism  
(Anti-Hybridity Paradigm) 
Expansionary security sector and 
proliferation of security forces as a source 
for public employment; quantity not quality 
Re-govern and re-structure security sector; 
discharge the ‘old guards’, create new élite 
Loyalty tool and buying in supporters / 
spoilers 
Apolitical and professional forces 
Parallel (shadow)- militias Al-Aqsa Martyrs' 
Brigades security model 
Silence and criminalise resistance; 
collaboration with the Israeli security 
forces; and move toward EUPOL COPPS 
and USSC model 
Hybridity as a tool for maneuvering and card 
in negotiations; and tool for resistance and 
revolutionary legacy 
Anti-Hybridity as monopoly of violence and 
tool for modern nation state building, and 
disarmed future state of Palestine 
Corruption and cash in hand and bags 
Less or hidden corruption; more transparent 
and different sort of incentive mechanism 
One man show and personalized control 
More institutional control and systematic 
division of labor; and less intra-competition 
Higher levels of ownership, only donors 
money but not hands and minds 
All is donor-driven to train, buy and pay 
 
 Table 6: Transformation in the Economy Sector: Arafatism vs. Fayyadism 
Arafatism Paradigm Fayyadism Paradigm 
Politics first, economy later: Political 
solution will bring economic development 
The notion and practice of ‘economic peace’: 
Economic solutions for political problems 
An economy based on rents, rent seeking 
activities, centralisation and monopolies 
The economy shifts toward the 
implementation of good governance and 
neoliberal agenda 
Special and secret bank accounts as tools for 
the neo-patrimonial system 
The creation of the Single Treasury Account 
as the unified account for the PA 
Rejection of financial audit under the slogan 
that ‘these funds are for the revolution’ (Anti 
Public financial management) 
More transparent, audited, but not locally 
accountable records- New Public 
management approach 
Arafat is a politician, fighter and revolution 
leader who dealt with economic matters 
Fayyad is an economist by education and 
training; a technocrat government official  
Wide-spread corruption, misallocated funds 
and wasted money in private pockets 
Less or hidden corruption that became 
inherent in the institutional structures 
Favours informality since it brings less 
restrictions and more room to manoeuvre 
Favours formality since it is a building bloc 
for a future modern state 
Offer exemptions, tax less efficiently and 
compensate it with politicised aid 
More generation of internal resources and 
reform of tax laws and enforcement 
The PA’s economic planning was 
characterised by ignorance and confusion 
(1993-1997) and pressure and coercion 
(1998-2004) vis-à-vis the policy 
prescriptions and reform agenda of the 
World Bank and IMF 
The  PA’s economic planning was 
characterised by conviction and promotion 
phase (2005-Today) vis-à-vis the policy 
prescriptions and reform agenda of the 
World Bank and IMF 
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Figure 9: Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), 
Spring 1995 
 
Source: Lia (2006). 
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Figure 10: Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), 
Spring 1998  
 
Source: Lia (2006). 
 
Figure 11: PA Security Organisations and Command Structure, June 2008  
 
Source: Zanotti, CRS 2010. 
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Figure 12: Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 2011 
Source: Sayigh 2011. 
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Figure 13: West Bank, Area (C) Map  
 
Source: OCHA 2011. 
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Table 7: A Chronology for the Evolution of the Palestinian Security Forces 
1993-2013 
Period/Year Major Characteristics and Main Events 
Pre-Palestinian 
Authority 
(Before 1993) 
 The PLO’s Palestine Liberation Army was the major security 
organisation in the exile, in addition to the political factions’ 
armed groups and military wings. 
 The Israeli occupation forces were in charge of (in)security 
matters in the OPT. 
 Palestinian political factions were the security providers through 
their armed groups and other informal mechanisms as families, 
popular committees, cooperatives and grassroots and civil society 
organisations.  
1993 – 1999  
(The Oslo 
Accords Phase) 
 Identity crisis between the revolutionary legacy of the PLO and 
the constraints and arrangements of the Oslo Accords. This 
identity crisis affected the operations of the security forces and 
their systems of governance. Gradual deployment of the PA 
security forces started by Gaza-Jericho First arrangements and 
then expanded to cover areas (A).  
 Proliferation of security forces and the adoption of a ‘divide to 
rule’ approach by Arafat; and the spread of corruption and 
misuse of authority and resources. 
 Trial and error learning process in building the security forces 
and their institutional capacities; and personalised governance 
system by Arafat. 
 Joint Palestinian-Israeli patrols; and limited professional training 
and equipping for the PA forces.  
 Limited clashes with the oppositions and torture at the ‘Death 
Squad’. 
 The PA’s forces suffered from legitimacy crisis and trust gap 
which was publically witnesses in the intra-forces infighting.  
 The recruitment process was not transparent and almost Fatah-
exclusive. 
 Al-‘aedeen (the returnees) led the security bodies and they were 
considered as strangers in the eyes of the local population.           
2000 – 2002  
(The Second 
Intifada Phase) 
 Failure of Camp David Peace Summit and the eruption of the 
Second Intifada. 
 The establishment of a new Fatah military wing, Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades. 
 The PA security forces engaged actively and militarily in the 
Second Intifada.  
 Israel incursion of the West Bank ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, 
and complete destruction of the PA security infrastructure. 
 A security vacuum had emerged and the Palestinian armed 
groups dominated the security realm.  
2002 – 2004 
(The Roadmap 
 The PA was forced to initiate serious reforms and a 100-day 
reform plan was announced. 
 The Quartet was created with the security agenda on the top of the 
Appendix 
 
284 
 
Period/Year Major Characteristics and Main Events 
and  
Reform Phase) 
reforms list.  
 In 2003, the Prime Minister post was created as part of the reform 
package and Mahmoud Abbas became the first Palestinian Prime 
Minister and Salam Fayyad as a World Bank conditionality was 
appointed as Finance Minister.  
 In 2004, PA’s President Yasser Arafat passed away after being 
under the Israeli siege in his compound for two years. 
 The Road Map explicitly called on the PA to rebuild and 
consolidate the Palestinian forces, into three main bodies 
reporting to a newly empowered interior minister, providing law 
and order, dismantling ‘terrorist’ organisations, and ensuring 
high cooperating with Israel. The primary goal was to transform 
the Palestinian security forces into instruments to fight against 
‘terror’. 
2005  
(The London 
Meeting for 
Palestinian 
Security Sector 
Reform) 
 Mahmoud Abbas became the PA’s President and aimed to 
achieve his major electoral slogan ‘one law, one gun, one 
authority’. 
 In March, the London Meeting on Supporting the Palestinian 
Authority took place as the major event to set the guidance for 
the Palestinian security reform. The PA promised to ‘create the 
conditions conducive to the peace process with the immediate 
objective of restoring internal law and order and preventing 
violence’, through the creation of a legal framework for its 
security organisations and overhaul their command structure as to 
support the Palestinian National Security Council, appoint a 
National Chief of Police, consolidate and unify the 
security/intelligence services, and ensure strict financial 
accountability of services. 
 The international community designed the future of the PA 
security forces and promised through aid, advice, training 
capacities, and drafting strategies and policies. The European 
Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support 
and the United States Security Coordinator were established to 
support both the civil police and national security forces 
respectively.   
 The London Meeting operationalise the new Palestinian security 
doctrine and paved the way for a greater role for external 
intervention.  
2006 – Mid-2007  
(Hamas Phase) 
 After the victory of Hamas in the Parliamentary elections, reform 
agenda were put on hold and donors started to look for 
alternative routes to bypass Hamas. 
 The existing Fatah security forces leadership prioritised their 
political affiliation over professionalism and refused to deal with 
Hamas and its government.  
 Hamas offered a long term Hudna (ceasefire) with Israel. 
 Hamas government was not able to pay salaries for the public 
employees including the security forces. 
 The refusal of Fatah to accept the electoral defeat and the 
insistence of Hamas to govern, led to clashes in both the West 
Bank and Gaza. 
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Period/Year Major Characteristics and Main Events 
 To bypass Hamas rule, the PA leadership (Abbas) and the donors 
returned back to replicate Arafat model for security governance 
to bypass Hamas. Abbas separated the National Security Forces 
from the Ministry of Interior, changed the heads of the security 
bodies, created new bodies and expanded others, and put many 
under his direct control. 
 Hamas created the Back-Up Force which became later the 
Executive Forces. 
 Tensions in summer 2007 led to the Palestinian divide and 
Hamas took over Gaza, and Fatah took over the West Bank. The 
intra-Palestinian divide implied consequences on the security 
structures and priorities in both places.  
Mid-2007 until 
Mid-2013  
(The Fayyadism 
Phase) 
 Hamas initiated its independent security model and the West 
Bank-PA conducted the strictest security reform since its 
establishment. 
 Abbas declared the state of emergency in 2007 and Salam 
Fayyad was appointed as the Prime and Finance Minister to 
create the institutional underpinning for a Palestinian state. 
 Fayyadism aimed to create apolitical, professional and well-
trained and equipped security forces, respected by the Palestinian 
people. Fayyadism restructured the security sector and enforced a 
clear segregation of duties and change or discharge the ‘old 
guards’ and brought new security élite. 
 Fayyad, with the support of the international community, rebuilt 
the destroyed security sector physical infrastructure.  
 The USSC and EUPOL COPPS and the Palestinian Security 
Academy became the major illustration of the new PA security 
doctrine.  
 Disarmament and security campaigns were launched to enforce 
law and order, collect ‘illegal’ arms and punish opposition. 
 The human rights violation record kept in increase due to the 
PA’Ss authoritarian transformations.  
 A proliferation in the number of the local and foreign NGOs 
working in the security realm, and a third of the international aid 
provided to the Palestinians continued to be allocated to the 
security domain.  
 In technical term, the PA’s security forces became professional, 
well-trained, engaged in a daily coordination with the Israeli 
counterpart despite the existence of the asymmetry of power, and 
their achievements and capacity records reached to the highest 
levels since the establishment of the PA.  
 The donors community and the government of Israel believed 
that the PA major success story and achievement under 
Fayyadism was the immense progress in the security realm.   
 Security collaboration with Israel to criminalise resistance 
against the occupation was the most detrimental feature of this 
phase.  
Source: Prepared by the Author. 
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Figure 14: The PLO vs. The PA  
 
Source: PASSIA (2014). 
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Figure 15: Aid Management Structure in Palestine 
 
 
Source: Local Development Forum, http://www.lacs.ps/showLevelDiagram.aspx  
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Table 8: Key Economic Indicators for the West Bank and Gaza  
 
Source: UNCTAD 2014. 
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Figure 16: The EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the Author. This brief profiling has consulted few studies as 
Kerkkänen et al. 2008; Bulut 2009; Bouris 2010; Persson 2011; Youngs and Michou 2011; 
Bouris and Reigeluth 2012; and Kristoff 2012.   
EUPOL COPPS was established in January 2006, building on the work of the EU Coordination 
Office for Palestinian Police Support which was established in 2005. EUPOL COPPS is a 
European Common Security and Defence Policy mission that is based and operational in the 
West Bank to support the Palestinian state-building project based on the two-state solution. It 
aims to “contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements and 
to advise Palestinian counterparts on criminal justice and rule of law related aspects under 
Palestinian ownership, in accordance with the best international standards and in co-operation 
with the EU institution-building programmes conducted by the European Commission and with 
other international efforts in the wider context of the security sector, including criminal justice 
reform”. Therefore, its main tasks are threefold; to assist the Palestinian Civil Police mentoring 
and advising it, to co-ordinate and facilitate EU member financial assistance to the Palestinian 
Civil Police and to give advice on politically related Criminal Justice elements. According to the 
EU, the EUPOL COPPS can be seen as “an expression of the EU’s continued readiness to 
support the Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with 
regard to security and institution building…. Furthermore, the support of the EU to the 
Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the safety and security of the Palestinian population 
and at serving the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law” 
(EUPOL COPPS 2012, European Council 2005). Currently, the mission has 71 International 
staff and 41 local staff. 21 EU member states, in addition to Canada, Norway, and Turkey are 
the contributing states to this mission. The mission’s budget for 2014/15 totalled EUR 8.97 
million. 
EUPOL COPPS works exclusively with the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), which comprises 
approximately 8,000 officers in the West Bank (EUPOL COPPS 2014). EUPOL COPPS 
provided technical support to the Palestine College of Police Sciences in Jericho (inaugurated in 
July 2012), maintained its focus on and assistance to the PCP Family Protection Unit, supported 
the creation of the Programme Steering Committee to enable the Civil Police and the Ministry of 
Interior to improve the coordination matters; remains the main provider of support to the Anti-
Corruption Commission and the specialised Crimes Corruption Court created in 2010; and 
provided technical advice in relation to a full range of Criminal Investigation Department-related 
issues and improved the Civil Police infrastructure and capacity building on IT, data, radio 
communication, administration, logistics, finance and training (EUPOL COPPS 2015). 
On the other hand, the major criticism for the operations of the EUPOL COPPS is that it has a 
very limited scope and mandate; it pursues a technical mandate that is not necessarily responsive 
to the political reality in the West Bank; its contribution to the sustainability of the Israeli 
occupation and to the process of establishing a Palestinian police state; its failure to challenge 
the Israeli security establishment when equipment and other resources are not allowed or 
confiscated; its control over a major part of the Palestinian security doctrine and the imposition 
of its own frameworks and structures, which undermine the principles of local ownership; its 
focus on micro issues while neglecting macro and strategic issues despite its contribution to the 
long term planning and reforming process; and finally that it has not paid much attention to 
improving democratic civilian oversight and accountability. 
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Figure 17: United States Security Coordinator (USSC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the Author. This profile had consulted few studies such as Byrne 
2009; Dayton 2009; Zanotti 2009, 2010; and Thrall 2010, in addition to U.S. State 
Department’s website, United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (USSC), [Online], Available: http://www.state.gov/s/ussc/index.htm 
The USSC was established in 2005 to “meet U.S. commitments under the Middle East Roadmap 
for Peace”. It is publically better known as the Dayton mission, which is a reference to Keith 
Dayton, who headed the mission from 2005 until 2010. The USSC is to “assist the PA to 
transform and professionalize its security sector; engage with the Israelis and Palestinians on 
security initiatives that build trust and confidence in order to meet Roadmap obligations and to 
support U.S. and international whole-of-government efforts that set the conditions for a 
negotiated two-state solution”. The goal is to allow the PA to “possesses professional and self-
sustaining security institutions, accountable to and under legitimate civilian authority, that 
effectively combat terrorism and criminal threats to law and order, perpetuate an environment of 
security and stability for the Palestinian people, are able to provide for the national security of a 
future Palestinian State, and serve as a stable and peaceful neighbour to the State of Israel” (US 
State Department website). In the words of Dayton, “the idea in forming the USSC was to create 
an entity to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would 
eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears 
about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian security forces. The USSC was to help the 
PA to right-size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve 
their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the 
Palestinian people whom they serve” (Dayton 2009).  
The four areas that the USSC work in are, (i) training and equipping the National Security 
Forces, with nearly 4500 troops having been trained at the Jordan International Police Training 
Center; (ii) capacity building for the MoI; (iii) investing in security infrastructure through 
building a state-of-the-art training college for the Presidential Guard and an operational base that 
will house one thousand of the NSF gendarmes; and (iv) provide a senior leadership training for 
around forty senior security personnel with the aim to “learn how to think about current-day 
problems and how to operate jointly and with respect for international standards” in the words of 
Dayton.  
The USSC was criticized for making a “brainwash” to the recruited young Palestinians. These 
chosen men whom were vetted for terrorist links, human rights violations and/or criminal 
records by the State Department, Israel, Jordan, and the PA; are called by the critics as, Dayton 
Forces. Or what Dayton called the “new Palestinian men” who “have shown motivation, 
discipline and professionalism, and they have made such a difference that senior {Israeli 
Defence Forces} IDF commanders ask me frequently: How many more of these new 
Palestinians can you generate, and how quickly?” (Dayton 2009). The Palestine Papers1 and 
many human rights organisation reports revealed that the US-trained and supervised forces were 
engaged in torture and aimed to attack Hamas and its presence and authority. It was documented 
that since 2007 until early 2011, over 10,000 supports of Hamas were arrested by the US-trained 
PA security forces (Perry 2012). 
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Figure 18: Al-Istiqlal University (Palestinian Academy for Security Science) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the Author. In addition to Sayigh (2011) and HRW (2008), this brief 
referred to the University’s website and to The Palestinian Centre for Security Sector 
Studies’ website, Mission Statement, [Online], Available: 
http://pcsss.pass.ps/index.php?action=show_page&pageID=107&page=&lang=en 
  
 
 
The idea of establishing a security academy started in 1998; however it materialized in 2006 and 
was opened in September 2007. It is considered to be the baby or pet project of the former head 
of the General Intelligence and a major security figure and leader in Fatah, Twafiq Al-Tirawi, 
and was supported by different actors financially, politically and logistically. Nearly $2 million 
in funding came from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in 
addition to EU Member States, Turkey, and Malaysia. The United States provided “indirect 
support” through earmarking funds for three other training centres in Jericho. It is located in the 
city of Jericho in the West Bank as the only national high education institution specialised in 
security and policing studies. By 2011, the academy was upgraded into a university and started 
to offer both vocational diploma (8 diplomas each for 2-semesters) and bachelor degrees. 
Currently it offers seven 4-yerars bachelor degrees (Psychology; Security Sciences; English and 
Hebrew Languages; Public Administration and Military Sciences; Management Information 
Systems; Law and Policing Sciences; Crimes and Law). The staff of the university grew from 70 
in 2007 to reach 320 in 2014. In 2011, the university had more than 300 students with around 32 
per cent females, with the aim to reach 1200 student in 2015. The university had four research 
and scientific centres: Al-Istiqlal Centre for Strategic Studies (formerly, The Palestinian Centre 
for Security Sector Studies); the Legal Clinic; Measurement and Evaluation Center; Center of 
Continuing Education and Social Service; and a Polygraph Centre. 
Al-Istiqlal Centre for Strategic Studies envisions its role in creating a large and expanding 
reservoir of factual, multi-sided knowledge about the Palestinian security sector and its 
involvement in the Palestinian society. Its mission statement mentions that “security in post 
conflict environment is crucial for peace making and peace implementation” (Centre’s website). 
The focus on a post conflict environment in the key here, and a major critique for the operation 
of the whole University. Sayigh (2011) argued that the academy is the “closest thing to having a 
genuine indigenous capability for human resource development in the PA Security Forces, with 
an all-Palestinian teaching and administrative staff”.  
However, on a more critical note, according to a HRW report (2008:87), “the academy is an 
integral part of Abbas’s security plan to combat Hamas and other Islamic militants, with training 
in a broad range of fields, including military tactics, information technology, crisis management, 
political parties and movements, security investigations, anti-terrorism, human rights and 
Hebrew language”. Therefore, it is seen as an extension for Abbas/Fayyad security plans, which 
aim to create a police state.  
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Figure 19: Photos Illustrating Security Reform, Authoritarianism and Refugee 
Camps 
1. Palestinians from Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, look at a list of Fatah’s gunmen 
who were given amnesty, and deliver weapons in exchange for financial 
compensation and integration in the PA security forces 
 
 
Sources: http://bit.ly/1Ju80lF; http://bit.ly/1Ju83hm  
 
2. Prime Minister Fayyad (left photo) and US Colonel Dayton (right photo) 
supervising the process of security reform. 
 
Sources: http://bit.ly/1Ju8ad1; http://bit.ly/1Ju89pt  
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3. Detention based on Political views, and repression via violence in the camps 
 
Sources: http://bit.ly/1Ju8fgO; http://bit.ly/1T0gQJE  
 
4. The Palestinian security forces operations during the security campaigns in 
Jenin and Balata 
 
Sources: http://bit.ly/1T0gYsu; http://bit.ly/1T0h3MP  
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5. The “new Palestinian” commandos for and during the PA’s security 
campaigns and military training  
  
Source: http://bit.ly/1Ju8Bnr; http://bit.ly/1Ju8A2M; http://bit.ly/1Ju8DeZ; 
http://bit.ly/1T0hxCD  
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6. EUPOLCOPPS: Training and supervision 
 
 
https://www.facebook.com/EUPOL
COPPS/photos/a.257387767697467.402
57.254830577953186/25761680434123
0/?type=1&theater  
  
 
In Ramallah 30 June and 1 July 2012 
Sources:  http://on.fb.me/1Ju7Pqw; http://on.fb.me/1Ju7Nip  
 
7. In Ramallah 30 June and 1 July 2012- Violently repressing a peaceful protest  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: http://bit.ly/1T0fI8N; http://bit.ly/1T0fKO1; http://bit.ly/1Ju7Evj; 
http://bit.ly/1Ju7Drn 
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8. Jenin camp in April 2002 in the aftermath of Jenin Battle/Massacre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: http://bit.ly/1Ju7g04; http://bit.ly/1Ju7ggw; http://bit.ly/1Ju7fJk; 
http://bit.ly/1Ju7eW0 
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9. Researcher’s observations during field work 2012 
10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s photos.
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Table 9: PA’s Statutory Security Forces: Financing, Functions and Capacity 
PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity* 
 
Main Functions Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship Estimated Size, and Others 
PA’s Internal Security Forces 
Civil Police 
The main law enforcement body. 
Responsible for daily policing duties as to 
maintain law and order, prevent and investigate 
crime, capture suspects, protect lives and 
property, and maintain prisons. 
Has sub-branches as the Criminal 
Investigations Department; Anti-Drug 
Department; Public Orders Forces; Border 
Police; Traffic Police; Emergency Response 
Department and Women’s Police. 
The European Union Police Coordinating 
Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL 
COPPS) was established in  January 2006, as a 
European Common Security and Defence 
Policy mission to support, train and fund the 
Palestinian police. 
European Union Border Assistance Mission in 
Rafah.  
EU individual countries support the Palestinian 
police. 
Employs some 18,500 policemen 
(around 10,500 in Gaza; 8000 in 
West Bank). 
Wear dark blue uniforms, except for 
the Public Orders Forces which 
wear blue-black-white camouflage 
fatigues. 
Preventive Security 
Powerful and controversial internal intelligence 
body. 
Responsible for conducting “counterterrorism” 
efforts, monitoring opposition groups. 
particularly through the Security and Protection 
Department (Death Squad). 
Conducting reconnaissance and intelligence 
operations. 
Since 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) is supporting and building its capacities 
through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and 
techniques. 
Employs some 8,500 agent (around 
4,500 in Gaza; 4000 in West Bank). 
A major reasons for the intra-
Palestinian divide, and since its 
establishment the most non-
transparent security body. 
The best equipped body with light 
green dress. 
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PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity* 
 
Main Functions Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship Estimated Size, and Others 
Civil Defence 
Responsible for common protection services, 
such as emergency rescue and fire department 
services. 
PA's budget 
Employs some 1,000 personnel. 
Other auxiliary services include 
bodies as the Military Medical 
Service; Military Judicial Staff; and 
Political and Moral Guidance 
Commission (estimated 1000 
personnel). 
PA’s National Security Forces 
National Security Forces 
The successor body of the PLO’s military in the 
exile, the Palestine Liberation Army. 
PA’S proto-army, a lightly armed and equipped 
gendarmerie-style force charged with 
supporting civil police; delivering law and 
order; and combating terrorism, short of acting 
as a true military force. 
Since 2005, United States Security Coordinator 
(USSC) is supporting and building its capacities 
through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and 
techniques. 
Three brigades in Gaza and 9 in 
West Bank. 
Employs some 11,000 personnel 
plus around hundred personnel in 
the Military Liaison which is 
responsible for coordinating 
security with the Israeli forces. 
Wear plain green or green US-style 
camouflage dress. 
Presidential Guard 
A separate force since 2006 after a US legal 
restriction that prevented cooperating with the 
Presidential Security.  
Its responsibilities include personal protection 
for the PA’s president and counter-insurgency 
and rapid intervention tasks. 
Since 2005, United States Security Coordinator 
is supporting and building its capacities through 
funds, training, vehicles, weapons and 
techniques. 
Received training from Jordan and Egypt. 
Estimates of its size around 8000 
personnel. 
Wear green and the rapid 
deployment unit black dress. 
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PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity* 
 
Main Functions Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship Estimated Size, and Others 
General Intelligence 
Official PA’s intelligence service and it is 
independent under the direct command of the 
PA’s President. 
It is responsible for collecting intelligence 
domestically and internationally, conducting 
counterespionage, and cooperates with other 
governments’ intelligence agencies. 
Since 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) is supporting and building its capacities 
through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and 
techniques. 
Employs some 7000 agents divided 
almost equally between Gaza and 
West Bank. 
The major body that was in charge 
of the building up of the Palestinian 
Academy for Security Sciences in 
Jericho, West Bank. 
Presidential Security/Force 17 
An elite military unit responsible for the 
protection of the key figures of the PA’s 
leadership and vital infrastructure, in addition to 
the quick reaction forces. 
Presidential budget 
Employs some 5400 men (2500 
troops in three battalions in Gaza; 
and 2000 in the West Bank). 
 Wear green US-style camouflage 
dress with Bordeaux-red berets. 
Military Intelligence 
Collects intelligence on the external military 
environment and responsible for arresting and 
interrogating opposition activists considered a 
threat to the PA. 
Under Arafat leadership they acted as an 
internal security body for monitoring 
opposition from within Fatah. 
PA's budget 
Employs some 6000 agents  
plain-clothes agents. 
Naval Police 
‘Proto-navy’ is responsible to protect the PA’s 
territorial waters particularly in Gaza.  
Participated in interrogating opposition activists 
and collaborators with Israel and protection of 
the PA’s president. 
PA's budget 
Employs some 1000 men (700 in 
Gaza; 300 in Nablus). 
 Wear white or the brown-beige US 
camouflage uniforms. 
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PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity* 
 
Main Functions Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship Estimated Size, and Others 
Military Police 
A separate force since 2005 and responsible for 
enforcing orders and discipline among the 
various security bodies of the PA and provides 
backup support to riot control and infrastructure 
protection. 
PA's budget 
Employs some 2000 personnel (one 
reinforced battalion in Gaza (1400 
personnel); and one regular 
battalion in Ramallah (600 
personnel). 
Wear plain green or green US-style 
camouflage with red berets. 
Executive Force 
Established in 2007 exclusively in Gaza by 
Hamas's government. 
It aimed to replaces the PA forces in Gaza and 
provide their duties in marinating law and order 
and protect Hamas leadership and rule. 
Hamas's budget 
Estimated 12,000 members of the 
armed wings of Hamas and the 
popular Resistance Committees in 
Gaza. 
One of the major sources of tension 
between the West Bank and Gaza 
leaderships. 
Wear either black-blue-white 
camouflage or black dress. 
* Note: Otherwise stated, all the PA security forces were established in 1993/4. The estimated number of the personnel employed in the security forces is around 70,000-82,000 
consuming around 30 per cent of the PA budget and making up around half of the monthly public payroll (Lia 2006; Najib and Friedrich 2007; Friedrich and Luethold 2007; 
Hussein 2007; Taghdisi-Rad 2010; Sadeq 2011; Sayigh 2011; Bouris 2014). 
Source: Prepared by the Author. 
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Table 10: Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups: Financing, Functions and Capacity 
Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups*: Financing, Functions and Capacity+ 
 
Main Functions Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship Estimated Size, and Others 
Political factions and armed resistance groups 
Martyr Izz al-Din al-
Qassam Brigades 
The military wing of Hamas, established in 1991. 
It operates under Hamas’s ideological guidance.  
It aims to evoke the spirit of Jihad amongst 
Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims; defend Palestinians 
and their land against the Zionist occupation and its 
aggression; and liberate Palestinians and the land 
usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers. 
Receive funding from Hamas inside and outside 
Palestine. Iran is a main sponsor for the 
Brigades with estimates of $3 million annually. 
Charities and non-governmental organisation in 
Saudi Arabic and Gulf sponsor Hamas as well. 
Zakat Committees and Hamas-run business and 
tunnels are another source of funding. 
Estimates for the number of 
personnel between 10,000 to 17,000 
with vast majority in Gaza. 
Equipped with assault rifles, 
imported and self-made RPG 
launchers, home-made Qassam 
rockets and was responsible for the 
majority of suicide bombing in the 
Second Intifada. 
Saraya Al-Quds Brigades 
The armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
established in 1992.  
Armed struggle is the raison d’etre of the Islamic 
Jihad and its major objective is ‘the liberation of all 
Palestine, the end of the Zionist presence, and the 
establishment of Islamic rule over the land of 
Palestine which guarantees justice, freedom and 
equality’. 
Iran is the main financial sponsor, whereas 
Hizbullah provides training, armament and 
logistical support with a rough estimates of 
around $2 million annually. 
Most estimates put its strength at 
around 2000 operatives. They are 
particularly active and focus in 
Gaza and northern West Bank 
(Jenin) and almost as equipped as 
Hamas force but with additional 
Grade missiles. 
It rejects the ‘reformist approach’ of 
Hamas and it is the only party that 
entirely rejected the Oslo Peace 
Accords. 
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Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups*: Financing, Functions and Capacity+ 
 
Main Functions Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship Estimated Size, and Others 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades 
The military arm of the Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement, Fatah, formed in 2000 under 
direct supervision of Yasir Arafat. 
 Its ideology is based on nationalism and secular 
principles despite the religious rhetoric and symbols.  
It aimed to resist the occupation and was formed of 
horizontal military sub-groups. 
The major funding was from Arafat special 
accounts directly or through loyalist 
intermediaries. After his death and after Fatah 
refusal to provide systematic and continued 
funding, they received conditional funding from 
Iran, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad despite it 
remained very limited and for short period. 
Estimations between 1000-5000 due 
to the absence of clear criteria and 
centralised leadership. Corruption 
and engagement in criminal, chaos 
and gangster activities. 
Officially banned by a presidential 
decree from PA’s president 
Mahmoud Abbas and was largely 
put on the payroll of the PA security 
services. 
The Nasser Salah al-Din 
Brigades 
The military arm of the Popular Resistance 
Committees in Gaza Strip. 
Major funding is acquired through illegal 
activities and external patronage, smuggling and 
tunnel business. Additional funding through 
Hizbullah, Iran and other Palestinian factions. 
Estimated 500 operatives divided 
into three branches in Gaza. 
Its personnel constituted of different 
factions. 
Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa 
Battalions 
and National Resistance 
Brigades 
The military arms of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 
respectively. 
Major funding from the political parties and 
from the PLO subsidies. Historically they were 
supported by the Soviet union camp and other 
Marxist and leftist alliances. 
They don’t exceed 500 personnel, 
conduct unique military operations 
and they are one of the oldest who 
has their golden age in the seventies 
and eighties. 
Note (*): Other non-statutory security actors include: families; camps’ popular committees; private security companies; salafist groups; collaborators with Israel; tunnel lords; 
and criminal groups 
Note (+): It is more difficult to track the figures of funding or personnel for these groups due to the nature of their operation (Najib and Friedrich 2007; Friedrich and Luethold 
2007; Lia 2007). 
Source: Prepared by the Author. 
